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Abstract
Terrell G. Russell: Contextual Authority Tagging:
Expertise Location via Social Labeling.
(Under the direction of Deborah Barreau and Gary Marchionini.)
This study investigates the possibility of a group of people making explicit their
tacit knowledge about one another’s areas of expertise. Through a design consisting
of a modified Delphi Study, group members are asked to label both their own and
each others’ areas of expertise over the course of five rounds. Statistical analysis and
qualitative evaluation of 10 participating organizations suggest they were successful
and that, with simple keywords, group members can convey the salient areas of
expertise of their colleagues to a degree that is deemed“similar”and of“high quality”
by both third parties and those being evaluated. More work needs to be done to
make this information directly actionable, but the foundational aspects have been
identified.
In a world with a democratization of voices from all around and increasing
demands on our time and attention, this study suggests that simple, aggregated
third-party expertise evaluations can augment our ongoing struggle for quality in-
formation source selection. These evaluations can serve as loose credentials when
more expensive or heavyweight reputation cues may not be viable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Today, the Internet has democratized speech at every level. It has made free
and open speech more available to everyone but it has not provided us with
the requisite filters to disambiguate the signal from all the new noise. For
democratic purposes, it is important that everyone have a voice (and an equal
vote), but for most other purposes, it is not necessary. For most purposes, it
is most helpful to hear the opinions of those who know what they are talking
about and who have the most to offer the conversation. Reliably knowing
who the experts are would be the first step of a larger goal to filter the signal
from the noise in our Internet-empowered world where everyone can have a
bullhorn.
The fundamental issue of expertise location has been faced at a smaller-
than-web scale within individual organizations. Knowing what an organization
knows about, and who carries that knowledge, is a valuable asset and has
been a primary focus of knowledge management for many years. In large part,
knowing who knows what has come from two places – the individuals who
have self-reported their own expertise and from algorithmic derivation from
the produced documents and paper trail of doing business.
I think that a valuable third source is being overlooked. I think that people,
other than the individual, have interesting insight and knowledge about what
the individual knows. I think that their collective human opinion can serve as
a reliable indicator of knowledge as well and should be included.
This dissertation research evaluates the ability of a group to know and
express what an individual knows.
1.2 Overview
Humans can only sense and process so much. Because of this physical lim-
itation, we have sought shortcuts in order to help us sense “more” (Downs,
1957) and to make up for our limited ability to have encyclopedic knowledge
of the situations around us (Lupia, 1994). The use of many of these shortcuts
is dependent on other people – those who are around us now, but also those
who have come before, and those who are far away. Our dependence on others
is inefficient in that we do not always know whom to ask or approach for help.
Sometimes we waste valuable time and energy looking for the right source
of information. We may be able to reduce this waste with some thoughtful
sharing and collective reflection. We could benefit greatly by discovering the
latent, undocumented knowledge of those around us and bringing it to the
surface. We should be able to tap the implicit by making it more explicit
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(Nonaka, 1991).
This research is an investigation into how a group of people can come to
know what it is that its members know. Through simple keyword tagging and
cognitive reflection on those tags over time, an individual and a group of his or
her peers may approach a common ground or “shared understanding” around
the topic of his or her areas of expertise. Better senses of self-awareness, other-
awareness, and downstream decision-making may come about because of this
information being collected and shared. This research is primarily focused on
tagging data around humans whose granted cognitive authority (Wilson, 1983)
to one another changes over time.
1.3 Problem Statement
Knowledge of our surroundings, from an empiricist perspective, comes from
our five senses. The things we see and hear, the things we smell and touch and
taste, they are all just constrained representations of our environment. We
strive to make as much sense of the world as possible, but we are limited by
our physical location, our position in time, access to information resources, and
by the processing power of our brains (Dervin, 1983). Cognitive load theory
(Sweller, Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998) tells us that we can only handle so much
data coming in at a time.
Because of this constraint, we seek shortcuts, or second-hand information,
in order to “see” more, to see beyond what is readily apparent. We seek
shortcuts in order to “know” more than what our senses can sense. I think
3
these pieces of second-hand information can be of two distinct types, either
basic pieces of simple information, or information that resembles an executive
summary. Second-hand information can come from others in the form of basic
facts such as “it’s raining outside” or “it’s raining at the beach” – both of
which are simple facts but relayed to us by another, rather than collected or
sensed on our own. Second-hand information can also come in the form of more
summarized or processed information like “our economy is in a recession.” This
second type of new information could have been determined by one person or
synthesized by many, but it also comes from sources outside of ourselves and
is then relayed to us. Most of our information about the world is actually
acquired this way – as second hand knowledge (Wilson, 1983). We experience
firsthand very little of what we come to “know.”
We depend on processing and sense-making done by others, in a different
place, in a different time, to help us make sense of our world (sometimes to a
polarizing degree (Gilovich, 1987)). This outsourcing of sense-making is fueled
by necessity. We do not have the time or energy to collect, process, synthesize,
and employ all our own data in a modern world. There is a division of labor
and with it a division of knowledge and expertise (who was the last person
to know “everything”?). To function in a (modern?) society, we depend on
others, both past and present, for help when fulfilling our information needs.
With this dependence on others, both in person and via the documents
and records others create, we must also be wary. We must keep a vigilant
eye towards the legitimacy of the information being passed along. We must
evaluate, critically, the source and the provenance of second-hand information.
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Savolainen writes that when evaluating others and what we think they know,
“overall, cognitive authority was characterized as having six facets; trustworthi-
ness, reliability, scholarliness, credibility, ‘officialness’ and authoritativeness; of
these, trustworthiness was perceived as the primary facet” (Savolainen, 2007,
3).
Even with the successful vetting and application of second-hand informa-
tion, or shortcuts, from others, we never have perfect information. We may
collect more information and we may collect better information, but it is never
all the information we need to make perfect decisions. We satisfice; we satisfy
with what is sufficient (Simon, 1957). We use what information we have to
make decisions that we deem to be good enough at the time. We often seek out
more information before making a decision but we have, what Simon called,
“bounded rationality.” We have imperfect information, limited attention and
money, limited processing power and limited time, but we still need to make
decisions.
Choo’s Decision Behavior Model shows us that contextualized decision
making happens within organizations based on cognitive limits, information
quality and availability, and the values of the organization (Choo, 1996, 332).
These inputs are handled with bounded rationality and within the confines of
performance concerns, and whether the decision is good enough, among other
simplifications. This decision making behavior is both rationally expected and
observed.
Even knowing we will never have perfect information when working in
these limited environments, we can arguably make better decisions if we can
5
improve or increase the amount of information on hand when making decisions.
Having more good information reduces uncertainty about the environment
surrounding a decision, but it does not necessarily reduce equivocality. To
reduce equivocality, or ambiguity, of the information we have on hand, we need
sensemaking and a perspective that comes from “retrospective interpretations”
of earlier data and decisions (Choo, 1996, 334). We need to have seen this
before and know what it means. What we need to make good decisions, in
addition to good information, is called expertise.
There is a vast amount of latent, untapped information in the environment
around us. Some of it is in the built world, some of it is in the natural world
(too big, too small, hidden in non-visible wavelengths, etc.), and some of it
is in the heads of those around us. Cross and Sproull (2004) noted that 85%
of managers immediately mentioned specific people when asked “to describe
sources of information important to successful completion of their project”.
They went on to write:
As one manager said, “I mean the whole game is just being the
person that can get the client what they need with [the Firm’s]
resources behind you. This almost always seems to mean know-
ing who knows what and figuring out a way to bring them to your
client’s issue”(R6). Very few of the named people were simply orga-
nizationally designated “experts”; most were described as partners
in information relationships.
If we are informed by the right people before making decisions, and they
help us decide what we are looking for (Belkin, Oddy, & Brooks, 1982), then
we may improve our knowledge and understanding of a situation or problem
at the time when we need to decide. Knowing from whom we should get
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our information, when we are not sure of what we need, is a hard
problem.
Expertise location, for this reason, has been a focus of the knowledge man-
agement field for many years. Knowledge management has also focused on the
process of organizational learning and dissemination of that learning within
the organization. In many cases, this has been done through the tracking of
created documents and other knowledge artifacts (Martin, 2008).
An additional approach should consist of uncovering that which has not
yet been recorded – that information which is in the heads of a group’s mem-
bership. We should be equipped to hold up a mirror to help reflect an orga-
nization’s insights and expertise back on itself. We need to help uncover the
dark corners where we are not sure about the expertise in the room. With a
regimen of self-reflection, iterated over time, I hope this problem can be made
less hard. I think we can discover whom to ask for the relatively low cost
of a little sustained individual effort and some focused record-keeping in the
distributed network.
1.4 Significance
When we are seeking answers to questions or trying to increase our knowledge
in a certain domain, we seek sources of information that are credentialed and
tested. We ask those who have come before us and who have learned from
their own experiences – either through doing or through their own process of
seeking and discovery. The sources we come to trust should have a history of
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providing good information in that domain in the past. We also come to expect
them to continue to provide good information into the future. They should be
known by others as keepers of good information and sound provenance. Our
highly concentrated word for this set of qualities is reputation.
Those who have a good reputation perhaps spent many years developing
their stature or physical skills in a field or domain. From the world of archival
studies1,2, we know that physical and electronic sources of information should
have a clear chain of custody and line of provenance as the document of record.
If people are to be trusted as sources, as experts, we should be able to see the
clear chain of custody and provenance of those who defer to these experts.
Identifying these trusted human sources and the provenance to go with them
is the thrust of this research.
Knowledge management has been about having the organization know
what its members know. If this is synthesized a bit, we may talk of what
the members know about. If we can reliably assume that a group can know
what a person knows about, we can potentially do some very interesting things.
We may be able to render moot the concerns we have today with individuals
lying to increase their stature. If the group can reliably increase the social
friction necessary to gain unmerited influence, we could safely ignore the opin-
ions of those who have not convinced quite a few of his peers that he knows
what he is talking about. In a world where we do care about credentials, until
1Society of American Archivists’ Archives, Personal Papers, and Manuscripts
2Canadian Council of Archives’ Rules for Archival Description
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one has at least the loose credential of a few peers who vouch for his credibil-
ity, one’s potential for abusing that credibility is severely limited. Of course,
existing credentials, even more formal credentials (diplomas, certifications, li-
censing, etc.), already allow this kind of credibility abuse. The addition of
a loose socially awarded credential to the existing landscape would not affect
the potential for abuse of those existing formal credentials. One would assume
they would continue to convey more credibility than that provided by social
labeling alone.
If a group can know what areas of expertise a person has, it may be able
to better distribute articles for peer review to those who can best ascertain
the quality of a pending publication. Important questions that arise could
be distributed more reliably to those who could provide an informed opinion.
Reporters in remote locations may have been better able to determine who had
actually been on the ground during the 2010 presidential elections in Iran and
who has recently created a Twitter account only to influence the placement of
news articles during the next news cycle.
In a more formalized decision making process, voting systems could have
weighted votes. If the matter at hand should not be decided strictly demo-
cratically (e.g., one person, one vote), the relative weight of the votes could be
set to match the relative weight of a voter’s apparent relative expertise on the
matter. This could mirror the practice of corporate elections based on share-
holder totals. Those who know, instead of those who own, would be rewarded
with influence. Perhaps just as interestingly, those who do not know could
be ignored at vote-tallying time. Internet-scale applications are often fraught
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with noisy comments and hostility. These could be programatically tuned out
or weighted less if it was deemed useful or helpful to do so. And this could be
done site-wide or customized for each viewer based on personal taste. It is also
important to note that this type of filtering would be done post-hoc. It would
not affect who could initially vote, comment, or otherwise share their opinion.
It would only affect how the display of the event would be rendered later. The
original “democratic” vote totals would still be tallied and available.
But all of these scenarios depend on the assumption that a group’s opinion
about a member’s areas of expertise can be trusted as “correct” – as good
enough. The group’s visible, shared opinion should allow the members of the
group to make better, more informed decisions with less effort in less time.
I want to provide a robust means for allowing a group to assess
and believe in their collective opinion about an individual’s areas
of expertise. They would be able to transparently evaluate how they grant
cognitive authority to an individual and continually reflect on it. It would
become a market indicator of what people know – one that fits into a larger,
existing ecosystem.
This social reflecting lens should provide a form of loose credentialing
and help to bring the implicit to the surface and make it explicit. When they
choose to provide it, the trusted, focused, tacit knowledge in the heads of those
we know could be available to all of us.
“The grand challenge is to boost the collective IQ of organizations
and of society”- Doug Engelbart regarding the Bootstrap Principle,
a human-machine system for harvesting collected knowledge and
evolving the technology for collective learning (Engelbart, 2004)
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We still have far to go before the online and oﬄine worlds truly merge.
Eventually, we will enjoy a global transparent layer of data that is collectively
curated and managed, but until that time, we continue to interact with other
humans face-to-face much more often and in much more significant capacities.
Lowenstein says that people trust their oﬄine counterparts more than online
social media (Lowenstein, 2009). However, research in computer-mediated
communication (CMC) says we react to machines as people, at least sub-
consciously (Reeves & Nass, 1996), but we still have deference towards “real
people”when we take the time to think through the communication event more
carefully. When interacting with others via mediated channels, we usually do
not focus on the medium itself and therefore we confer trust more than when
the medium is explicitly obvious to us. As a medium continues to become
more transparent and easy and common, it will become more trusted.
1.5 Related Work
1.5.1 Expertise Location
Organizational Memory (OM) is a key component of Knowledge Management
(KM). Abecker, Bernardi, Hinkelmann, Ku¨hn, and Sintek (1997, 1) write“that
an OM [system] has to be more than an information system but must help to
transform information into action.” One part of OM is Expertise Location
and Management (ELM), or the tracking of know-how within an organization
(Lamont, 2003). As keeping track of employees’ knowledge is generally a
very expensive undertaking for any size organization, a cheaper, more efficient
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technique for uncovering, managing, and disseminating this type of information
would be a key contribution.
KM exercises involving human time and effort are naturally expensive for
the firm. As such, incentivizing participation is one of the greatest hurdles to
the implementation of a KM system (Ehrlich, 2003). Engaging with profes-
sional communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Duguid, 2005), physical
workspace reconfiguration, and encouraging water-cooler discussions can each
improve the sharing and awareness of expertise among professionals. Even
so, Ling, Sandhu, and Jain (2009, 135) suggest that the single best type of
incentives for knowledge sharing activities remain top-down such as “rewards
and performance appraisal.” Callahan agrees and suggests that managers must
be involved, resources (time and money) must be given to the task, and overt
(already known) content must be used to seed any initial system that hopes
to elicit tacit content (Callahan, 2006b).
Stein (1995) provides a standard set of stages for the understanding of
organizational memory - knowledge acquisition, retention, maintenance, and
retrieval. This is similar, but not identical, to Dieng’s model for corporate
memory management - detection of needs, knowledge construction, distribu-
tion, use, evaluation, and evolution (Dieng, Corby, Giboin, & Ribie´re, 1999).
Each suggests a timelined progression but differ in that Stein’s stages feel
more institutionalized and less a collaborative effort. Dieng’s use, evaluation,
and evolution incorporate the dynamic nature and multi-person aspects of a
distributed know-how.
Dieng et al. (1999, 578) write:
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However, the goal of a corporate memory building is different from
the goal of an expert system: instead of aiming at an automatic
solution for a task (with automatic reasoning capabilities), a corpo-
rate memory rather needs to be an assistant to the user, supplying
him/her with relevant corporate information but leaving him/her
the responsibility of a contextual interpretation and evaluation of
this information (Ku¨hn & Abecker, 1997). Ku¨hn and Abecker
(1997) notices that ‘in contrast to expert systems, the goal of a
corporate memory is not the support of a particular task, but the
better exploitation of the essential corporate resource: knowledge’
and cites some knowledge-based corporate memories (e.g., KONUS
system aimed at support to crankshaft design).
Existing tools around Expertise Location and Management involve, almost
entirely, self-description or existing-document data-mining (Lamont, 2003; Fitz-
patrick, 2001; Becks, Reichling, & Wulf, 2004; Balog, Azzopardi, & Rijke,
2009). Traditional tf–idf 3 and bag-of-words analysis on these document stores
can uncover a vast amount, but I think these techniques are missing out on
what is in the heads of those who work with the person of interest. This
is an important enough distinction to be made in a controlled environment,
where the identities of the people involved are fairly well known and stable.
However, trusting self-description in an unstructured, internet-wide environ-
ment without corporate identity management software seems ripe for abuse.
The individual in question could easily be misrepresenting him or herself with
malicious intent. Convincing many others of a lie or getting others to lie in
a consistent manner regarding one’s areas of expertise is much harder than
deciding to lie on one’s own behalf.
3Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency
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A tool for assisting in Expertise Location should meet the following re-
quirements as set forth by Abecker et al. (1997):
• gather information from multiple sources
• integrate with existing infrastructure and practices
• require little overhead in time/attention and provide benefits quickly
• actively present relevant information
• must stay up-to-date
Contextual Authority Tagging would handle the first, third, and fifth na-
tively. Integration and presentation would both depend on implementation
details. Ehrlich goes on to say that these systems must be fast, easy to use,
engender trust in their results (e.g., be accurate enough to warrant contin-
ued use), and scale to the whole enterprise. Additionally, they must be used
by management if the culture of the organization is expected to embrace the
adoption of such a system (Ehrlich, 2003).
1.5.2 Existing Systems
Systematically identifying experts has been an ongoing research problem for
quite some time (Ackerman & Malone, 1990; McDonald & Ackerman, 1998;
Lutters, Ackerman, Boster, & McDonald, 2000; McDonald, 2001).
First, the people themselves have been asked to describe their own talents
and areas of expertise, but this has demonstrated problems of motivation and
incentive, as well as issues involving truthfulness and bias (Fitzpatrick, 1999;
Yamim, 1996). Additionally, self evaluation leads to blind spots and the tricky
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pre-coordination problem of not knowing who the audience will be. We explain
what we do and what we know differently to a colleague in the same field than
to someone who does not already have a working knowledge of our own area.
We contextualize when describing our skills to others face-to-face, because we
can, because we know the audience. When asked to do this for all possible
audiences, we stumble.
Alternatively to self-report, the knowledge artifacts that have been pre-
viously produced have been investigated and analyzed (Balog et al., 2009).
Trying to identify the latent expertise from the documents that are produced
and the transactions that have been recorded has been well studied, e.g., re-
ports and meeting minutes (Craswell, Hawking, Vercoustre, & Wilkins, 2001;
Balog, Azzopardi, & Rijke, 2006; Balog & Rijke, 2008), email (Campbell,
Maglio, Cozzi, & Dom, 2003), and social network analysis (Zhang, Tang, & Li,
2007; Balog & Rijke, 2007). This area is also changing rapidly as we move into
technology-mediated social spaces at increasing rates (e.g. corporate installs
of social sites and tools like Facebook, delicious, LinkedIn, Twitter). We are
producing more artifacts than ever before, which is actually creating a differ-
ent problem – there is too much. Finding the wheat is proving increasingly
difficult and expensive.
Some existing systems include technology that allowed for both self doc-
umentation as well as automatic extraction and creation of profiles. The
Community of Science’s Expertise product allows for scientists in all fields
to maintain an expertise profile that can follow them throughout their career,
but the fields are self-updated and badly out of date or sparsely populated for
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many who have profiles in the system (Fitzpatrick, 1999, 2001). HP’s internal
Connex directory of experts also allowed for self-description and self-updating
(Davenport, 1997; Becerra-Fernandez, 2000). The National Security Agency
has an internal staffing and project matching system named the Knowledge
and Skills Management System (KSMS) but is based on a custom knowledge
taxonomy. Booz Allen Hamilton runs an internal expert skills directory that
helps consultants match their expertise with clients’ needs (Becerra-Fernandez,
2000). In 2008, Tacit.com sold their expertise location technology, based on au-
tomatic profiling from corporate email, and rolled their solution, illumio.com,
into Oracle’s Beehive collaboration platform. Cameron Marlow’s Tagsona is
Yahoo’s unofficial internal directory that implemented tags and allowed em-
ployees to label each other. IBM built Fringe Contacts around the idea that
people-tagging is a viable way to categorize “people’s skills, roles, and projects
in the form of a ‘tag cloud’” and was modeled off the earlier IBM work on
Dogear, a document tagging system (Farrell & Lau, 2006). Perhaps the most
famous of corporate directories, IBM’s BluePages house both company con-
trolled information (lines of direct report, past and current projects, contact
information) and persona information (controlled/populated by the employee
him/herself) (Callahan, 2006a). Most recently Google acquired Aardvark
(vark.com) and its question and answer routing technology that is based on
semi-automatic expertise profile creation. None of these systems, with the
exception of IBM’s Fringe Contacts, allows social labeling. They include only
self-reported metadata or automatically generated metadata.
I propose another method. I ask, can we not have people talk about what
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each other know, and create a new, social, shared knowledge artifact? It
should neither be directly derived from the documents produced or by the
person being evaluated; it should come from the people around the person of
interest. It should come from tacit, social knowledge.
Can we create a knowledge artifact similar to the existing knowledge ar-
tifacts, but with a greater ability to encapsulate the here and now and to
bend with time? Humans can synthesize a vast amount of context and pro-
vide better descriptors and categorize each other in more nuanced ways than
perhaps any text mining or latent semantic indexing algorithm can. Even if it
is not better, it may provide a different, important perspective not currently
harvestable through automated means.
A socially created, shared artifact might quickly adapt to new terminology,
new clusters, and see patterns that other systems might take longer to “see.”
It could be a new artifact, one that portends to be the current culmination of
knowledge and synthesis. It could be a cutting edge reflection on the knowledge
and expertise of a group in the moment.
I want to ask, and then enable, people to help create this new artifact.
1.6 Contextual Authority Tagging
Once we have a social reflecting lens to help us see what a person knows about,
it serves as a jumping off point for powerful assessments and assertions. A
validated socially robust system of categorized areas of expertise could be the
foundation on which to build business and social services.
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Can we imagine an ever-available data overlay of expertise? It could be the
collective back wall that all ideas get bounced off of before further discussion
– a back-chatter that has the opinions you value and need at any time. If it
is ever-present and ever-evolving, it could influence nearly every decision we
make when we interact with others. It could become the input we need to feel
confident. We could eventually feel exposed and vulnerable without it.
It is important to remember that, as we move forward, we do not lose the
ability to continue mining all our existing artifacts, documents, and logfiles.
These are the raw materials that we use when we generate and manufacture our
opinions. The socially constructed representation of one’s areas of expertise,
the visible version of Wegner’s Transactive Memory (Wegner, 1986), would
be a new source of information and would only serve to complement what
we have already been able to do within the realm of document management
(Choo, 1996). Keeping the focus on the people instead of the artifacts they
create may better reflect the organizational knowledge inside a group and could
greatly reduce the periods of time when new entrants are trying to get their
bearings in a new office or managers are trying to assign relevant people to
the task at hand.
Contextual Authority Tagging is a proposed technique for expertise loca-
tion within a group by creating explicit knowledge from the group’s individual
tacit knowledge about each members’ areas of expertise (Nonaka, 1991). This
group can be an organization of any size, a loose affiliation of acquaintances or
colleagues, or potentially everyone on Earth. For the purposes of this research,
the scope of Contextual Authority Tagging will be directed towards the small
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and medium-sized working organization and membership. If and when this
technique is shown as viable, then a greater scope could be approached, but
at this time, some basic assumptions need to be questioned and verified.
Individuals have diverse interests, experiences, and connections with oth-
ers. Some individuals have a wide variety of areas of expertise with working
knowledge across many domains. Other individuals may live a very focused
life and have extensive depth of knowledge in one area or two. As sources of
information, members of each of these categories of individual are valuable,
but in different ways. The Jack-of-all-trades may have insight into how tech-
niques or methods fit together across traditional domain boundaries whereas
the deep expert may have encountered a specific subtlety of something that
one is beginning to work on and consulting with that person could save one
lots of time and money that might have otherwise been wasted.
Knowing which people know which things is key to efficiently leveraging
a network of contacts. Routing one’s questions, seeking inspiration, and the
building of teams each benefit from efficient use of existing mappings of knowl-
edge and areas of expertise. Historically, these types of activities have been
hard to commodify or automate. Humans are very good at applying a heuristic
for knowing what others know and this research aims to tap into that talent.
Contextual Authority Tagging seeks to create and maintain a mapping of
the areas of expertise of a network of individuals. It will do this by having the
individuals involved use free text keywords or tags to label each others’ areas
of expertise. It is explicit and transparent and designed to uncover “reader-
generated metadata” rather than “author-generated metadata.” Results are
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shared back into the group and made visible, and the process is repeated.
The resulting product is a weighted list of words associated with each person’s
areas of expertise. Words are weighted more heavily when more people used
those words to tag an individual. Over time, the list, or some subset of the
list (e.g., only tags from the most recent 12-month period), would presumably
bend and follow the shape of the individual’s current interests and knowledge
as perceived by the group. Each individual’s weighted list would be a specific
fingerprint in the multidimensional space created by all possible keywords and
could potentially serve as inputs and be used by a multitude of other tools to
aid in further decision-making tasks.
CAT is contextual in that each person’s fingerprint is unique and relative
both to the querier’s network and to the queried’s network. Limiting whose
“votes” count could preempt noisy or “spammy” results. Limiting “votes” with
respect to the time they were recorded could prevent “old” or outdated results.
One could imagine future algorithms working in the background, being
recursive in nature (similar to Google’s PageRank (Brin & Page, 1998) or
Kleinberg’s HITS (Kleinberg, 1999a)), returning a ranked list of people as
weighted by how many other people, who have weight in that domain, “voted”
for those listed.
Authority refers to the cognitive authority being granted by the network to
each group member (Wilson, 1983). Wilson differentiated between administra-
tive authority (which is obtained by virtue of position or rank) and cognitive
authority (which is granted by others based on experience and demonstrated
knowledge). The fact that this authority is granted, rather than held “ex
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officio,” is what makes CAT interesting.
The opinions of one’s peers hold interesting collective insights and this
technique hopes to tap into this insight and bring it out where both the indi-
vidual can benefit from her own hard work and expertise and others can more
efficiently locate that expertise.
1.7 Research Questions
Contextual Authority Tagging has been conceived and designed to get at two
major questions regarding how a group comes to know about its own areas
of expertise. The following questions are raised and will be addressed by the
following research methodology.
R1. Does CAT work?
(a) Similarity - How similar are a group member’s opinion of his/her
own areas of expertise and the group’s opinion of his/her areas of
expertise?
(b) Convergence - How does the similarity behave over time? Do the
two opinions converge? If so, how long does it take? If not, is there
a persistent gap?
R2. How acceptable is CAT?
(a) Comfort - How comfortable are group members in participating?
What are the main factors influencing their comfort level?
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(b) Confidence - How confident are group members in a system like
this? What is the quality of the output of this system? Does this
system provide a valid credential? Does this system increase users’
trust in one another?
(c) Usefulness - What is useful about a system like this? What did
participants learn? How would using this system affect participants’
decision making?
Latour and Nelson suggest to us that where there is a lack of contention,
a social fact will be defined (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Nelson, 1993). So-
cial tagging phenomena have demonstrated a stabilization of tagging behavior
(Russell, 2006; Golder & Huberman, 2005). Together, these suggest the first
hypothesis:
H1. As the social fact of what a person knows is molded by the group, a
consensus will appear and converge.
The comfort levels of the participants will depend on their surroundings,
the familiarity of the task, and their feelings of control:
H2. Comfort levels will increase as the system becomes known and under-
stood. Initial trepidation will be assuaged as the system allows partici-
pants to see more of how they are perceived by others.
The warranting principle suggests that we give more credence to infor-
mation provided by others, rather than information within the control of a
particular other (Walther & Parks, 2002; Walther, Heide, Hamel, & Shulman,
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2009). Online or oﬄine, information that is known to be easily manipulated
is less trusted. Additionally, Delphi-style studies increase the confidence levels
of the participants (Rowe, Wright, & McColl, 2005). This leads to the third
hypothesis:
H3. Group members will have confidence in this system and exhibit increased
trust in one another.
23
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The following four sections represent core philosophies and research by others
that are both interesting and important and are relevant to the work done
in this dissertation. In addition to the work mentioned earlier with specific
reference to expertise location (Section 1.5.1), the following situate Contex-
tual Authority Tagging within the existing academic literature. Section 2.1
discusses group dynamics and how information flows into, within, and from
groups and organizations. Section 2.2 covers identity, reputation, and trust
from the perspective of an individual in our newly always-connected, always-
on reality, how we understand each other through our past actions and cre-
dentials, and how we plan for the future based on that understanding. Section
2.3 is about expertise, what it is, how we think of it, and the artifacts we use
to measure it. Section 2.4 looks at the state of the art with regards to tagging,
or social labeling, and how it has disrupted the largely top-down hierarchies
through which the world has long been described.
2.1 Groups
2.1.1 Knowledge Management
“If HP knew what HP knows, we would be three times as profitable”
– Lew Platt, Hewlett-Packard CEO, echoing a former head of HP
Labs
On the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) hierarchy (Sharma,
2004), knowledge is only one of four things that are hard to define. Culturally
defined as what we know, knowledge has long been considered to be captured
within documents or other containers. A more contemporary understanding
would be that “knowledge can only be created dynamically in time” (Newell,
1981, 11). Newell’s work goes on to suggest that “knowledge is best concep-
tualized as an observer-relative attribution: an agent attributes knowledge to
an agent observed in order to explain the observed agent’s behaviour. It is
hardly possible to find out whether the observed agent actually has knowledge
as knowledge is dynamically created” (Lueg, 2002, 4).
But knowing that someone knows something is only useful if we can share
that information and then act on it. This is most pressing in the organiza-
tion, where the obligation of the company is to produce a product or service
and generate revenue. As such, organizations are constantly struggling with
the efficient allocation of scarce resources. They struggle to optimize labor,
capital, expertise, knowledge, energy, time, and reporting. Management of
an organization, or any part thereof, is tasked with this constant struggle for
optimal allocation. Doing it well increases the likelihood of profitability and
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customer satisfaction, as well as a better sense of organizational well being and
confidence for the next task.
The orchestration of knowing where everything is and how it operates is
complex and cannot realistically be handled by a single individual. We have
come to depend on each other for knowing what is going on (Johnson, Lorenz,
& Lundvall, 2002). Hierarchies develop in organizations; division of labor,
workgroups, they all develop because each person can only do so much and it
is more efficient if the tasks at hand are separated and conquered individually.
This creates another level of management to keep track of the different people
doing different tasks.
All that said, organizations are pretty good at this. The field of knowledge
management has developed over the course of 20-30 years and seen the rise and
fall of management styles and trends. When labor was the most important
asset to be managed in the late 19th century, organizational best practices
were born out of Scientific Management, or Taylorism (Taylor, 1911). Tay-
lor advocated measurement and optimization on the factory floor and on the
assembly line. Later in the early 20th century, statistical methods were ap-
plied to the scientific management movement and eventually led to a part of
what is now known as Operations Research. Taylor’s influence remains part of
modern organizational theory and practice, in that we now have departments
of work study, personnel, and quality assessment and control in organizations
large enough to demand them.
Information machines were introduced into the modern organization in the
middle of the 20th century and reformulated the way organizations reported on
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their activities. Project status and projections became more specific and finite.
We could measure things we could not measure before and with measurement
comes an opportunity for further optimization and testing. Fortunes were
made at the systems level by shaving a percent here or a percent there and
streamlining existing production channels.
When the computers began to generate the bulk of new documents them-
selves, instead of simply counting what the humans were doing, we entered a
new age of storage/retrieval and document management that lasted through
the end of the 20th century. We struggled with machine learning and data min-
ing to help us understand and see the patterns in all the documents, logfiles,
and artifacts we were producing.
Eventually, Nonaka published his works on the SECI model (Socialization,
Externalization, Combination, Internalization) (Figure 2.1) whereby the pro-
duction of knowledge and value in an organization was actually made up of
people working together, learning on the move, and synergizing to produce
new knowledge. Nonaka proposed a continuous cycle of knowledge creation
between Tacit and Explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 1991, 1994).
Widely cited and commonly accepted today, this cycle is where I plan to
couch the approach of allowing individuals to talk about one another’s areas
of expertise, to bring the tacit knowledge of an organization or group to the
surface. Contextual Authority Tagging is a tool that sits along the upper two
quadrants of the Nonaka model and helps to externalize a group’s opinions on
its own expertise.
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Figure 2.1: Nonaka’s SECI Model
Polanyi wrote that “we know more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966, 136).
His prime reference is to the ability we have to distinguish faces of others we
know without being able to really describe these faces to others. There is
information in our heads that we cannot communicate with only our sense of
language. His point is that there is information below the surface that we may
not readily be aware of. He calls this information “tacit.” Choo says that tacit
knowledge is “personal knowledge that is hard to formalize or communicate to
others. . . . [and] consists of subjective know-how, insights, and intuitions
that comes to a person from having been immersed in an activity for an ex-
tended period of time”(Choo, 1996, 334). By reflecting and becoming aware of
this tacit information, we can begin to describe it and pull it into the realm of
the explicit – that which can be easily transmitted between people and groups.
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When suspects’ faces are encouraged to be recreated by sketch artists or com-
puter composites, crime victims and study participants both do a much better
job of recreating faces they know than without these external aids. Working
with the sketch artist, by iterating between description and feedback to what
has been drawn, creates better results. The information is there, it just needed
better tools to be externalized before it could be effectively shared with others.
Beyond the realm of managing and handling of documents created by hu-
mans, knowledge management involves “any process or practice of creating,
acquiring, capturing, sharing, and using knowledge, wherever it resides, to en-
hance learning and performance in organizations” (Swan, Scarbrough, & Pre-
ston, 1999). This means that it encompasses other areas such as workspace
design, communities of practice, and an understanding of incentives to get
people to share their expertise and knowledge.
2.1.2 Community
Communication theory includes the concept of diffusion of innovation. Rogers
defined diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is communicated
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”
(Rogers, 1962, 5). He defined an innovation as “an idea, practice, or object
that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers,
1962, 12). This movement through organizations or memberships has largely
been affiliated with the concept of homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, &
Cook, 2001), those people who are similar to one another take on similar be-
haviors faster and in greater numbers. This leads to a natural imbalance among
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members of a group with regards to their experiences and therefore their ac-
cess to information. This unequal distribution of information leads to a state
of having both information-rich members and information-poor members, but
not equally across all information domains. The separation of information-rich
and information-poor happens roughly independently for each area of knowl-
edge. Every topic will have people who know more about a topic even if they
have each had the same training and exposure, since they will group and clump
with one another, socially and therefore unevenly. To flatten this distribution,
we must be aware of and take into consideration the social aspects of group dy-
namics. If we can encourage discussion across these normally disparate groups,
we may increase familiarity and understanding as well as a better, more even
distribution of knowledge.
Groups also self organize within organizations – they create what are known
as ingroups and outgroups (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974). The social need for defining
oneself via others drives us to seek those who are similar to help define who
we are while also defining who we are not. This leads to differentiation among
groups. Another effect of this self organizing is the development of a common
language within a group (Abrams, O’Connor, & Giles, 2002). Members will
define new language for a variety of reasons - these include specialization and
opaqueness. An example of specialization is when members within a trade
group slip into trade speak fairly quickly as it is a more efficient means to talk
about the things they find interesting. Police officers do this while on the job,
and may continue the practice when off-duty. An example of opaqueness is
when teenagers continually create new slang so that their parents and other
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adults seem to realize they are as out of touch with the teenagers as their
teenagers want them to feel.
Also among groups, a sense of community forms as people realize they
have a shared experience and shared understanding of the world (McMillan &
Chavis, 1986). This can be seen in diverse contexts such as the military (boot
camp), at corporate retreats (trust fall), and summer camp (pitching a tent).
To know that someone else has been through the same experience means that
you know a little bit about what they are and what they have been through,
things that make them who they are. This shared understanding makes the
members of a group more intimately aware of each other’s perspective.
When the members of a group are interacting mostly online, this sense
of community and shared understanding has been called “ambient intimacy”.
People who are not sharing physical time together have reported a sense of
closeness to those they are connected to, at a distance, through the mediat-
ing technologies of the Internet (Reichelt, 2007). This matches earlier group
work on network proximity that shows members who are more close are more
exposed to social information and more likely to be influenced by that informa-
tion (R. E. Rice & Aydin, 1991). The information flows are directly related to
the density of an actor’s network such that members who are tightly connected
to many others are more heavily influenced by their peers.
When a community exists in an online space, certain organizational dynam-
ics are made available. One of these is the freedom from “specializing roles by
geographic location” (Rosedale, 2009). When a team’s communication chan-
nels are composed of data moving across a network rather than through the
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air in a physical space, the team can be widely distributed. When the com-
munication channels are sufficiently robust and fast, and “as communication
technology makes transparency cheaper, the need for central control drops”
(Rosedale, 2009). Teams can be composed from the most talented, most com-
patible people from anywhere in the world, not just from the talent nearby or
on hand. Managing those teams can prove more complicated, but the talent
and demeanor of the team can overcome the added complexity.
Community of Practice theory holds that there is value beyond the tacit –
the very existence of a social order suggests there is more to knowledge than
the codified explicit and uncodified tacit (Duguid, 2005). Duguid says that
because we are social creatures, we create information of a social nature. It is
not explicit or tacit (as the SECI model suggests), but rather, social. I would
suggest that the sociality of information is a separate facet or spectrum of
the information, and not a separate type altogether. Communities that share
information due to the fact that they are a community have identified a useful
outlet for some of their collected tacit information.
2.1.3 Incentivization
The incentives involved in encouraging community members to contribute to
the common goal are many. In large part, membership in a community or
organization is driven by self-serving motivating forces. Barnard summarized
this position in 1968 as a basis for his seminal work, The Functions of the
Executive:
The contributions of personal efforts which constitute the energies
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of organizations are yielded by individuals because of incentives.
The egotistical motives of self-preservation and self-gratification are
dominating forces; on the whole, organizations can exist only when
consistent with the satisfaction of the motives, unless, alternatively,
they can change these motives. The individual is always the basic
strategic factor in organizations. Regardless of his history or his
obligations he must be induced to cooperate, or there can be no
cooperation. (Barnard, 1968, 139)
Barnard goes on to explain that organizations can induce participation (or
membership) either through objective incentives or persuasive methods. What
he calls objective incentives include both specific objective incentives (material
items, physical conditions) and general incentives (communion, associational
attractiveness, participation) while his persuasive methods are called such be-
cause they affect the subjective state of mind of the member in question (cre-
ation of coercive conditions, rationalization of opportunity, and inculcation of
motives). Barnard says that the objective incentives are used mostly by in-
dustry and industrialized organizations where monetary consideration is stable
and normative and persuasive methods are used predominantly in religious and
political organizations. He is also careful to point out that both types are used
in all organizations but that he had observed the distributions above across
many organizations (Barnard, 1968, 141).
When a new group forms, participation may begin with enthusiasm, but as
roles and norms settle out, keeping the energy and contributions at a high level
becomes harder. Keeping membership motivated and interested requires keep-
ing them incentivized. Clark and Wilson (1961, 134) suggest that incentives
can be categorized as either 1) material (tangible and/or economic and valu-
able to the membership), 2) solidary (intangible, social, involving status, and
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unrelated to the goals of the organization), or 3) purposive (also intangible, but
related to the goals of the organization). Knoke finds that individual members
of associations are motivated by three types of influence: 1) rational choice
(cost/benefit analysis of expected utility), 2) affective bonding (emotional at-
tachment to other members of the group), and 3) normative conformity (doing
what others like themselves are doing) (Knoke, 1988). The determinants for
participation in volunteer organizations and activities have been found to be
“larger context (territory and organization), social background and role vari-
ables, personality traits, attitudes, and situational variables” (Smith, 1994,
256).
Overall, motivation to belong and participate seem to revolve around eco-
nomic incentives, social incentives, and political incentives – a very familiar
triple of considerations. Related to Clark and Wilson’s third category of purpo-
sive incentives, Elinor Ostrom recently won the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics
for her work (Ostrom, 1990) suggesting that common goods can be managed
with purposive collective oversight, and under certain circumstances avoid the
classic Tragedy of the Commons that demands government oversight or private
ownership to manage resources (Hardin, 1968). Ostrom writes about global
trust and global payback in the sense that members give back to the organi-
zation because they felt obligated through what they had received, and this
payback could be at a value much greater than the value the member originally
received.
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2.1.4 Collective Intelligence
A definition of collective intelligence comes from Le´vy, just as the advent of
the web took place (originally published in French in 1994), “It is a form of
universally distributed intelligence, constantly enhanced, coordinated in real
time, and resulting in the effective mobilization of skills . . . No one knows
everything, everyone knows something . . . ” (Le´vy, 1997, 13). Shortly there-
after, Heylighen stated that “collective intelligence is defined as the ability of a
group to solve more problems than its individual members” (Heylighen, 1999,
253). More recently, collective intelligence has been described as a Wisdom
of Crowds (Surowiecki, 2004), Smart Mobs (Rheingold, 2002), or more enter-
tainingly, Here Comes Everybody (Shirky, 2008a). These different ideas sound
very similar, but have a few distinct differences. Surowiecki thinks that the
participants need to be diverse, act independently and without central con-
trol, and their wisdom will present itself in aggregation. Rheingold suggests
that the intelligence of a group comes from the vast array of within-network
linkages given our newfound digital connectedness. Shirky says that we do not
need formal organizations to help us figure out how to act as groups – that
we can do that on our own now. Le´vy saw us moving into the fourth of our
social spaces – from Nomads, to the agrarian Territory, to the commoditized
Property, and now into a shared space of Knowledge.
Another way of thinking about collective intelligence may be as distributed
cognition. Distributed cognition suggests that the groups of people working to-
gether towards a coordinated end are communicating and sharing information
in a socio-technical system (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000). The creation
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and transfer of artifacts and signaling within these systems allow the group to
succeed at their task. When knobs are turned and notes taken and commands
relayed, the members of the group are part of a collective process, a collective
cognition, that helps the group learn and understand. Distributed cognition
also plays out over time, as the culture and environment of the group share
information with group members that come later.
Related to the environment, Activity Theory suggests that the tools we
create come directly from and map to our mental processes. When tools are
created within a group, to manage the repeat work and save human effort, they
are manifestations of the cognitive effort and the shared culture of the group
(Vygotsky, 1978). A direct result is that the shared artifact of the tool and
the work it represents become encapsulated. What had been in the minds of
the group can be communicated with a shared understanding of what the tool
does. This allows the human mind to work on new problems and move on to
encapsulate new knowledge. It also allows complex procedures and activities
to be broken down into their requisite steps and understood in pieces (Nardi,
1995).
Some work being done at MIT has led to a mapping of the “genes” that
are part of collective intelligence systems. These genes include the answers
to four main questions (Who, Why, What, How) and so therefore consist of
issues around Staffing, Incentives, Goals, and Structure/Processes (Malone,
Laubacher, & Dellarocas, 2009). By breaking down the parts of what makes
collective intelligence systems tick, they hope to be able to then understand
and manipulate how these genes fit together within networks of people.
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The underlying theme throughout this diversity of opinion and work is the
idea that the communication technologies that we have built up and continue
to integrate into our everyday lives are essential to a burgeoning collective
intelligence. It is through this “synergy between human and machines” where
“machines are the enablers: they store and remember data, search and com-
bine data,” and where “people learn by communicating with each other” more
efficiently via those machines that we are capable of communicating across
time and space with such increasing power. That there are “different roles
for people and machines” and that “people learn by communicating with each
other” are both central themes in my future work (Gruber, 2008). Computers
are good at connecting, storing, and counting. Humans are good at socializ-
ing and finding meaning – they are the “producers and the customers” in any
system that resembles having some collective intelligence.
Additionally, I believe that to understand collective intelligence, we must
realize that the frameworks and the research named above are predicated on
three key factors that must be considered and understood: that any intelli-
gence comes about because of an underlying network and that network’s own
network dynamics, that collaboration and awareness must exist between the
participants of the network, and that software is the enabling tool to help us
quantify and then analyze what is happening.
2.1.5 Networks and Network Science
Network science has recently come into its own as a discipline. With the
publishing of books by Baraba´si in 2002 and Easley and Kleinberg in 2010,
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the study of networks and the interconnectedness of the systems in which we
live have found themselves front and center of the discussions of how Web 2.0,
among other things, touches most of our lives in profound ways (Baraba´si,
2002; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010).
Networks comprised by social systems largely contain Pareto distributions
of connections between the items being linked. This means that roughly 80
percent of the links point to 20 percent of the nodes. More generally, this has
been found to be the distribution of time spent on decision making in meetings,
paper citations among academics, and cities served by the airline industry.
Networks where human activity is involved usually exhibit these power law,
or Pareto, tendencies and can be modeled with logarithmic techniques that
are strikingly predictable. Plotted on a logarithm-logarithm chart, power laws
appear as a straight line. Other related phenomena include Zipf’s Law (the
distribution of words in the English language is linear on a log-log plot) and
Moore’s Law (the number of transistors on a chip doubles roughly every two
years).
Knowing how networks are constructed and how they grow has also al-
lowed researchers to predict the effects of these networks on other things (e.g.,
creating network effects). In the broadcasting medium of radio and television,
Sarnoff’s Law suggests that as each new entrant appears on the network (e.g.,
a consumer purchases a television), the increase in the value of the network
is proportional to that single viewer. This means that the network’s value is
equal to the total number of viewers, or n (Reed, 1999).
Bob Metcalfe observed that in a bidirectional communications network,
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where he worked in industry, a new entrant into the network increased the
number of connections, and therefore the value of the network, in a quadratic
way, as the square of the number of “compatibly communicating” network
nodes (Simeonov, 2006). Using fax machines as an example he pointed out that
a single fax machine had very little value, as there was no one to communicate
with. A second fax machine added a single link. A third fax machine added two
links, and a fourth, three more links. This formula of n(n− 1)/2 is dominated
by the n2 term and can therefore be modeled as simply n2 and has come to be
known as Metcalfe’s Law (Gilder, 1993).
More recently, Reed suggested that within a network there are actually
many more connections being made than between individuals. In addition
to connections being made between individuals, groups themselves are making
connections. Group Forming Networks have additional network properties and
should be measured differently. Reed’s Law says that the value of the network
itself can be modeled with an exponential or geometric formula on the order
of 2n which grows much faster as additional nodes are added (Reed, 1999).
There have also been suggestions that Metcalfe’s Law is overstated since
not every participant in a network can actually communicate with every other
network member. Odlyzko and Briscoe have suggested that a more practical
measurement of the value of a network is n ∗ log(n), but have not produced
any formal proof. These are mostly abstractly useful models that predict an
upper bound on “value” (Odlyzko & Tilly, 2005; Briscoe, Odlyzko, & Tilly,
2006).
Additionally, much work has been done with regards to how the networks
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themselves are comprised and the interconnectedness that has been measured.
Granovetter described the power associated with weak ties in our social net-
works. He said that most of the value in our networks come from our loose
affiliations, or weak ties, and not the ones that we consider strong (Granovetter,
1973).
Kleinberg wrote about hubs and authorities as indicators of influence in
the networked world (Kleinberg, 1999b). Hubs are defined as those nodes that
point to many other nodes. Authorities are defined as those nodes that have
many nodes pointing to them.
Formalizing and generalizing what Milgram called the Small World problem
in the 1960s (Milgram, 1967), Watts and Strogatz described with remarkable
clarity how deeply interconnected we are and how networks usually have a
“giant component” where the majority of group members are well-connected
(Watts & Strogatz, 1998). The areas of social capital and reputation research
have also benefited from our understanding of network theory. Social capital
theory, pulling together both Kleinberg’s hubs and authorities model with the
strong and weak tie work of Granovetter, shows how bonding and bridging
capital allow us to model our relationships in a predictably economic-like way
(Lin, 1999).
Understanding the implications and findings of this network science re-
search is critical when planning or building out new network features and
capabilities. My hope is that Contextual Authority Tagging can make some
qualified, safe assumptions about network topology and connectedness when
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evaluating the results of having people tagging other people’s areas of ex-
pertise. In short order, the hope is that findings within smaller groups can
be eventually claimed to be more generally applicable via Small World and
Strength of Weak Ties theory.
41
2.2 Identity, Reputation, and Trust
“I am a part of all that I have met” – Alfred, Lord Tennyson,
Ulysses
2.2.1 Identity
2.2.1.1 Oﬄine
Identity is something that has fascinated and puzzled mankind for generations.
Descartes wrote “I think, therefore I am.” He was working out the existential
questions of what it means to be human – of what it means to consider the
world and all that is in it. But he was also working through his own relationship
with the world. This sense of relationship, of belonging, is something that
each and every one of us comes to question as we come into our own and as
we change throughout our lives.
Goffman’s seminal work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, con-
jures a metaphor that has served most of sociology, psychology, and many other
social sciences very well over the years (Goffman, 1959). His dramaturgical
metaphor of the theatrical performance where we each wear different masks
and present to different audiences on different stages is extremely satisfying.
He writes that:
The stage presents things that are make-believe; presumably life
presents things that are real and sometimes not well rehearsed.
More important, perhaps, on the stage one player presents himself
in the guise of a character to characters projected by other players;
the audience constitutes a third party to the interaction - one that
is essential and yet, if the stage performance were real, one that
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would not be there. In real life, the three parties are compressed
into two; the part one individual plays is tailored to the parts
played by the others present, and yet these others also constitute
the audience. (Goffman, 1959, Preface)
As we work and play with one another, the ability to move and morph
between different presentations of self are essential. We cannot be the same
person all the time to all people. We dictate our actions on a huge number
of variables but the big ones include who the audience is and our desired
outcome; the means and the end. Both matter, and neither really justifies the
other, but both are essential in determining how we act. Social identity theory
(SIT) suggests that our sense of self comes from two places, our social and
our personal identities. The personal comes from our unique characteristics,
whereas the social comes from our shared cultural and interest groups (Tajfel
& Turner, 1986).
With regards to the presentation of self to others, there is a distinction
to be made between presenting a persona or version of oneself and presenting
an entirely different version of oneself which is outright deception. One is a
natural product of us having social circles and the necessary human reaction
to interacting with a diversity of social connections in different contexts. The
other is a legally abhorrent means of fraud or impersonation.
The traveling medicine man of the 19th century (huckster) was a rare suc-
cessful embodiment of this latter phenomenon (McNamara, 1971). In today’s
connected world the ability to defraud people in consecutive towns has largely
gone away because it is extremely hard to reinvent oneself without appearing
strange to normative observers (“You have no prior work experience?”, etc.).
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To attempt a reinvention of this type means that the stakes are very high and
one does not necessarily care about the ramifications. It is a Hail Mary pass
with an unlikely positive outcome for the defrauder.
In the physical world, our laws are set up to allow the social masks we put
on for different audiences and to discourage and punish the outright deception
and fraud. In the online or mediated space, it is much harder to police this
distinction. We do not yet have the mechanics to reliably know the identity of
the other party in a transaction. We certainly are not prepared with thousands
of years of practice with these tools – as we have been in the oﬄine, face to
face world.
2.2.1.2 Online
Our understanding of our sense of self is being challenged in the online space.
As we continue to hurtle forward into a fully networked world, where commu-
nications are being mediated through electronic means to a greater extent, we
have a new, different set of attributes and rules to play by. This new stage,
the mediated presence, affords new behavior and norms, but we do not yet
have best practices or agreed upon senses of what they mean. We live in a
new age of “cheap pseudonyms,” where it is easy to start over, where there is
no history attached to a new account (E. Friedman & Resnick, 2001).
Across cultures, we struggle in the physical world, but at least we can be
embarrassed, confused, or angry and the effect is limited by time and place.
With online mediated identity, we are often presenting the same self to many
more people. There is a loss of context of time and place. Networked publics,
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modeled after Negroponte’s descriptions of bits versus atoms (Negroponte,
1995), are creating havoc with our known patterns of presentation and normal
socially aware behavior (boyd, 2008). These new networked publics have the
following properties:
• Persistence: online expressions are automatically recorded and archived.
• Replicability : content made out of bits can be duplicated.
• Scalability : the potential visibility of content in networked publics is
great.
• Searchability : content in networked publics can be accessed through
search.
In light of these new publics, the future norm-brokers, the youth of today,
have already begun to behave accordingly (Stutzman, 2006). The sharing
practices of youth are more pronounced than adults – they use more of the
privacy tools available. The youth do not understand how all the technology
works, but they do realize that if unwanted people can see into these online
spaces, then they lose some of their sought-after and ever-elusive autonomy.
Parents are concerned about their children’s safety, both online and oﬄine.
Because of this fear and the (over)pre-cautious behavior of the parents, the
ability to play as a child is going away, and with it the ability for youth to
experiment with who they are and what they want to project to the world
(Skenazy, 2009; boyd, 2008).
Daniel Solove paints the future of privacy as a balance between our pub-
lished selves and the interests of the organization or firm. He feels we have
largely given up our privacy today and the future will only see more of the
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same unless we curb, through law, the tide of this loss of control (Solove, 2007).
If the law does not step in, Solove feels we will capitulate even more of our
power over our privacy and the data we generate to corporate interests, who,
by law, have profit as their primary goal.
In the ramp up of user-centered technologies that are being developed to
help us navigate the Internet as people, Kim Cameron has come to the fore
in helping to define and construct what an Identity Metasystem would look
like. In 2005, he published the 7 Laws of Identity that have to be met by any
system claiming to handle digital identity in a user-centric fashion (Cameron,
2005a).
1. User Control and Consent : Identity systems must only reveal informa-
tion identifying a user with the user’s consent.
2. Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use: The identity system must
disclose the least identifying information possible, as this is the most
stable, long-term solution.
3. Justifiable Parties : Identity systems must be designed so the disclosure
of identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary and
justifiable place in a given identity relationship.
4. Directed Identity : A universal identity system must support both “omni-
directional” identifiers for use by public entities and “uni-directional”
identifiers for use by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while
preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles.
5. Pluralism of Operators and Technologies : A universal identity solution
must utilize and enable the interoperation of multiple identity technolo-
gies run by multiple identity providers.
6. Human Integration: Identity systems must define the human user to be
a component of the distributed system, integrated through unambiguous
human-machine communication mechanisms offering protection against
identity attacks.
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7. Consistent Experience Across Contexts : The unifying identity metasys-
tem must guarantee its users a simple, consistent experience while en-
abling separation of contexts through multiple operators and technolo-
gies.
These seven laws will be the bedrock of good identity systems that get
built in the next few years. Erring on the side of minimal and justified disclo-
sure based on the user’s consent will be a welcome change from the types of
systems and practices we see in place today with regards to data handling and
management in most places that have to worry about this kind of personal
information. Having options for the users, with regards to service providers,
portability, and identifiers keeps the person whose data this is, in charge. Re-
quiring humans to be a part of the mix and keeping things consistent are
essential as well if anyone other than the engineers who have been thinking
about this type of technology for years is expected to use it or like it.
These laws look past the severe hurdles of corporate politics, legal wrangling
(domestic and international), and technological feasibility and compatibility.
These facts are not faults, though, but rather, features. Having the big picture
in sight allows for a common frame of reference as we move forward with a
rather large, rather impossible-looking task. But it will happen, because it is
important.
2.2.1.3 Infrastructure
Many community-led efforts have been making progress on the Identity Meta-
system vision. Before the term had been coined, technologies such as Shib-
boleth, x509, LDAP, SSL, PGP/GPG, and cryptography more generally were
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being used successfully in the marketplace to help identify and credential users
and transactions across the internet. Most credentialing had not been done
on the World Wide Web, as the interfaces were too raw and bringing the user
into the transaction usually only ended in confusion and frustration.
More recently, newer technologies and projects have started to dot the
landscape and make real infrastructure and user interface progress; informa-
tion cards, the Liberty Alliance, OpenID, SAML, Heraldry, Higgens, Pamela
Project, OSIS, and Bandit to name a few. An explosion of both consumer
awareness and interoperability are leading the efforts towards widespread iden-
tity infrastructure. In a few years, we will begin to see robust reputation and
trust systems built on top of a reliable and credible identity layer and meta-
system. There are too many large players and too much money to be made to
not expect a convergence of technology and thinking in this space. Consistent,
interoperable standards around identity will allow for new markets to open up
and innovation to push the edge of what is possible.
On the individual level, there are a few coping mechanisms in seeing our
oﬄine and online personas begin to blur. Michael Wesch has called it “context
collapse” (Wesch, 2008a, 2008b), and danah boyd has referenced “context col-
lisions” in her discussions around Facebook Friends or Friendsters, suggesting
that these are not your real friends (boyd, 2008). Facebook itself promotes
the fact that your connections on their site are of real IDs – that there is so-
cial value in real existing connections, and not just people we have met online.
Much social research suggests that this is true, but others say that with enough
time and energy, online relationships are no less important or real than those
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we groom oﬄine as well. Additionally, research has shown that those people
who share more in public are more willing to let their personas overlap and
verify that they are the same person (Russell & Stutzman, 2007). Some peo-
ple try to keep multiple personas online, and to keep them separate from one
another. This is largely futile in the long run (Novak, Raghavan, & Tomkins,
2004; Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009), but there are reports of people going to
remarkable lengths to keep their public and private, or work and family lives
separate (i.e., Belle de Jour) (Knight, 2009). Of course, the counter example
is that we do not know about the cases we do not know about – the successes.
2.2.2 Reputation
Upon identity, reputation can be constructed. Without identity, reputation
and trust are much harder, if not impossible to employ. Reputation and trust
are concepts that go hand in hand in the literature. One cannot read very
deeply without finding either competing definitions or overlapping patches of
claimed groundwork.
Phil Windley and his students have most recently produced a cogent set
of the twelve elements, or characteristics, that any system used for reputation
should include (Windley, Tew, & Daley, 2007). Each is a distillation of earlier
research and it currently stands as the single most concise list of attributes
of reputation. Contextual Authority Tagging, I think, successfully includes or
employs all twelve.
• Reputation is one of the factors upon which trust is based.
• The expectation of future reciprocity or retaliation creates an incentive
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for good behavior in the present.
• Reputation is personal.
• Reputation is a currency.
• Reputation is narrative.
• Reputation is based on identity.
• Reputation is based on verified claims and transactions.
• Reputation is based on opinion (indirect information from other wit-
nesses).
• Reputation exists in the context of community.
• Reputation exists in a particular context.
• There is a natural tradeoff between reputation and privacy.
• The quality of a reputation calculation should be regularly assessed.
Sabater and Sierra compiled a wide list of computational models that at-
tempt to calculate or otherwise measure trust and reputation between actors
in a network (Sabater & Sierra, 2005). This computer science work largely
made it clear that there are many measuring sticks currently being used to
write software and that, in large part, they are not measuring the same things
yet – making it hard to compare the algorithms. Sabater and Sierra classi-
fied the algorithmic models across seven facets. Algorithms were classified by
conceptual model (game theoretical or cognitive), information source (direct,
witnessed, sociological information, and prejudice), visibility (local or global
calculations), granularity (contextualized or general calculations), behavior as-
sumptions (lying), boolean/continuous measures, and reliability information.
Sabater and Sierra notice that the game theoretical paradigm is dominant,
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probably due to the backgrounds of those doing the current research, and that
there is more need for input from psychology and sociology researchers in this
area. As the models become more complex, the current batch of game the-
oretical models do not continue to perform as well as with earlier, simpler
e-commerce models. Additionally, contextualized models have not been used
as much recently, as they are more complex to model. Again, these global trust
and reputation scores work well with simple models, but begin to show their
limitations when presented with more social problems and decision making
tasks.
One of the facets that is implied in the earlier discussion is that of collusion.
When people or agents work together, under cover of deception, to further a
particular goal, they are lying together. Lying, itself, is an important piece for
this research, for when many of these identity relationships have historically
happened between people in the physical world they have a human sense of
whether the person standing in front of them is the same person who was
standing before them the day before. Identity, in this sense, is stable and
assumed in the physical world in which we have so much collective history
(and practice). And with this, the assumption is that the person who will be
standing before you tomorrow, claiming to be your friend, is still the same
person.
Online, this assumption of stable identity is not as strong. We do not
currently have a good, strong means of identifying actors on the global network
with any confidence. There is ongoing work in the Identity community (see
Section 2.2.1) to help solve some of these issues, so that our online interactions
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can begin to function a little more like our oﬄine interactions – with confidence
and more stability over time.
At the societal level, we do have means of assessing reputation. Today’s
banks, credit rating agencies, mortgage companies all work together to share
information about their customers so they can make informed opinions about
one’s future likelihood to be financially solvent and capable of paying back their
loans. In large part, one’s creditworthiness now sits upon a single computed
value, one’s credit score. It is worth noting here that while one’s credit score is
available to you and others (at a cost, of course), the algorithm (or algorithms)
used to determine that score is not. There is little transparency into a process
that holds a vast amount of control over one’s economic reality in modern life.
2.2.2.1 Source Selection
Another body of research is centered around source selection among peers in
a work environment. Source selection is defined to be the process or decision-
making that one goes through in deciding which sources of information to use
for the task at hand. Many studies over the years have crystalized the notion
that source selection is based primarily on source accessibility and source qual-
ity. The definitions of these two concepts have been up for debate as well, as
accessibility has been defined in terms of physical proximity (Pinelli, Bishop,
Barclay, & Kennedy, 1993), comfort with a source (Fidel & Green, 2004), ef-
fort involved (Marton & Choo, 2002), as well as simple availability (Vancouver
& Morrison, 1995). An interesting social effect is found around the possibility
of appearing incompetent when seeking information from a trusted, quality
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source (Cross & Borgatti, 2004). Through think aloud exercises, recent re-
search suggests that source quality is the most dominant factor when making
these source selection decisions (Woudstra & Hooff, 2008).
If source quality is the primary factor determining source selection, then
aiding the effective identification of quality sources follows as an important
factor. O’Reilly found that quality sources are perceived to be relevant, timely,
specific, and accurate (O’Reilly, 1982). Later, authority and expertise and
trust were most frequently cited as criteria for acceptance or rejection of an
information source (Nilan, Peek, & Snyder, 1988; Halpern & Nilan, 1988).
A few years later, work on information quality and cognitive authority was
made more explicit and showed that the credibility of an information source
or document relied heavily on the belief that the source was coming from a
reliable place (based on reputation, prior work, and apparent authenticity)
(Rieh, 2002).
As we continue to struggle with source selection, determining the veracity
of a claim of authenticity and vetting the credibility of the provenance of a
source become arguably more important than the information held within the
source. Finding good data starts with finding good sources of data. Of course,
this depends on finding good data on good sources of data. As they say, “It’s
turtles all the way down” (Hawking, 1988).
2.2.2.2 Social Capital
Social capital is a loosely defined, cross-disciplinary idea spanning sociology,
economics, medicine, political science, and psychology. It has been studied
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in all of these fields, and the definitions used vary widely depending on the
context of the question being examined and the backgrounds of the researchers
involved. A definition that should be agreeable to most of the researchers in
this area is that social capital “is about the value of social networks, bonding
similar people and bridging between diverse people, with norms of reciprocity”
(Claridge, 2004; Dekker & Uslaner, 2001). Claridge compiled a table of over
twenty definitions of social capital and found that they could be grouped by
whether the definitions focused on internal and external relationships, bonding
and linking relationships, or both of these types (Claridge, 2004).
Seeing that social capital theory involves a human element, and not a
necessarily economic element, researchers have a hard time quantifying and
therefore measuring social capital. Others have shown that social capital is
impossible to measure directly and that proxies must be used in any attempts
at empirical analysis (Collier, 2002). The models that have been developed
over the years each have a specificity to them belying the underlying research
area and for the most part cannot be said to be comprehensive (Claridge,
2004). That said, social capital theory is widely held as having value and is
being incorporated into more and more of the models being proposed that
govern understanding of human behavior and decision-making (economic and
otherwise). Social capital theory brings together important sociological areas
of research including social support, social cohesion, and integration theory
(Requena, 2003).
At some point during a group’s bonding, group participants have been
shown to have a greater connectivity and cohesion with one another (Baker &
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Dutton, 2007). Even if the group was part of the control in an experiment,
benefits afforded to them by fellow group members begin to be paid back at a
greater rate (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000).
The organization, or firm, has also presented itself as a rich environment
in which to study social capital, as it is “conducive to the development of high
levels of social capital” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Contextual Authority
Tagging leverages the environment of the workplace or organization“as a social
community specializing in the speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer
of knowledge” (Kogut & Zander, 1996).
Lin was the first to take social capital theory and formally apply social
network analysis. His work placed social capital into the realm of the mea-
surable and potentially granted the power of causality to some of the social
linkages within a network (Lin, 1999). He also spoke about how reputation is
an indication of social gain and that this reputation is an aggregation of good
will, or, social capital (Lin, 2001).
Moving the discussion of social capital to the web, Uslaner concluded that
the Internet is “neither a dark and threatening place nor a grand intellectual
and social commune” (Uslaner, 2000). People will remain people and the
network is a tool through which they will continue to work, play, trust, and
distrust each other. The network does not remove the social from social capital,
but because it does hamper the non-verbals, the highs are higher and the lows
are lower. We are still on our own to determine the intentions of the person
on the other computer.
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2.2.2.3 Shared Understanding
Humans have a unique ability to put themselves in the minds of others. Dun-
bar’s Theory of Mind suggests that most humans can place themselves into
recursion, or model, three or four levels deep before getting confused (Dunbar,
2004b). This means that we can think about another person’s thinking about
a third’s thinking about a fourth. Dunbar pointed out that Shakespeare reg-
ularly worked on the sixth level of recursion: Shakespeare as the writer must
intend that the audience believes that Iago intends that Othello supposes that
Desdemona loves Cassio, who in fact loves Bianca.
This ability to imagine what others imagine also means that we are capable
of manipulating those perceptions in others. We act in calculated ways and we
use gossip as a social cue to control the behaviors of others. Dunbar writes that
we can control the number of free riders in our midst via social grooming and
gossip (Dunbar, 2004a). This assumes stable identities and, with them, we are
very effective at limiting those who cross norms and break social standards.
Organizational psychology has developed a tool called “360-degree feed-
back” or “multisource feedback” or “multisource assessment.” First used by
the Germans prior to World War II, multisource feedback has steadily gained
in popularity over the last 60 years. As an evaluation method, it is now in
very wide use in organizations to evaluate worker performance from all per-
spectives – peers, bosses, subordinates, and others (Fleener & Prince, 1997).
Rather than only receiving appraisals from direct reports or from those above,
multisource evaluations provide multiple perspectives on a worker’s output or
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performance. Multisource feedback may also include self evaluation. Most be-
lieve that this style of feedback allows for a more full, more nuanced view of an
employee to be obtained during review, but consensus has not been reached on
whether this knowledge about the worker effects real change (Seifert, Yukl, &
McDonald, 2003). Being evaluated by others also brings a cognitive load that
forces the participant to see others’ perspectives – an invocation of Theory of
Mind is part of what makes going through the process hard for the employee.
The Johari Window (See Figure 2.2), named after its creators, is another
device that has come into its own as a useful representation of the level of
awareness of interpersonal relationships between people (Luft & Ingham, 1955;
Luft, 1961). When evaluated, a group member or researcher categorizes the
information being revealed about the group member. The four panes of the
window are as follows and represent the different types of information about
a person.
• Quadrant I, the area of free and open activity, refers to behavior and
motivation known to self and known to others.
• Quadrant II, the blind area, where others can see things in ourselves of
which we are unaware.
• Quadrant III, the avoided or hidden area, represents things we know but
do not reveal to others (e.g., a hidden agenda or matters about which
we have sensitive feelings).
• Quadrant IV, area of unknown activity, where neither the individual nor
others are aware of certain behaviors or motives. Yet we can assume
their existence because eventually some of these things become known,
and it is then realized that these unknown behaviors and motives were
influencing relationships all along.
The Johari Window may be such a useful tool and graphical model for
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Figure 2.2: Johari Window of Interpersonal Relations
an organization since we know about social comparison theory. Humans are
constantly sizing each other up and trying to make sure they fit in with their
social surroundings (Festinger, 1954). However, our ability for “social projec-
tion” (Gerard & Orive, 1987, 171), that of estimating others’ attitudes about
oneself, has often been shown to be “dichotomous” with ones own attitudes
about oneself. If not kept in check, this dichotomy can lead to a false sense of
consensus and agreement between coworkers and group members (L. E. Rice
& Mitchell, 1973). We need to be reminded of the shortcomings of our own
ability to evaluate social situations so that we can continue to re-evaluate and
incorporate all perspectives.
One method to detect a dichotomy among a group, or a lack of “Shared
Understanding” is that of The Squirm Test (E. E. Kim, 2009):
The Squirm Test is a simple tool for measuring Shared Understand-
ing. Take a team of people working on a project together. Have
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them sit in a circle and on their hands.
Ask someone to stand up and briefly explain what the team is
working on, what are the challenges, and what’s [sic] the plan
moving forward. No one is allowed to say anything unless they are
standing. Once that person is finished talking, have the next person
stand and go through the same exercise. Repeat until everyone has
had a chance to speak.
The more people squirmed while others were talking, the less Shared
Understanding you have.
Applied to people, instead of projects or teamwork, The Squirm Test, or a
test like it in form and function, could be a good indicator of shared under-
standing about a person’s areas of expertise or knowledge.
Recent studies by Vazire and Mehl go further. While there may be blind
spots and missing information among groups in a social setting, evaluations of
each other cannot be comprehensive without the input from all parties. “There
is no single perspective from which a person is known best and that both the
self and others possess unique insight into how a person typically behaves”
(Vazire & Mehl, 2008, 1202). We need everyone to participate in thinking
about one another if we hope to fully capture the social knowledge within a
group or organization.
2.2.3 Trust
The new, digitized transparency is one major means of facilitating
deals between people who do not know each other. (Etzioni &
Bhat, 2009)
Like a few of the topics in this literature review, there are both philosoph-
ical definitions as well as modern, computer-related definitions and research
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regarding trust. Baier wrote about Trust and Antitrust in 1986 and is com-
monly referred to in matters of defining trust as we understand it in a modern
society (Baier, 1986). Citing works from Aristotle, Hume, Plato, Locke, and
Hobbes, she points out that largely, philosophical debates regarding trust have
been rather sparse. In addition, Baier argues that most discourse is on trust
between rational peers not of unequal power – objective and dispassionate
discourse among those equal in a social hierarchy. She finds this to be a
shortcoming of the literature and the discussion, but at the same time, while
pointing out that the majority of relationships in the world are not of this type,
rational peers serve as the best place to get at the moral questions regarding
free will and trust.
She says that trust could be evaluated in terms of betrayal rather than just
reliance. “One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when one trusts, and
also shows one’s confidence that they will not take it” (Baier, 1986, 235). The
more information one passes to someone else, the more power one grants to
them – power to do both good and bad. When someone is granted the power
to betray but with the confidence that they will not betray, trust has been
conferred. To this end, trust can be measured as a function of confidence and
power.
As well, “trust is much easier to maintain than it is to get started and is
never hard to destroy” (Baier, 1986, 242). Along with reputation, trust can
be quickly reduced to doubt and questioning by a breach of confidentiality,
morality, or follow-through. Axelrod said in 1984 that trust allows us to give
value to the “shadow of the future” today (Axelrod, 1984). All our information
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flows have “historical residues” moving forward and should be considered with
every decision we make (Fisman & Khanna, 1999).
Research on trust within information science has tended to focus on the
relationship between the user and the document or the information that is be-
ing interacted with (Kelton, Fleishmann, & Wallace, 2008). Other researchers
complain that trust can only be between two people and not computers or
information sources (Solomon, 2000; B. Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, & Howe,
2000). Kelton defined four levels of trust related to the scope of the players
involved (Kelton et al., 2008, 364):
• Individual : Personality characteristic
• Interpersonal : Social tie directed from one actor to another
• Relational : Emergent property of a mutual relationship
• Societal : Feature of a community as a whole
This scoping of trust creates a clean perspective into existing research and
keeps separate the vastly different working definitions of trust. Kelton explains
that the Individual level is largely defined by the Psychology literature where
trust is defined more as a predisposition to trust, a personality characteris-
tic. Interpersonal contains the most work and characterizes trust largely as a
measure of expectation or confidence in another actor’s future behavior. This
encompasses the computer science and modeling work mentioned below. The
Relational level is smaller since it assumes a mutual relationship, and Uslaner
and Lin’s work on social capital fall into the Societal category.
While Baier speaks mostly about trust between consenting, rational adults
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with the capacity to continuously make decisions about past, current, and fu-
ture transactions, the literature within computer science is largely constructed
around the most primitive model of a relationship, that of one software agent
to another. Trust in this regard is interesting as the exhibited behavior can
be deterministic and computed across a vast array of actors. Of course, these
types of experiments and software models borrow much more from economic
models than from philosophical ones, but the results are interesting because
humans, to some extent, are predictable enough for these types of models to
be useful. In addition, humans interacting via mediated computer technolo-
gies exhibit less trust than when interacting face-to-face making them seem
more like the computer science software agents (Bos, Olson, Gergle, Olson, &
Wright, 2002). Although as the technologies we use to communicate become
less visible, making the interactions seem more “natural”, this diminishing
effect shows promise of going away. Since humans can be tested and then
modeled with software (to varying degrees), this area is rich for the study of
networks and untrusted interactions.
Jennifer Golbeck has done a variety of studies on networked trust and
reputation models using the nascent connections making up the Semantic Web
(Golbeck & Hendler, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). She is finding that automated,
local calculations of trust can be inferred and applied to systems such as email
and social network inferences. This work is largely limited by the amount of
online data describing people, but as the web becomes more social (Facebook,
Twitter, etc.), this kind of data will become more prevalent and the models
are expected to become more robust.
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The idea that trust is transitive (can be sensed or passed via a trusted con-
tact) is also prevalent in this type of work. Trust Network Analysis uses this as-
sumption to varying degrees (Jøsang, Hayward, & Pope, 2006) and can model
both positive and negative values of trust, unlike earlier work like PageRank
(Brin & Page, 1998) and EigenTrust (Kamvar, Schlosser, & Garcia-Molina,
2003), and even Kleinberg’s HITS algorithm (Kleinberg, 1999a). Combatting
malicious use (link spam, colluding agents) is a constant struggle for the op-
erators of social networks, but there have been gains made in engineering the
social aspects to benefit the communities of users (Levien, 2004; Lauterbach,
Truong, Shah, & Adamic, 2009). Post analysis of malicious use also leads to
new knowledge of how to model trust networks built on real data (Gyo¨ngyi,
Garcia-Molina, & Pedersen, 2004).
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2.3 Expertise
“We shape our tools, and thereafter our tools shape us.” – Marshall
McLuhan (McLuhan, 1964)
Expertise is a word that is usually used to describe a sense of experience and
knowledge about a subject area. It is something that a person has acquired
and can demonstrate at will. Expertise has been studied across disciplines
and some generalizations can be applied (Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, &
Hoffman, 2006).
Herling says expertise is defined as “displayed behavior within a specialized
domain and/or related domain in the form of consistently demonstrated actions
of an individual which are both optimally efficient in the execution and effective
in their results.” This is separate from mere competence, which is minimally
efficient in the execution and effective in the results (Herling, 2000). And to
that end, it is not a mere demonstration of expertise or mastery and it is “not
an event – it’s a purposeful journey” (Swanson, 2007).
It seems that expertise is something that can be generated, but it takes
time. The literature around deliberate practice and sustained effort suggest
that around 10,000 hours (roughly ten years) are necessary to accrue enough
repetitive action that things seem to come “naturally” (Gladwell, 2008). The
experts themselves do not use the word natural to describe their ability, but
non-experts in a domain certainly do.
Experts are people who can give a lay of the land quickly with a view from
above. They understand how things fit together and see a bigger picture than
those of us who may not know as much about a subject. They know where
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they know things, but more importantly, they are unique in that they know
where they do not know things. They are aware of their own shortcomings
along the spectrum – the Rumsfeldian “known unknowns” (Rumsfeld, 2002).
Collins and Evans (2007) open their Introduction with:
The underlying assumption of this analysis is that, other things
being equal, we ought to prefer the judgments of those who “know
what they are talking about.”This does not mean that correct judg-
ments are always made by those who know what they are talking
about. . . . The assumption means simply that in spite of the
fallibility of those who know what they are talking about, their
advice is likely to be no worse, and may be better, than those who
do not know what they are talking about.
Collins also does not like the relational (or labeling) view of expertise,
where someone is labeled after the fact. He prefers the “realist” approach. He
assumes expertise may or may not be possessed by an individual independent
of whether others think they possess expertise. Contextual Authority Tagging
would assume that in a sufficiently social environment over time, this becomes
less true – and that the relational model holds up well enough to be considered
actionable. I write more about this relative or relational aspect of expertise
and truth in Section 2.3.4.
Maybury boiled all this down to five principles of expertise (Maybury,
D’Amore, & House, 2002):
• Dynamicity : Expertise evolves over time and requires continuous aware-
ness of changes in individual knowledge and skills.
• Distribution: Expertise typically resides across a set of individuals be-
cause of the complexity and breadth of technologies and missions.
• Community : Experts aggregate into either loosely or tightly coupled
communities of expertise based on attractors such as value gained from
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shared knowledge. Often experts self-organize into networks within which
individuals play roles such as individual contributor, broker, or facilita-
tor.
• Self-Assessment : Expertise is typically validated in the context of the
work environment. Frequently peer review or assessment is a preferred
validation mechanism, in part because of the scarceness of expertise.
• Access : Expertise is rare, expensive, and often difficult to access. Fur-
thermore, assessments of expertise are often controlled because of privacy
concerns.
2.3.1 Expert Processing
When tasked with answering what it is about experts that make them ex-
perts, most experts agree that cognitively, experts display an understanding
or schema of a domain better than non-experts. Cognitively, human expertise
is “characterized not by superior strategies of problem solving or a larger ca-
pacity of working memory, but larger and better selection of organized domain-
specific knowledge structures (schemas) in long-term memory. Such schematic
knowledge representations allow us to categorize incoming information and act
in appropriate ways” (Kalyuga, 2009).
In the mid-1960s, seminal expert research showed that chess masters had
extremely better recall of chess positions than those who were not chess mas-
ters (de Groot, 1965, 1966). Chess masters could remember meaningful chess
placements - but did no better than non-players in remembering positions that
were randomized (Chase & Simon, 1973). The masters saw real chess positions
in terms of “chunks” whereas the novices saw individual pieces. The masters
were seeing a different model of what was happening on the board. When
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the pieces did not fit a sensical chess layout, the masters were reduced to the
relatively poor performance of remembering individual pieces.
This type of cognitive modeling is well accepted now. One of the most
interesting models consists of global and local architectures for processing new
information (Sternberg & Frensch, 1992). When confronted with new infor-
mation, experts use a global view (understanding) to first categorize the new
information, but then hand off to more automatic, local processing once they
“get” it. With information of a type the experts have seen before, they can
easily categorize and move on with much less effort than a novice. Even when
a lack of specific knowledge is available in a domain, experts use their more
rigorous high-level structure and understanding of information of that type to
process new incoming information or situations (Schraagen, 1993). They have
a more extensive ontology in their minds that helps them to quickly assess
what is new and different from what is similar to what they have seen before
and probably holds little new information for them to learn from.
Similarly, experts categorize things based on existing high-level cognitive
schemas, whereas novices rely on surface features of specific tasks (Schoenfeld
& Herrmann, 1982). When approached with a decision or task, an expert will
fit it into a larger framework of how the world works first, and then operate
on what they know to be the important parts of tasks of that type. A novice
will focus more on the specifics and try to solve the problem in front of them,
as that is all they know. With experience and a broader familiarity, the novice
begins to work more like the expert – in fact, begins to become an expert in
his or her own right.
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2.3.2 Deliberate Practice
Deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993) is the idea that
getting better at something, obtaining success and demonstrating expertise, is
a function not only of talent, but also training (Dubner & Levitt, 2006; Dubner,
2008). Excellence is accomplished mainly through the following tenets:
• Focusing on technique as opposed to outcome
• Setting specific goals
• Getting good, prompt feedback, and using it
Following these tenets, Dubner says that practice can become more about
science and less about repetition. If repetition is in order, then fine, but it
may not be the best thing for increasing performance.
Much of this work has been done in the area of expert performance where
Ericsson et al. (2006) write in their 918-page Handbook:
expert performers — whether in memory or surgery, ballet or com-
puter programming — are nearly always made, not born. And yes,
practice does make perfect.
This is a theme throughout Freakanomics as well (Levitt & Dubner, 2005).
Levitt and Dubner use hockey players’ birthdays as well as other interesting
causal indicators to show that it is not just talent that makes winners winners,
it is also circumstance and will. Those born earlier in the year are therefore
older and bigger when the time for tryouts rolls around.
Related, but in the mainstream business literature, is Seth Godin’s en-
trepreneurial theory of the Dip - that successful entrepreneurs and athletes
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work through being average through persistence and focus. Most people burn
out in the long run up to being the best – they falter in the Dip. Godin’s three
steps include:
• Make the world sufficiently small
• Be the best at it in that world
• Then the market cares
Getting up the hill of performance and success is about seeing the landscape
and understanding that to be the best in the world, you have to define the scope
of the world, and then stick to it (Godin, 2008). To take on the global market
at first is probably not the smart play. Set your sights on the local market
first, and be the best there. Then ramp up to the next level.
2.3.3 Expertise and the Citizen
Collins and Evans (2007) provide the basis for this next section. They clearly
articulate our collective movement into “The Third Wave of Science Studies”.
They say that a distinction is to be made between experiences that the public
has a lot of, and therefore cannot be considered specialist knowledge, and
specialist expertise, in that it is notable that someone has experience and
skills in an area. They feel strongly that “experts should obviously have a
relatively greater input where their results are more reliable” (p135), which is
to say, areas of technical expertise and social sciences. They are not talking
about areas such as culture and religion.
There has been an “epistemological leveling” over the last few decades as
seen in Polanyi’s “Republic of Science” (Polanyi, 1962). Science has become
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more approachable and knowable and “familiar,” “demystified,” and it is the
right of everyone to be accepted into the role of scientist, assuming that norms
are observed. But now is the time that we need to rebuild some of the vertical
that has been leveled (Collins & Evans, 2007, 139).
The metaphor of the mountain (Collins & Pinch, 1993) is referred to di-
rectly:
Nevertheless, to take it that the epistemological landscape is with-
out a vertical dimension is to abandon responsibility for the world
we live in. The new job of social scientists, having been so suc-
cessful with the leveling, is to rebuild some structure – or, more
properly, since it is obvious that there is lots of vertical structure
– to understand what holds things up.
And given this mandate, the responsibility falls to the individuals of so-
ciety. We need to decide who we confer power on and in what realms they
should wield that power of authority. “In the absence of suitable specialist
experience, the citizen can make technical judgments only through the trans-
mutation of expertise that starts with the social expertise of ubiquitous and
local discrimination – a matter of choosing who to believe rather that what to
believe” (Collins & Evans, 2007, 139).
The citizen does not have to know everything or be able to prove anything
on their own, they only have to have a system of credentials they can believe
in and trust.
Transmuted knowledge does not make the citizen a scientific expert
capable of contributing to the question of whether it is “p” or “not-
p”that is true in any particular scientific debate, but it can help the
citizen make a sensible decision about whether his or her political
decision should be premised on p or not-p. (Collins & Evans, 2007,
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139)
The scientists themselves have a greater burden as well, through trans-
parency and methodology. If the discussions around what science has to give
to society are driven by the experts, then the “social scientists, philosophers,
and other experts on expertise must [be ready to do] more than [point] to the
tension between the idea of expertise and the idea of democracy.” They need
to guide the discussion and not just declare that a discussion needs to take
place. Good policy is dependent on informed citizens and belief in a system
of cognitive authority1 where cognitive authority is necessary (when decisions
need to be made by those who are expert).
The struggle between democracy (an equal vote for all) and expertise
(weighted votes for those who know) is a constant balance. Getting to the
point where the population feels involved but guided by knowledge instead of
ideology is hard. Getting there
means working out some way of deciding how to use expertise even
when we know it is much less sure than once we thought it was,
even when we know it is too early to know who the experts really
are, and even when we know that it seems undemocratic to select
a group of experts, however wide, to whom we grant more author-
ity than we grant to the ordinary citizen. We must be ready to
alleviate the tension between democracy and expertise by helping
with the design of citizens’ juries and consensus conferences: help-
ing not just by saying “let us bring in some citizens” but by stating
what kinds of citizens with what backgrounds would be best and
what kind of and what length of exposure to what sort of technical
1Patrick Wilson wrote about cognitive authority as distinct from administrative author-
ity. Cognitive authority is that which is granted to you by others because of what they
think you know about. Administrative authority is that which one has because of rank or
position (Wilson, 1983).
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material might turn them into better representatives of the rest.
(Collins & Evans, 2007)
There will always be a mathematical distribution of expertise and knowl-
edge within a population. There will be members with low knowledge and
members with high knowledge. There will be members with amounts in-
between. And there is never an ideal amount of consensus when it is time
to make a decision. The role of expertise here is to serve as shortcut for those
who do not know enough to make a decision based only on the merits and
details of the case at hand. These members want to and must rely on the
part of the population that can understand the merits and details. These low
knowledge members must have a mechanism by which to choose which ex-
perts to trust. It is the responsibility of the group as a whole to provide that
mechanism.
2.3.4 Social Epistemology and Transparency
(spoken) Elphaba, where I’m from, we believe all sorts of
things that aren’t true. We call it - “history.”
(sung) A man’s called a traitor - or liberator
A rich man’s a thief - or philanthropist
Is one a crusader - or ruthless invader?
It’s all in which label
Is able to persist
There are precious few at ease
With moral ambiguities
So we act as though they don’t exist
They call me “Wonderful”
So I am wonderful
In fact - it’s so much who I am
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It’s part of my name
– Wizard, from Wonderful from Wicked
Social epistemology has relative definitions of fact and truth. These things
are collectively derived from the group, from society. Interestingly, this debate
comes, again, directly from “The Republic of Science” (Polanyi, 1962) having
made its debut in the work of Egan and Shera (1952). The scientists learn from
one another and in working together, they define what is known, what the facts
are. However, the idea that facts are facts is something social epistemology
has some trouble with, itself.
Truth with a capital T gives social epistemologists pause. We know that
if a pencil is dropped from a table, it will fall to the floor. However, that
fact is only the case within a certain framework. If we are in orbit aboard
the International Space Station, the pencil will not necessarily fall anywhere.
To predict future behavior requires some information about the framework in
which an experiment is being conducted. The fact that the pencil will fall is
only valid when the experimental framework matches up with the framework
from prior experiments. And so, if it does, we can make claims on our knowl-
edge about future events. We can make good predictions. We are pretty sure,
in fact we have never seen it happen otherwise, that if we are on Earth, the
pencil will fall to the floor. It is a probabilistic fact.
With more social facts of a less deterministic nature, say, the status of the
former planet Pluto, the framework we are operating in defines the answer,
just like before. Many textbooks still suggest that Pluto is a planet in our
solar system, but it was declared a dwarf planet in 2006 (IAU, 2006). The
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planet classification turns out to depend on the definition of planet itself.
That definition is a social agreement between the experts who are members
of the International Astronomical Union. When they changed the definition,
Pluto was no longer a planet – it became a dwarf planet.
A fact is something that is established by the practice of experts. As more
experts agree on a fact, we tend to think of the fact as being true. The fact
itself is “socially constructed”. In the same vein, a fact could be defined as a
lack of contention or controversy among experts. Latour and Woolgar claim
that the“reality [of a scientific entity or fact] is formed as a consequence of [the]
stabilization [of a controversy]” (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, 180). Nelson (1993)
even claims that the community is required as it is the only entity capable of
knowing anything (Goldman, 2001).
In discussing the issue of justice and equality, Goldman writes “Fricker
(1998) then points out that norms of credibility arise in society to pick out
the class of good informants, people alleged to be competent about the truth
as well as sincere. Unfortunately, societal norms of credibility tend to assign
more credibility to the powerful than they deserve and to deny credibility to
the powerless. The latter is a phenomenon of epistemic injustice.” (Goldman,
2001)
Goldman finally comes to the conclusion that seems inevitable as soon as
there is no Truth:
It seems clear that if social epistemology is to invoke group belief
and group knowledge, it should be prepared to deal with many
types of groups or collectivities and many conceptions of group
belief and knowledge. One size will not fit all. (Goldman, 2001)
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The facts themselves may have multiple definitions. This is David Wein-
berger’s conclusion as well – “My evidence that we’re never going to agree on
anything is . . . all of human history” (Weinberger, 2009). And if we are
to conclude that facts are hard to agree on, assuming we can agree at all –
then it must also follow that “facts are scarce” (Weinberger, 2009). When they
are agreed upon or objective, they end discussions2. They help to drive out
disagreement. But this is exactly the circular type of logic we end up with
if we assume that facts have that kind of power. Earlier, we said facts are
identified where there is a lack of controversy. Now, we are saying that facts
help clear up controversy. These are a tenuous set of definitions. “Facts used
to nail down arguments. Now they start them. We are in the middle of the
great unnailing.” (Weinberger, 2009).
Today, facts have become commodities in the sense that we assume we can
find the ones we need easily and quickly when necessary. And we have turned to
authority, in large part, to help make sense of our complicated, interconnected
world. There are just too many things that an individual cannot possibly be
expert in, and so, we defer to others. And the authority we defer to has relied
on their credentials as a quality proof for what they tell us but “credentialling
turns out to be a hack, based on the limitations of paper” (Weinberger, 2009).
Since communication and verification have always been expensive, we took a
shortcut and did the best we could; we invented certificates and credentials
written on paper and we invented seals and notaries.
2I claim that mathematics is the only inductive science (2 + 3 = 5). All others are
deductive and based on experiments (Popper, 1959) which are based on earlier established
facts, measurement, and frames of reference.
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But when facts require a community to define them, and the community is
comprised of experts and non-experts, then deciding whom to trust becomes
a new problem. The network is hyperconnected and we find ourselves dealing
with multisubjectivity with regards to what it is that is known. We struggle
to “triangulate towards objectivity” and find that transparency is really the
only logical way we can believe what we see. Existing paper credentials do
not provide the necessary transparency. We have to see the provenance of the
information in front of us. We begin to demand the provenance of the facts.
How strange that “transparency is the new objectivity” (Weinberger, 2009).
Transparency leads us to talk about Wikipedia.
2.3.5 Wikipedia
The Wikipedia has recently exploded on the scene and furthered the debate
on power and authority and expertise quite dramatically. The implementation
of a system that codifies the egalitarianism of all opinions has brought with it
a resurgence of the old arguments for and against power in the hands of the
practiced and knowledgeable. The Wikipedia is a “social agreement” with “no
control surfaces . . . [and] completely smooth” (Pesce, 2009). In a reference
to an ongoing spat between the Church of Scientology and Wikipedians, Pesce
asks “What happens when the hierarchies find that their usual tools of war
are entirely mismatched to their opponent?” (Pesce, 2009). Hierarchies do not
interface with adhocracies, they “short out.” Being transparent and dispersed,
with nobody in control, and by being a series of software codes, Wikipedia lays
the fundamental frameworks of our society bare and begs for further evidence
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and discussion. The code demands that changes are made in public, and
therefore, they are. Code is Law (Lessig, 1999).
Larry Sanger, co-founder of Wikipedia, philosopher, and staunch defender
of the idea that the learned should be reserved some power of decision-making,
has written about Expertise after Wikipedia (Sanger, 2009).
Sanger seems to assume that experts on a topic area agree with one another,
but it is perfectly acceptable to think that expert opinions, on any topic, are
no more consistent with one another than lay people’s understanding of an
issue. We can assume this to be true, especially where the topics are more
soft, as he says, than the hard sciences where it is much more straightforward
what are the facts and what are the agreed upon theories.
Anonymity is protected within the codes of Wikipedia. It comes with
a social cost (more likely to be reverted, marked at spam, etc.) but it is
a necessary means to allow information to enter the system. Subversive or
unpopular opinions and people under hostile regimes all need a place to be
represented and debated. Making edits and discussing potential changes with
a consistent handle or user account can accrue history and reputation that
anonymity cannot.
But as there is anonymity allowed (protected) within the walls of Wikipedia,
the statements and claims made by authors need to be backed up with some
proof. The authority of the person behind an account is not enough to push
through a change, as the widely deployed annotation “citation needed” makes
clear. Roles within Wikipedia do not hold authority because content gets its
own authority from other places. Authority is chained, from the outside, by
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design. The pillar of “No Original Research” means that authority has to be
derived from other sources (Wikipedia, 2003).
Sanger asks whether this will remove the role of expert from society? The
answer is no, as this is the wrong question. The wiki is a place for the dissem-
ination of existing thought. No original research. Log the facts and frame the
story here that is happening somewhere else. The reporter and the article are
not the story, and they should not be.
Sanger’s perspective of authority and expertise is that they are infallible
and part of “truth.” He addresses this while talking about the relativistic
perspective, that he claims not to understand. He feels that there is truth
in the world that can better be explained, conveyed, and related by someone
vested in the knowledge of an area. I feel that over the long haul, the Truth,
itself, changes and it is better modeled by everyone’s understanding of an issue
than by the experts. The scientific truths of today are dramatically different
than the scientific truths from four hundred years ago. It is the burden of the
expert to convey, convincingly, what their version of the truth is. It is their
burden to communicate effectively why they are correct and why the masses
(and other experts) should cite their opinions on how things are and what they
should be.
Lanier (2006) says we are swinging too much towards the rule of the masses,
a Digital Maoism. I tend to agree, but only in the sense that we currently have
swung too much towards anonymity and a lack of ownership and responsibility
concerning our discourse. We have comments from unnamed ogres on our
newspaper sites and blogs. We lack an identity metasystem on which to hang
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our names and reputations (Cameron, 2005b). On top of identity, we are
provided the capabilities for reputation, respect, and real discourse.
We need a middle ground between what Lanier laments (anonymity ev-
erywhere, mob rule) and what Sanger seems to assume (experts know best
and should be deferred to when they decide to intervene). We need a system
that allows for anonymity, for all the reasons that anonymity is good, but also
sustains a social cost for that anonymity, either by making it harder to be seen
or by making verified commenters more visible. It should not be a question
of blindly deferring to authority or power at the code level. The solution to
this “problem” is a social one - one that requires people. Strong defaults mat-
ter, and with a default nod towards verified comments, many of the default
problems with Wikipedia would melt away.
Wikipedia is not designed to be a source. A Wikipedia article should
provide a shortcut compared to doing the deep digging by one’s self – a first
step. Wikipedia is best presented as a path towards the truth that can be
found in other places. It is a list of citations and relevant work in an area. It
is not, itself, the relevant work or the place where any authority lives. It does
get its authority from outside – that is what makes it verifiable, and therefore,
powerful.
Sanger cannot imagine why nobody at Wikipedia has deferred to the ex-
perts. He is driven by the vision that when presented with expert opinion,
non-experts will gladly nod and say thank you and swallow it whole. This
is not how our society works – and well it should not. We want cross-linking
and provenance. We want skeptical thinking. We want investigative questions.
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Blind followership helps no one uncover any Truth.
Cognitive authority and administrative authority; Sanger conflates the two
and this is dangerous. Wikipedia articles should have no power of authority
because they are Wikipedia articles. As should not the authors of those articles
have any power because they are the authors. He misses the point that people
are granting authority to Wikipedia because it grants authority to others, in
a transparent way. The links are all clickable, allowing anyone the ability to
follow a rabbit hole and decide when they, themselves, are sated. The burden
is on each of us to uncover the truth that is sufficient – not on the social
agreement that is Wikipedia.
2.3.6 Subjective Logic
Having spoken about facts and their lack of objectivity, we can now talk about
opinions.
Measuring opinion is hard and many areas of research are active in this
regard. One of the most interesting is the formal area of Subjective Logic
(Jøsang, 2009). It sits between probability logic and calculus. It is a field that
“models belief and confidence in uncertain circumstances.” Beliefs are “rarely
binary” and “usually involve some amount of uncertainty” and can be modeled
with“belief distributions.”The most salient feature of this field, to an outsider,
is the opinion triangle model (Figure 2.3) that relates the variables necessary
for the visual representation of uncertainty.
In binary logic, belief and disbelief always sum to one, or b + d = 1.
In subjective logic, belief and disbelief sum to less than one, or b + d < 1.
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Figure 2.3: Jøsang’s Opinion Triangle (Jøsang, 2009, 11). This example shows
a pretty confident opinion (in the lower right corner) with belief of 0.7 and
uncertainty of 0.2.
When belief and disbelief sum to less than one, this is due to some amount of
uncertainty, u, represented in the final subjective logic equation b + d + u =
1. Together, these three elements, along with a base rate, a, combine to
form an opinion on a topic, ωx = (b, d, u, a), representing belief, disbelief, and
uncertainty, with a default base rate of 1/2 (or 0.5), leaning neither with a
bias towards belief or disbelief (Jøsang, 2009).
Representing opinions in this manner allows for calculations to be per-
formed on many opinions at once and may give insight into a collective view
that may otherwise have remained hidden. Jøsang says that mapping between
fuzzy categories (Figure 2.4) of likelihood and certainty (Figure 2.5) could be
done in a “straight-forward” manner (Jøsang, 2009, 18):
Real-world categories would likely be similar to those found in Sher-
man Kent’s Words of Estimated Probability (Kent, 1994); based on
the Admiralty Scale as used within the UK National Intelligence
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Model; or could be based on empirical results obtained from psy-
chological experimentation.
Figure 2.4: An example set of fuzzy categories that could be mapped to
Jøsang’s Opinion Triangle. (Jøsang, 2009, 18)
This format presents a clean means of approaching a more mathematical
model of Contextual Authority Tagging in the future. Rather than issuing
beliefs that an individual knows about a topic by tagging him or her, one
could additionally represent the strength of one’s belief at the same time.
CAT’s current implementation is all or none and does not provide this level of
precision.
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Figure 2.5: A mapping of fuzzy confidence categories to Jøsang’s Opinion
Triangle with two different base rate values. (Jøsang, 2009, 19)
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2.4 Tagging
Tagging, or social labeling, has presented itself as a lasting effect of the Web 2.0
movement of the middle 2000s. First popularized on the social bookmarking
website del.icio.us (later renamed delicious.com) by creator Joshua Schachter
(Schachter, 2005), tagging has proven resilient to both detractors and tradi-
tionalists. Within a social system, tagging with simple text labels provides an
inexpensive, yet rapid means of creating metadata around a set of resources
(Mathes, 2004). In the case of delicious.com, these resources were URLs on
the network, items that the users of the website wanted to bookmark or save
for later. Instead of saving these bookmarks in simple chronological order
by the datetime at which they were saved (the current best-practice of web
browsers of the day), these bookmarks were saved with a set of user-added
free-text labels. This proved powerful for at least three reasons: sorting and
filtering through these saved bookmarks and labels became much faster and
more effective, both for the user and anyone else; anyone could have a say in
how something was categorized; and it encouraged the act of bookmarking to
be done in public, shared for others to see and use. Other users could see (and
benefit) from the actions taken by any single user. The real power came when
many people saved the same link with many different words. Some of these
words overlapped with other users’ words and, collectively, could describe a
bookmark with alarming specificity. And nobody was in charge. This col-
lectivity without direction is what Thomas Vander Wal dubbed “folksonomy”
(Vander Wal, 2007). Vander Wal also made the distinction between broad
and narrow folksonomies. Narrow folksonomies are what come from a single
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or few users’ tagging behavior (see Flickr) whereas broad folksonomies come
about through the aggregation of many users’ tags (see delicious.com). He has
called the tagging, or labeling, activity within an individual’s Gmail account
a personal folksonomy (Vander Wal, 2005).
Folksonomies are non-hierarchical, messy, non-complete, colloquial, and
often sparse. But they are also nimble, esoteric, subtle, mutiplexed and often
extremely less expensive to operate and maintain. And they have a much
better chance, in the long run, to actually organize everything (“The only group
that can categorize everything is everybody” (Shirky, 2005)). Individual users
act largely in their own self-interest, with less cognitive load than traditional
filing into existing categories (Sinha, 2005), and exhibit greater recall later in
broad folksonomies that are highly populated (Lux, Granitzer, & Kern, 2007).
Tagging, architecturally speaking, can do everything that a hierarchical
system can do. What it provides in addition, is the notion that something can
be put into more than one place at a time. We have always fundamentally
organized physical objects based on shelf space and available storage areas.
This is because the physical object could only exist in one place at any one
time, our physical space was limited and expensive, and the pre-coordination
cost was necessary (we had to figure it out before we could label it). Digi-
tal information is not limited in this way. Instead of putting our documents
into physical hierarchical folders, we can put many labels onto each document.
Each document can exist in more than one “place” at a time. As Clay Shirky
wrote emphatically, “There is no shelf!”. Ontological classification works well
when the domain to be organized is small, has formal categories, stable and
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restricted entities, and clear, definable edges between them and when the par-
ticipants are trained, coordinated, expert, authoritative users. When these
things are not the case (usually, if not nearly always), we need tagging if we
are going to label it (and not depend on full-text search); we need to remove
the notion that we can fairly, and correctly, precoordinatedly represent the
domain. Ontological classification does not work when the domain is large,
unstable, unrestricted and without clear edges between entities and when the
participants are amateur, uncoordinated users without the authority to declare
what is true and what is not (Shirky, 2005).
When a group of people who are not trained as librarians or archivists or
gatekeepers can produce a system that does many of the same things more
traditional systems have been tasked with doing, but at a lesser cost and with
less coordination, discussions quickly begin to form around the merits of the
new system that could change everything. Thomas Friedman, when writing
about the 21st century world being flat, said that the collaborative nature
of online projects is “the most disruptive force of all,” in how it distributes
the load and the responsibility (and the gatekeeping) for deciding what is
right (T. Friedman, 2005). Historically, these gatekeepers were the ones who
determined what things were named and how they should be represented.
David Weinberger pointed out in 2005 that “tagging repudiates one of the
deepest projects our culture has undertaken over and over again: The rendering
of all knowledge into a single, universal framework. The rendering has been
assumed to be a process of discovery: The universe has an inner order that
experts and authorities can expose. But in a networked world we know better
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than ever that such an order is a myth of rationality” (Weinberger, 2005).
The world has become read/write instead of just read. Another project to
take up this mantle is Fluidinfo (Jones, 2009; Baeza-Yates, Jones, & Rawlins,
2000). Fluidinfo is a storage system, a “cloud database,” that only has objects
and tags and users. No single user owns any object, only their own tags
on those objects. The world, within Fluidinfo, is entirely read/write. Every
user can have opinions and put them in public (or keep them private). The
arbiters of truth become all of us. Figuring out whom to pay attention to is
much harder.
2.4.1 Structure
Tagging systems are constituted by a triumvirate of user, tag, and resource
(Marlow, Naaman, boyd, & Davis, 2006). Each of these three provide an essen-
tial piece of what makes these systems powerful and useful. Within a system of
tagged data, a user can ordinarily pivot between looking at information about
a user (what they have tagged and how they have tagged it), a tag (which users
use the tag and which resources have been tagged), and the resource (which
users have tagged the resource and with what tags) (Figure 2.6). Jumping
among and between these views into the data, known as pivoting, is trivial
with the hypertext upon which these systems are built.
Tagging systems in wide usage today still have not agreed upon a best
practice with regards to delimiters and user interface for the addition/editing
of tags. Some systems use spaces as delimiters (with no spaces in any single
tag) (Schachter, 2005), some allow multi-word tags with the usage of double
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Figure 2.6: Triumvirate of User, Tag, Resource
quotation marks (seems the most awkward to use), and most are comma de-
limited (which also allow for multi-word tags). There are pros and cons for
each style. Flickr has an interesting procedure. They allow tags with spaces
and capital letters, but store that information as the“raw”tag information and
then also generate“clean”tags for each resource that they use for most internal
calculations and back end processing. This allows for disambiguation between
“New York”, “NewYork”, and “newyork” in the user interface, but allows them
all to be processed by the system as “newyork” (Yahoo!, 2005).
A system that Vander Wal has found in his work to allow the most flexibility
and the least confusion in a multilingual world is to have multi-word tags
(allowing spaces) be entered and then managed through a series of text boxes,
one for each tag. A single click can remove any existing tag (usually represented
with a small graphical “x”), and there are little or no issues with confusion
around commas, underscores, or spaces within a series of tags (Vander Wal,
2009).
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2.4.2 Data or Metadata
In Everything is Miscellaneous, David Weinberger argues that data and meta-
data are one and the same. He feels that depending on what is interesting
to you at the moment, some attributes of a thing are data and the rest are
metadata. When you already know something about an object, and you are
looking to find that object or a different attribute of that object, the thing you
know is metadata. What you seek is data – it is the thing of interest. When
you uncover the (previously) unknown information, that is the data you were
looking for. Weinberger goes on to say that, while this is interesting, what is
more interesting is that a different searcher could be conducting exactly the
opposite search, and your metadata is his data, and vice versa (Weinberger,
2008a).
In a response to Weinberger’s 2005 essay on Tagging and Why It Matters
(Weinberger, 2005), Peterson takes issue with Some Philosophical Problems
with Folksonomy (Peterson, 2006). She sees the two worlds of classification
and folksonomy as fundamentally different and good for different things, but
also feels that folksonomies confuse “cataloging structure with personal opin-
ions” and “need to be separated”. Peterson feels that the innate relativism
of allowing multiple people to record conflicting annotations on a work is the
single greatest concern she has with folksonomies. The author’s intent should
be the thing the cataloguer strives to deduce and carry out with regards to
the classification of a document or work. She concludes with “Folksonomy is a
scheme based on philosophical relativism, and therefore it will always include
the failings of relativism. A traditional classification scheme will consistently
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provide better results to information seekers.”
Of course, Weinberger finds fault with this statement as well as the un-
derlying assumption that when the classification scheme comes from above (or
from the author), it is correct. He writes in 2006: “Tags are metaphysically
disruptive only if one believes that (a) there is one and only one way of cate-
gorizing The Republic, (b) that way has to be according to Plato’s intent, and
(c) tags are intended to state the single, true classification of The Republic. If
Elaine is right, then what is that true classification of The Republic? I don’t
know, I don’t think Elaine knows, I don’t think Plato knew, and I’m pretty
sure the entire question is technically nonsensical” (Weinberger, 2006).
Later, in 2008, Weinberger agrees with himself by saying“though categoriz-
ing only by the author’s intent is to me like insisting that readers only under-
line passages that the author considers significant” (Weinberger, 2008b). He
thinks “inconsistencies in tags actually make a folksonomy useful” and are not
philosophically describing the Aristotelian aboutness of an object, but rather
are describing the meaning of an object to an individual searcher or reader.
Who is to say that an opinion expressed by an individual, for an individual, is
wrong? If proxy statements are made by others concerning the aboutness of
an object based on the tags that have been inconsistently applied by searchers
and readers, so be it. But that categorization is not being done by the group
collectively, but rather it is an aggregated opinion, cast without collaboration,
on the part of those participating in the creation of the folksonomy.
The data of what is being searched for is another man’s metadata. If I find
a document because the author described it a certain way, or because a fellow
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searcher described it a certain way – do I care which one actually happened?
Or do I only care that I found the document I was looking for in a timely
manner, and that it satisfied whatever search task I was conducting at that
moment? Are we all not relativists now?
2.4.3 Properties
Tag datasets that are human-generated turn out to have some fairly consis-
tent, interesting properties very similar to many other phenomenon (Golder
& Huberman, 2005). These include power law distributions of activity, social
ordering effects, standard well-studied English distributions of words, and a
long tail effect (a few items and a few users and a few tags show the vast
majority of the activity) (see Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Chris Anderson’s The Long Tail (Anderson, 2006)
One of the more interesting characteristics of a tag dataset is that when
looking at a particular resource in the dataset, the usage of the tags assigned
to the resource usually follow a power law as well. Some words are used a
great many times in relation to most words. Quite a number of words will be
used only once, or maybe twice. On the right side of a delicious.com page for a
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particular URL, for example, this distribution is plain to see (See Figure 2.8).
When rotated counter-clockwise 90◦, a more familiar bar chart can be
drawn with the same data. This bar chart usually looks like a power law
with a long tail headed down and to the right. This type of graph is extremely
common in the social sciences and can be confidently placed into a family of
curves called power laws. As referenced in section 2.1.5, these curves have
been seen in English language usage, citation patterns, etc. Additionally, the
same type of curve can be seen when data from other social media sites are
collected and graphed in a similar way (Flickr.com (Dubinko et al., 2007),
LibraryThing.com, and Last.fm, among others).
The word counts representing the tag usage can be plotted and graphed
over time as well, as the dataset itself changes due to sustained tagging activity
(Figure 2.9). This was first done at Cloudalicious in 2005 (Russell, 2006) and
later confirmed and analyzed by Golder and Huberman (Golder & Huberman,
2005). The diagonal lines within such a graph are the interesting ones. Sta-
bilization of the tagcloud is standard as time passes - the profile of a resource
becomes familiar within a tagspace. What the resource is about is determined,
at least at a particular point in time. But if a particular tag rises or falls in
usage in relation to other tags, something is happening and it may indicate a
need for further investigation as to the cause. The causes can be one of four
types, related to the four elements of a tag cloud: 1) the users doing the tag-
ging are changing (soccer moms have recently discovered this resource), 2) the
resource has changed (actual content found at the URL, in this case), 3) the
meaning of the words being used has changed (if we had data for the last 50
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Figure 2.8: The Delicious.com tags for a site describing the technology that
later became known as Ajax.
93
Figure 2.9: Cloudalicious - Stabilization of a tag cloud over time. Diagonals
are interesting.
years, the tag “gay” and/or “happy” would have surely presented themselves as
diagonal lines for certain material), or 4) time itself has changed the tagging
practice around a particular resource as users have been influenced by earlier
tagging actions (manifested in the choice of user interface into the system, or
access to a system such as Cloudalicious, itself). Of course, any combination
of these four types would also support a change in the tagging behavior over
time (Russell, 2006).
Another type of analysis can be done when looking at time. Individual tag
usage itself is not constant and the rate of this change can be thought of as
a rate of decay as tags go out of favor. The tag decay of a resource, or set
of resources, over time can also give insight into the “churn” of the language
around an item or group of items (Russell, 2008b). If the rate of decay has
been low, then the language around a resource has been more stable; there has
been less volatility in the culture surrounding that particular resource (Russell,
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2008a).
2.4.4 Linked Data
When the Internet was first being developed as ARPANET, the stated goal
and assumption of the United States government as well as the researchers
was that this network would allow and facilitate remote computing and the
sharing of datasets in the course of a nuclear attack (Leiner et al., 2003).
However, it quickly became apparent that messaging was the primary function
of this new network and email, particularly, was the application that made the
new network special. Even three decades later, as we moved towards the
World Wide Web (WWW) over HTTP, data was still not the unit of interest.
Rather, along with email, the webpage became the unit of record and many
tools have been built around the processing, serving, and storing of webpages
or documents.
As we move slowly towards a more Semantic Web, the calls have come
from those who want to see the data itself be referenceable and the unit of
interest (Berners-Lee, 2006). As data begins to gain first class status online,
the standards around how that data should be represented and moved along
the wire become critical. Recent work at the Library of Congress and at the
New York Times have shown what is possible when existing, well documented
datasets are put onto the web in standard, accessible ways. The Flickr Com-
mons project has encouraged the Library of Congress to put over 3000 images
online and asked the online community to help document and tag the infor-
mation in the photographs (Oates, 2008; Raymond, 2008). The response was
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remarkable and there are now over 7500 Library of Congress images, as well as
many thousands from other partnerships, being publicly annotated at Flickr.
The New York Times recently announced the availability of an effort to put
all their ontological and classification data, going back over 150 years, online
in the SKOS format (defined below) (Sandhaus & Larson, 2009).
One type of data that is being put online and in need of interoperability
standards is tagging data. Gruber’s TagOntology attempts to create a formal-
ization around the activity of tagging and to allow description of that tagging
activity at a semantic level (Gruber, 2005).
Building on Gruber’s work, a few different standards have been created to
work in harmony and begin to connect the vast amount of existing data sources
as well as new user-created data. Figure 2.10 gives a clean representation of
how four community-driven standards can be connected. Note the resemblance
to the elements of a folksonomy in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.10: Social Semantic Cloud of Tags - SCOT Model
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These four standards (SCOT, FOAF, SIOC, and SKOS) could soon become
the backbone for the transport of existing and community generated tagging
data and serve to populate a fledgling Semantic Web that has been struggling
to get off the ground in the last decade. When data-interoperability and
portability become standard features of any new tools that are built with these
open standards, we should expect a blossoming of new uses and scenarios.
• SCOT - Social Semantic Cloud of Tags - Ontology for the activity of
tagging (H. L. Kim & Breslin, 2008)
• FOAF - Friend of a Friend - Standard ontology for describing people and
their relationships to one another (Brickley & Miller, 2000)
• SIOC - Semantically-Interlinked Online Communities - Ontology describ-
ing objects or resources in a networked environment (Boja¯rs & Breslin,
2005)
• SKOS - Simple Knowledge Organization System - Ontology for describ-
ing concepts, used here for tags (Miles & Bechhofer, 2009)
Contextual Authority Tagging would be producing vast amounts of time-
stamped, shareable, semantically-rich data that could be published in these
formats. Some very interesting social change could be just around the cor-
ner with a few loosely coupled tools that could parse, combine, and calculate
based on collectively generated expertise description data. Open formats and
standards are the key to new, innovative, and unforeseen uses of existing knowl-
edge. Publishing what we know about one another in these formats could lay
the groundwork for many more sophisticated later uses of the data.
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2.4.5 Interface Issues
The idea of tagging people rather than resources (or URLs) is not new. Using
tags for privacy and sharing control (Razavi & Iverson, 2009; Lukas, 2008) have
been proposed, coded, and studied, but there has not yet been a comprehensive
review of how users combine the power of tagging with the control they so
desperately require over the access to their documents. The Razavi paper was
a limited pilot of 10 participants in a lab setting where the participants did not
have access to their own data. The Mine! project, which allows an individual
to host and manage access to a repository of information via tagging, has yet
to have any meaningful deployment of real users with real data (Lukas, 2008).
The DiSo project aims high with goals that include hosting all of one’s web data
(tagging, friending, photos, writings, videos, contact information, bookmarks,
locations, etc.) and sharing it out from a centralized hub - but this comes with
a tremendous management overhead (DiSo Project, 2007). Facebook itself has
recently required all applications to share their data through the lens of one’s
Friends Lists, giving users control, but again, creating a much higher cost of
interaction and navigation (Facebook, 2009). But we are at the leading edge
of what will very soon become normal. As how we enjoy nuanced sharing and
privacy controls with the simple lowering of our voice in a restaurant, we shall
soon be able to do the equivalent online. It cannot happen soon enough.
The dynamic nature of Facebook’s Friends Lists are problematic as well.
Razavi and Iverson talk about their OpnTag solution handling this dynamicity
with ease, but they also mention at the end of their paper the potential problem
of spam from others and a potential flooding from our own data. The tools
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for filtering will no doubt improve, but we have not seen how they break yet
in order to create better management interfaces.
If these types of interface navigations and interactions become standard for
ever-smaller bits of information decision-making, we will soon be flooded with
obtrusive, but menial, decisions that we will begin to ignore. Apple made fun
of Microsoft’s Windows Vista operating system because it began asking about
every permission that a running application needed before it could execute
(Cancel or Allow?) (Apple, 2007). Users obviously began to ignore or turn off
these interruptions almost immediately.
Moving forward, our graphical interfaces and APIs (Application Program-
ming Interfaces) need to provide filters and hooks so that we can dial down the
amount of noise we experience when going about our computing day. Com-
puters are moving towards being ubiquitously available and we will soon feel
overloaded when having to make security decisions in addition to the ever-
more-complicated tasks we are trying to complete. Humans are notoriously
bad about making computer security decisions anyway, and having to make
them more often, while trying to focus on other things, will only lead to more
breaches and unintended consequences (Mitnick & Simon, 2001). If we can
capture some of the collective wisdom about things (via tagging and social
labeling), there is a much greater chance that we can keep ahead of the “bad
guys” when they figure out how to present us with bogus interface decisions –
they will already have been labeled as bad3.
3Gmail, among others, already does this with the “Report spam” button
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Chapter 3
Methodology
“If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.” – William
Thomson, 1st Baron (Lord) Kelvin
3.1 Overview
I am interested in exploring the ability of a group to identify the areas of
expertise of its members. Current efforts to capture this type of information
almost always derive their value from either documents produced by or between
group members or from asking members to talk about themselves and their
own areas of expertise and knowledge. The document method is at the basis of
most expert systems and knowledge management software of the past couple
decades.
The self-disclosure method works, at best, when all the members tell the
truth, have the best interests of the group at heart, and are thorough in their
descriptions of their skillsets and knowledge. Usually, data of this kind is sim-
ply too sparse or outdated to be actionable. Members may leave out important
items from their descriptions or not participate at all. Worse, members may
simply lie about their skillsets for any number of reasons.
A more robust system may be available by allowing the members to talk
about each other. Holes (where things were left out) may be filled, and decep-
tion would be made more difficult because many in the group would need to
give consistent, false descriptions for the collective opinion to be swayed.
If a group can (or does) know better than an individual, there should be a
way to ask them. Contextual Authority Tagging may allow for the systematic
gathering and evaluation of this type of information.
3.2 Delphi
The study for this dissertation used a modified version of the Delphi method.
The original Delphi study was run in the 1950s and 1960s by the RAND
corporation to help the US Government determine the nuclear capabilities of
the Soviet Union (Helmer & Rescher, 1959; Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). They
were studying the unknown military futures market by asking a variety of
experts to answer a battery of questions. The answers were collated and then
distributed back to the experts for additional rounds of answering the same
questions - but critically, with the collective opinions of the other experts to
aid their synthesis.
Rowe and Wright (1999, 354) write that, “in particular, the structure of the
technique is intended to allow access to the positive attributes of interacting
groups (knowledge from a variety of sources, creative synthesis, etc.), while
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pre-empting their negative aspects (attributable to social, personal and polit-
ical conflicts, etc.).” Over the following four decades, the Delphi method has
been refined and used in many other areas besides military futures, including
social science predictions (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Rowe et al., 2005; Hsu &
Sandford, 2007).
Most research has suggested that with proper preparation and considera-
tion for expert subjects, questionnaires, and evaluation, a Delphi study can
run from three to five rounds, with four being the most common number of
iterations (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). Some prior Delphi studies have used post-
task surveys to sample participants’ reactions - from satisfaction (Van De Van
& Delbecq, 1974) to confidence (Scheibe, Skutsch, & Schofer, 1975; Boje &
Murnighan, 1982) to difficulty and enjoyableness (Rohrbaugh, 1979) - and I
employed some of the same types of questions with CAT, especially consider-
ing the subjects were being asked to formalize their informal knowledge about
one another.
A traditional Delphi study involves 1) an objective facilitator who gives
“controlled feedback” in the aggregate, 2) a collection of independent experts in
a domain (anonymous, to each other), and 3) a series of evaluations (iterations)
designed to have the collective opinion of the experts predict the future in that
particular domain (Rowe & Wright, 1999).
I modified this method to have members of a group or team define the areas
of expertise for one other. This substitutes for the original formula 1) a piece
of software to facilitate and aggregate free-text tags from 2) the members of
the group who are anonymously tagging each other’s areas of expertise in 3)
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a series of rounds where cumulative tagging information is visible from prior
rounds. A group of ten members, in effect, runs ten concurrent Delphis at one
time – all of the participants evaluating each of the participants.
Documented criticism of the Delphi consists of lack of statistical tests, lack
of demographic description of the participants, the eligibility and selection of
the expert participants, the lack of explanatory quality of the responses, and
the degree of anonymity of the participants (Luo & Wildemuth, 2009).
Additionally, Delphi studies need to be carefully administered to avoid the
following things (Linstone & Turoff, 1975):
• overspecification of the problem statement and potential dampening of
diverse perspectives
• inadequate summarization during the aggregation and synthesis stages
• lack of common interpretation by the participants of any scales being
applied
• ignoring of differences of responses among participants that could be
fruitful
• underestimating the amount of time and effort required to participate
and administer the study
• misunderstandings between participants due to cultural or linguistic dif-
ferences
Delphi has a lot to offer as a grounded, tested method to find convergence
of opinion given its skeleton of domain experts, anonymity, and iteration. As
Contextual Authority Tagging is being introduced to help uncover (unleash?)
a collective subjective truth, the Delphi method seemed appropriate as a con-
struct upon which to formalize this research.
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3.3 Modified Delphi
I asked a team of people about their opinions, aggregated their opinions, re-
distributed their opinions back to the group, and then iterated the process.
This process should continue either for a minimum amount of time, until their
opinions“converge”, or until a maximum amount of time or iterations has been
met. In order to explicate the time variable, the study was performed in a se-
ries of five rounds. This was longer than I estimated to be necessary to see
the tagging activity settle down, but was chosen because the amount of time
required to complete an additional round was estimated to be less than one
minute per participant.
As opposed to a traditional Delphi Method study, wherein the participants
are selected and recognized as experts and the point of the study is to identify
their collective opinion on a matter, this study used groups of people who work
with one other. These group members, while not necessarily experts in any
specific domain, know each other well enough to describe each others’ areas
of knowledge and expertise. They already grant some cognitive authority to
each other in certain areas, and this study asked them to explicitly name those
areas.
The irony of investigating expertise with a method originally designed to
employ experts is not lost (or intentional), but I do think the approach holds
up. An individual’s colleagues spend more time thinking about what that
individual knows more than probably anybody else, apart of the individual.
They are uniquely situated to evaluate the question around the individual’s
areas of expertise – and therefore, I considered the colleagues the equivalent
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of the selected Delphi experts. Traditionally, this type of expertise evaluation
has been done either solely by the individual (via his or her re´sume´) or his or
her boss (in a letter of recommendation or reference).
Through the anonymous aggregation and redistribution of the group mem-
bers’ descriptions, the areas of cognitive authority were named and quantified
by the group. I employed simple keyword labeling, or tagging, as the method
by which group members attributed areas of expertise to one another.
Some limitations and concerns are addressed in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Anonymity
Any concern over the anonymity of the participants or the attribution of
the tags was reduced to the security issues around the database where the
information was stored. For research purposes, I stored both the “tagger” and
the“taggee”, but this would not be strictly necessary if plausible deniability was
of due import. Further concerns over who said what are relegated to the realm
of the social – the scope of which is beyond the aim of this research. I assumed
that by making these expertise tags visible and available for discussion, some
stories regarding the provenance and justification of the tags were to be told.
Truly secret information should remain secret, regardless of the availability of
a tool or exercise like CAT – but that is an issue between those who have
secrets (or privileged/private information) and those who know the secrets.
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3.3.2 Selection
I also expected to hear feedback regarding the selection of participants of the
form “friends/colleagues are not experts.” I posit that they are expert, within
the context in which the study is run. Some information about a participants’
areas of expertise were surely beyond the purview of the other participants
involved, regardless of the environment in which the study was run. That
said, I limited the research to be run in professional or collegial environments
where intellectual activity is the main type of interaction between participants.
I explicitly avoided groups that could be construed as family, social, hobbyist,
or athletic. By sticking to offices and workplaces, I expected that the types of
information generated by CAT to remain largely“on topic”as that is the nature
of the majority of interactions between the participants. Additional “off topic”
information was generated and displayed as well, but it was expected that these
tags would be limited in scope and not extend much beyond what is commonly
discussed at work already; the participants will continue working together now
that the study is complete. And of course, with further consideration, any “off
topic” information could have been removed in later rounds by a participant
who had any second guesses.
3.3.3 Misinformation
There was some concern over the possibility of negative information or false
claims. These two concerns are important and deserve attention. I expected
that non-normative behavior and aberrant tags would draw attention quickly.
This is no different from unprofessional language being uttered or a physical
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disruption in the workplace – it is quickly noticed and addressed. Negative
tags were largely disincentivized by the positive phrasing of the question being
asked, “What do you think this person knows about?”, and “What are this
person’s areas of expertise?”, and by the professional nature of the relationships
in the groups.
3.3.4 Coverage
Another concern was that the generated tags could be argued as providing a
lack of coverage and the fact that there may remain hidden information not
captured by this technique. I agree with the possibility, but do not see it as
a limiting factor. I assume that humans will always hold some information to
themselves – and I encourage that. I also think that the anonymity provided
by CAT allows more information than is currently being put on display to be
captured and propagated. I think having total information would be a horrible
thing. I also think that having a place for anonymous speech is important and
that it sometimes brings potentially fascinating and useful information to the
fore.
3.3.5 Statistical Rigor
Regarding the lack of statistical measurements and tests to determine
the significance of the findings rendered by classical Delphi, I feel CAT can be
claimed as immune. The nature of Delphi is that it results in a set of findings or
opinions that have been deemed “convergent.” The weakness of these findings
can be attacked from a predictive standpoint, but as I intend for CAT to
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be run continuously (if implemented beyond my dissertation research), the
notion that a test was not conclusive or that there is no test is a non-issue
as there are never any final “findings.” The participants will take what they
want from the information and use it accordingly. I see CAT being a piece
of reporting/learning infrastructure that allows other tools to be built and
used around it for decision making. Making the shared opinions of people
visible should create more opportunities for discussion and reduce the chance
for misunderstandings.
3.3.6 Loss of Control
I also expected to see some pushback from (potential) participants regarding
their not having a say in what is being said about them and the fact that
this information is being published for others to see. My counterpoint is that
this is already happening, everyday, all around us. People gossip and talk
amongst themselves. CAT just brings this information together, aggregates
it, and shows it publicly. Damaging gossip is gossip that usually happens
anonymously and behind closed doors. CAT is done in the open. Those who
are good at what they do, and know their stuff, will be rewarded. Those who
have not convinced their colleagues of their areas of expertise may have sparse
data to show for it. Additionally, those who are well liked may be rewarded
more than those who are not. This is not as much a privacy concern as it is an
issue of control. CAT, I agree, definitely moves the control of defining one’s
areas of expertise away from the individual and towards the group (but it does
not remove the voice of the individual, it just adds the voice of the group). I
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also think that moving control towards the group is a good thing and something
we need as we begin to live in an ever-connected, online environment where
notions of identity are not as ingrained and well-understood as in our known
physical world.
3.4 Lists of Tags
Conceptually, CAT employs two sets of lists - created and processed. Created
lists are lists that are created by members of the group, and processed lists
are lists that are the output of the process of the exercise (see Figure 3.1).
They contain the same type of content (tags), but are shuﬄed, ordered, and
aggregated differently as part of the exercise.
Figure 3.1: Canonical Group: Group member A is tagged by the other indi-
viduals in the group (B..I) and represented as AB..AI . Collectively, the tags
generated by this group about A would be represented as A∗.
The first set is the lists as they are created by a member of the group of
size n. For each iteration of the exercise, each group member creates n lists.
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Figure 3.2: Four Lists: A group member creates lists about him/herself (AA)
and other group members (BA..IA). After processing, each member has a list
about themselves (AA) and what the group thinks he/she knows about (A
∗).
They are of two types (totaling n): Self (1) and Other (n−1) (see Figure 3.2).
1. Self (AA) : a list consisting of tags that a member uses to describe
his/her own areas of expertise. There is only one Self list, per member,
per iteration.
2. Other (BA..IA) : a set of lists created by the member to describe each
of the other n − 1 members of the group. If there are 9 total members
of the group, there are 8 Other lists created, per member, per iteration.
The second set is just a reorganization by the system of the created set of
lists. This set consists of the lists “about” a member, rather than “created by”
a member. Each member of a group will have two processed lists describing
them, for each iteration of the study.
The two processed lists include:
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1. Self (AA) : a list describing the individual by the individual (identical
to the created Self list above), and
2. Group (A∗) : a weighted aggregated list where the other group members
describe the individual (the Other lists combined into one)
If a group has 9 members (as in Figure 3.1), the first iteration of the
exercise will generate a total of 18 processed lists, 2 for each person. If there
are 5 iterations in the exercise, a total of 90 processed lists will be generated.
Within each iteration, or round, a series of four steps is followed by each
member of the group. The steps include:
1. Review : The member is presented with the current state of the experi-
ment from his/her perspective. His/her accumulated Self list and Group
list are visible. Self and Group lists are also visible for every other mem-
ber of the group. This is where most of the learning and consideration
of new information presented by the software takes place. This step is
used as a welcome and introduction in the first round, as there are not
yet any tags to review.
2. Self Assessment : The member adds and removes tags to his/her cur-
rent Self list of tags.
3. Group Assessment : The member adds and removes Other tags for
each of the other members of the group.
4. Round Complete : The member is notified of completion of the current
round.
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These steps directly follow one after the other in one sitting. The spacing
of the rounds was up to the groups themselves and was between two days and
three weeks.
The screenshots in Figures 3.4 through 3.13 are shown as occurring in the
fourth round of iterations.
3.5 Instruments and Datasets
Data collection was carried out in three major stages. Data in Stage 1 was
collected via the custom tagging software and an integrated survey. Data in
Stage 2 was collected through a set of semi-structured interviews. Data from
Stage 3 is comprised of both human- and algorithmically-generated similarity
scores. Data from all three stages is presented in Chapter 4 and then discussed
in Chapter 5.
My study design is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Each group went through the
process and generated tags about each member in each group.
Figure 3.3: Study Design: Each group on the left is put through the Modified
Delphi process. The resulting lists of words about each participants’ areas of
expertise are then evaluated using three different similarity algorithms. Sepa-
rately, the participants complete a survey and some are later interviewed.
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3.5.1 Stage 1a : CAT Software (Lists)
The custom software (seen below) generated the primary tagging dataset for
this research. The participating groups each used this software through 5
rounds and populated a database of taggings (rows) consisting of a tagger, a
tag, a taggee, and a timestamp. Once the groups had completed the tagging
activity, the software generated 1 list of tags for each combination of group,
participant, list type (self/group), and round. For an example study consisting
of 6 groups with 8 participants each moving through 5 rounds, the system
would generate a total of 6 ∗ 8 ∗ 2 ∗ 5 = 480 lists. Two of the 480 example lists
can be seen in Figure 3.6, one for self and one for the group.
3.5.1.1 Screenshots
Figure 3.4: Login: Each group member used a simple passphrase to log into
the system.
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Figure 3.5: Step 1 - Introduction and Welcome: The group member is shown
a welcome screen explaining the upcoming process and instructions on how to
move forward. This screen is only visible in Round 1.
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Figure 3.6: Step 1 - Review - Self: The group member is shown the aggregate
listing of tags since Round 1. This includes both self tags and the aggregated
tags that the group has put into the system about his/her areas of expertise.
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Figure 3.7: Step 1 - Review - Others: The group member is shown the ag-
gregate listing of tags since Round 1 for each of the group members. These
include both self tags and the aggregated tags that the group has put into the
system about each group member’s areas of expertise.
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Figure 3.8: Step 2 - Self Assessment: The group member is asked to tag his/her
own areas of expertise. The full listing of existing self tags (from prior rounds)
is shown in the right column. Any existing tag can be removed by clicking on
the corresponding red X.
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Figure 3.9: Step 3 - Group Assessment - Before: The group member is asked
to tag each of his/her group members during Step 3. The group members
can be tagged in any order. The group members must all be “visited” before
moving to Step 4.
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Figure 3.10: Step 3 - Group Assessment - Tagging: The logged in group
member is asked to tag another group member’s areas of expertise. The full
listing of existing tags from the logged in group member (from prior rounds)
is shown in the right column. Any existing tag can be removed by clicking on
the corresponding red X.
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Figure 3.11: Step 3 - Group Assessment - Partial: The logged in group member
must “visit” each other group member before moving to Step 4. This user has
tagged 3 of 6 of his fellow group members during this round.
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Figure 3.12: Step 3 - Group Assessment - Complete: Each fellow member has
been tagged in this round. The logged in member is ready to move to Step 4.
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Figure 3.13: Step 4 - Round Complete: The logged in member has completed
this round.
3.5.2 Stage 1b : Survey
The survey was designed primarily to answer parts of the Comfort (R2a) and
Confidence (R2b) research questions. Questions marked with ∗∗ are in the
form of a statement where the participant was asked to respond with a level of
agreement on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from Extremely Disagree to
Extremely Agree. This is in line with Likert’s own scale items (Likert, 1932)
and related work with the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (reversed in
order) (Davis, 1986, 94), an instrument for measuring Adoption of Information
Technology Innovation (Moore & Benbasat, 1991, 199), and the Unified Theory
of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) Model (Venkatesh, Morris,
Davis, & Davis, 2003, 438).
The questions in Table 3.1 were asked in order to collect basic demographic
122
data about the participants.
- Age Under 21, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, Over 60
- Gender M, F
- How long have you been a part of this group? (R2a) Less than
6 months, 6-12 months, 1-3 years, 3-5 years, More than 5 years
Table 3.1: Survey: Demographic and Familiarity Items
The following sections of feedback items come from a variety of sources.
The first section of items (Table 3.2) are original items designed for this study.
The remaining sections of items come from prior work and have been selected
because they represent validated scales designed to interrogate the potential
acceptance of new technologies. Items within each particular section in Table
3.3 were averaged to produce an index. The research question addressed by
each item or scale is in parentheses.
Original Items
- What was your favorite part of this exercise? Why? (R2a) Free Response
- What was your least favorite part of this exercise? Why? (R2a) Free Response
- I am familiar with my group members’ areas of expertise. (R2a) ∗∗
- My group members are familiar with my areas of expertise. (R2a) ∗∗
- I am comfortable with my group’s tags about my areas of expertise. (R2a) ∗∗
- I am happy with my group’s tags about my areas of expertise. (R2a) ∗∗
- I would be more comfortable with my group’s tags if the tags were not anony-
mous. (R2a) ∗∗
- My group did not list important areas of my expertise. (R2b) ∗∗ (reverse coded)
- I am confident that this system gives me good information. (R2b) ∗∗
- I am confident that this system gives me new information. (R2b, R2c) ∗∗
- I am willing to incorporate output from this system into my decision making.
(R2b, R2c) ∗∗
- This was a useful exercise. (R2c) ∗∗
- This was an interesting exercise. (R2c) ∗∗
Table 3.2: Survey: Original Items
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Result Demonstrability (Moore & Benbasat, 1991, 216) (R2c) ∗∗
- I would have no difficulty telling others about the results of using this system.
- I believe I could communicate to others the consequences of using this system.
- The results of using this system are apparent to me.
- I would have difficulty explaining why using this system may or may not be
beneficial. (reverse coded)
Relative Advantage (Moore & Benbasat, 1991, 216) (R2c) ∗∗
- Using this system would enable me to accomplish tasks more quickly.
- Using this system would improve the quality of work I do.
- Using this system would make it easier to do my job.
- Using this system would enhance my effectiveness on the job.
- Using this system would give me greater control over my work.
Performance Expectancy (Venkatesh et al., 2003, 460) (R2c) ∗∗
- I would find this system useful in my job.
- Using this system enables me to accomplish tasks more quickly.
- Using this system increases my productivity.
Effort Expectancy (Venkatesh et al., 2003, 460) (R2c) ∗∗
- My interaction with this system would be clear and understandable.
- It would be easy for me to become skillful at using this system.
- I would find this system easy to use.
- Learning to operate this system would be easy for me.
Facilitating Conditions (Venkatesh et al., 2003, 460) (R2c) ∗∗
- I have the resources necessary to use this system.
- I have the knowledge necessary to use this system.
- This system is not compatible with other systems I use. (reverse coded)
Anxiety (Venkatesh et al., 2003, 460) (R2a) ∗∗
- I feel apprehensive about using this system.
- It scares me to think that I could lose a lot of information using this system by
hitting the wrong key.
- I hesitate to use this system for fear of making mistakes I cannot correct.
- This system is somewhat intimidating to me.
Data Quality (Wang & Strong, 1996, 18) (R2b) ∗∗
- This system produced data in conformance with the actual or true values.
- This system produced data that is applicable and relevant to my job.
- This system produced data that is intelligible and clear.
- This system produced data that is easily accessible.
Table 3.3: Survey: Items from Selected Scales
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3.5.3 Stage 2: Interviews
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with those who responded at
the end of the survey and indicated they would be willing to be interviewed.
The questions in Table 3.4 were asked over the phone and responses were
recorded for transcription and content analysis. The following questions were
designed to primarily answer the research questions around Usefulness (R2c).
- What was your general impression of this exercise?
- Please take me through your tags and talk about them. Value? Single
term tags? Was there anything wrong or incorrect? How are the lists
different? Can you characterize the difference? What’s distinguishing?
- What did you learn about yourself? (R2c)
- What do you feel the group learned about you? (R2c)
- What was your favorite part of this exercise? Why? (R2a)
- What was your least favorite part of this exercise? Why? (R2a)
- How did the group feel about participating? Were they nervous? Ex-
cited? Other Emotions? Have you spoken with them since? Did you
speak with them during? (R2a)
- Was the exercise a success? Has it had any effect on how the participants
act towards one another? Are you satisfied with it? (R2c)
- How do you think the exercise would have been different if the tags had
not been anonymous? (R2a)
- Would you recommend this type of activity to others? To partner
organizations or groups? Why or why not? Who would you recommend
this to, now that you have gone through it yourself? (R2c)
- Is there anything else you would like to share about this activity? About
others in the group? Any interesting/unexpected tags about others?
About you?
Table 3.4: Interview Questions
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3.5.4 Stage 3: Similarity
The main thrust of this research is to determine whether a group and a par-
ticular member agree on a member’s areas of expertise. The ratings from this
dataset were used to determine this level of agreement.
The similarity datasets are designed to describe the level of similarity be-
tween the different taggings lists that are generated by the CAT software.
Evaluation of subjective information (such as one’s areas of expertise) must
be carried out in a relative manner - as there is no objective ground truth or
known yardstick against which to measure.
Three separate techniques of quantifying this similarity were used. The first
used trained humans to judge the similarity of the presented sets of words. The
second used untrained humans via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The last used
an existing algorithm designed to find the semantic similarity between two
sentences, but without using the information encoded in sentence structure.
Graphing similarity scores against the iteration (round) shows whether the
two lists (Self and Group) for a single person converge (become more similar)
over time. If the similarity scores increase, then there is tendency towards
convergence. If the scores do not increase, or they plateau, then there remains
some difference in the lists and therefore, for a pairing of Self/Group lists, the
Self and Group did not agree on that participants’ areas of expertise.
This analysis can be performed for each person, then pooled and performed
for each group as a whole, and then for the entire study. For the size of the
datasets in this study, only group and study analyses were carried out.
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3.5.4.1 Human Judged
The first dataset was generated by six trained human subjects (HumanSim).
Each trained rater evaluated pairs of Self and Group lists of words and scored
them on seven-point Likert scales. The interface and method used was similar
to that used for the Mechanical Turk workers (see Figures 3.14 and 3.15).
The trained human dataset served as the “gold standard” for the other two
evaluation methods.
Figure 3.14: Human Similarity Rating Model – Two lists of words were pre-
sented to both trained humans and Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who
were asked to rate their similarity on a seven-point Likert scale.
The second dataset was generated via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Turk-
Sim). Mechanical Turk is a workplace where humans have enrolled to complete
simple tasks for payment. It is designed to be used for tasks that computers
are ill-equipped or too expensive to solve.
127
Figure 3.15: Example Similarity HIT: An example of the Human Intelligence
Task (HIT) that was presented to a Mechanical Turk worker. Completion of
this task was worth $0.02.
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Two lists of tags were shown to a Mechanical Turk worker and the worker
was asked to rate the two lists’ similarity (see Figure 3.14). The similarity rat-
ings are on seven-point Likert scales. Each pair of presented lists was evaluated
five times (by different workers) to check for consistency and reliability.
The two lists that were shown are the two lists about a particular par-
ticipant from a particular round. The Self list was comprised of all the self
tags from that participant, randomized and shown in no particular order. The
Group list was comprised of all the common tags (used at least twice by the
group), unweighted, and randomized. Tags only used once by the group were
removed in this similarity rating as they do not represent any type of consensus
within the group.
Separate calculations were conducted by pairing the Self and Group lists
when the Group list included the singly used tags, and then again when it
included weighted tags.
Lastly, separate similarity scores were generated by comparing lists from
random participants to generate a baseline for the turker similarity scale. Com-
paring “real” data lists with randomly paired lists should allow for distinguish-
ing that the real data is qualitatively different and therefore carrying some
signal.
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3.5.4.2 Algorithmically Judged
The third set of similarity scores was computationally generated (see Figure
3.16) based on an algorithm (Equation 3.1) defined by Mihalcea, Corley, and
Strapparava (2006). The resulting similarity scores were in the range [0..1].
The original lists of raw tags were sense disambiguated and then compared
against one another.
Figure 3.16: Algorithmic Similarity Rating Model – Two lists of words were
1) sense disambiguated using WordNet::SenseRelate::AllWords and then 2)
compared using Mihalcea2006 (Equation 3.1) giving an AlgSim score in the
range [0..1].
This method did not take into consideration the word order or “sentence”
structure like more recent methods (Liu, Zhou, & Zheng, 2008). As sets of
tags have no syntactic structure or order, Mihalcea was appropriate for this
task.
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The WordNet database was used to calculate similarity scores between two
single words (Fellbaum, 1998) and accessed through the WordNet::Similarity1
and WordNet::SenseRelate::AllWords2 perl packages (Pedersen, Patwardhan,
& Michelizzi, 2004; Pedersen & Kolhatkar, 2009). The similarity calculation
is based on the “nearness” of two words in the WordNet database. Sense
disambiguation uses the accompanying words in a list to detect context and
assign the most probable sense to each word in the list. The inverse document
frequency (idf ) of a word was calculated from the 100M word sample in the
British National Corpus3 (BNC, 2007).
Tags that were not found in the WordNet database (60% of unique tags,
see Table 4.4) were dropped from analysis as they could not be mathemati-
cally assessed. Tags that could not be sense disambiguated with confidence
defaulted to the first numbered gloss, or definition, of the word. Tags that
were sense disambiguated but then not found in the BNC were set to have an
idf equal to that of the highest idf otherwise seen.
The Self list was processed as-is; each word had equal weight and all served
as inputs into the model. The Group list was processed through the model in
two different ways. First, all the words from the group list served as inputs,
but unweighted. Second, the group list was truncated to only contain the
words with a weight of two or greater. These words were then unweighted and
1http://wn-similarity.sourceforge.net/
2http://senserelate.sourceforge.net/
3http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/
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served as the inputs into the model.
AlgSim(A,B) =
1
2

∑
w∈{A}
(maxSim(w,B) ∗ idf(w))
∑
w∈{A}
idf(w)
+
∑
w∈{B}
(maxSim(w,A) ∗ idf(w))
∑
w∈{B}
idf(w)

(3.1)
Equation 3.1 took each word in set A and found the most similar word in
set B (represented by maxSim(w,B)) and then multiplied by the information
content of that word (represented by idf(w)). This summation was normalized
across the information content of the entire list (
∑
w∈{A} idf(w)). After each
list was compared one to the other, the similarity values were averaged for the
final AlgSim value.
3.6 Analysis
In order to address the research questions stated at the end of Section 1.7, I
conducted the analysis shown in Table 3.5.
Question Hypothesis Dataset(s) Analysis
R1a - Similarity Increasing Lists and
Similarity
HumanSim, Turk-
Sim, and AlgSim
R1b - Convergence Yes Lists and
Similarity
ANOVA
R2a - Comfort Increasing Survey and
Interviews
Content Analysis
R2b - Confidence Improved Survey and
Interviews
Content Analysis
R2c - Usefulness – Survey and
Interviews
Content Analysis
Table 3.5: Mapping of Research Questions, Hypotheses, Data, and Analyses
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Research Question 1 was addressed with the use of the Similarity datasets
coming from the trained human raters, the Mechanical Turk workers, and
the automatic algorithmic approach. I plotted these similarity ratings against
time (Round) and expected to see the value increase. I expected the rate
of change to slow over time after an initial jump in similarity ratings from
Round 1 to Round 2. A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
allowed me to determine the significance of the changes over time. The different
combinations of similarity ratings will allow analysis of this technique versus
random pairings of lists, analysis at the group and the study level, analysis of
the appropriateness of using an algorithmic technique, and analysis into the
effect of displaying weighted tags versus unweighted tags.
Research Question 2 was addressed primarily with the responses to the
survey and the interviews. I expected to hear a variety of perspectives on
the reasons this tool created uncertainty and suspicion with regards to the
participants’ level of control of what they viewed as their personal information.
I thought that participants would come to realize the contextualized nature of
this medium of communication and that it provided a level of information that
was not otherwise being captured somewhere else. With regards to confidence,
CAT provides a sanity-check on what an individual thinks about someone’s
areas of expertise. With iteration and continued use, I thought confidence that
the system was providing a unique service would increase.
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3.7 Potential Ramifications
If this type of methodology and analysis can be shown to be effective in the
physical world, where identity is more stable and communication channels
more rich and varied, perhaps it would also work in a mediated space (an online
forum, gaming, or with remote workers). When identity is more malleable
and easier to manipulate, a system that can provide some infrastructure and
persistence could prove very useful.
When building systems that depend on expertise tagging data for input,
another potentially exciting property would be the ability to “quiet” the input
from those who do not meet a certain “threshold” of knowledge in an area. If
a participant (human or software agent) is not deemed knowledgeable enough
on a particular topic of interest, then their input could be programmatically
ignored or filtered by others. Fewer distractions lead to much higher quality
discussions among those who know what they are talking about.
Additionally, on the other hand, extra voice could be given to those who
do know what they are talking about. In an election, or key decision-making
period, someone who the group deems knowledgeable in a certain domain
may be routed certain questions, awarded extra votes, or have a weighted
opinion counted in some other way, again, automatically or programmatically.
Decisions do not have to be arrived at democratically. Most decisions in the
real world are not made with equal representation.
Last, as a practical matter, organizations could use this method for deciding
who to have work together when forming teams, conferences could use this
method to help decide how to distribute reviewing assignments for posters
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and papers, and new hires into a group or company could use this system to
acclimate themselves into the culture by quickly knowing whom best to ask
when they have questions.
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter will describe the results of the study and cover the study popu-
lation, the tagging dataset, the types of similarity comparisons made, and the
details of those different comparison techniques. Additionally, an analysis of
the survey and interview data is presented.
As an overview, my study design (see Figure 4.1) consisted of 10 groups
and 64 participants who generated 8773 Mechanical Turk Human Intelligence
Tasks (HITs), 56 survey responses, and 15 interviews.
Figure 4.1: Study Design - Results: With 10 groups consisting of 64 partici-
pants, the resulting lists of words were processed through HumanSim, Turk-
Sim, and AlgSim. Additionally, 56 surveys and 15 interviews rounded out the
response data.
4.1 Study Population
A pilot study for this research was conducted using a circle of close friends
and fellow PhD students. The data and the feedback from the pilot study
influenced the final design of the software and the questions for the survey and
subsequent interviews.
The population for this study was identified through an IRB-approved
snowball sample of friends, family, and professional contacts. Each group had
a primary liaison during the recruitment stage who was in contact with the
researcher and gathered the names and email addresses of interested members
of the liaison’s group or organization. The names and emails were entered
into the study software and contact from that point forward was between the
researcher and the participants directly.
Nearly 200 initial recruitment emails were sent to potential liaisons and
organizations. Eight negative responses came back immediately, most stating
“lack of time” as the reason for not participating. Three groups responded
after having a meeting of board members or team leaders and deciding it did
not fit with their primary mission or direction. Fifteen liaisons brought up
the proposed study with their organizations but contact was lost after three
months had passed and follow-up emails were not responded to. Ten groups
eventually participated in the study. The remaining contacts and groups did
not respond after both initial and follow-up contact over the course of four
months.
The ten groups (Table 4.1) that participated in the study consisted of
64 total participants. Two groups had five members. Four groups had six
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members. Two groups had seven members and two groups had eight members.
Three additional participants began the study and were tagged by their group
members, but never completed the first round and subsequently dropped out.
Group Interaction Primary Employment Location
family retail business daily yes physical
dentist’s office daily yes physical
distributed software development daily no virtual
distributed software development daily yes virtual
museum education staff daily yes physical
writer’s network not daily no virtual
legal non-profit not daily no physical
global engineering firm daily yes physical
academic faculty daily yes physical
academic administrative office daily yes physical
Table 4.1: Study Population by Group: 10 Groups, 64 Total Participants
The participating groups consisted of members from a family retail busi-
ness, a dentist’s office, two distributed software development groups, a museum
education staff, a writer’s network, a legal non-profit, a global engineering firm,
an academic faculty group, and an academic administrative office.
Eight of the groups meet or interact on a daily basis and three are orga-
nizations that do not provide primary employment for the members. Seven of
the ten groups have members who work together while physically co-present.
The other three groups are dispersed and have limited or no contact in the
same physical space.
The participants were not compensated for their time, but they did receive
the results of the exercise (consisting of the final lists of Self and Group tags
for each person in their group) at the conclusion of the study.
Of the 56 completed surveys from the 64 participants (88% follow-through
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rate), there were 24 men (43%), 31 women (55%), and 1 non-response. Table
4.2 shows that the age of the participants was skewed slightly below 40 years
old (55%). There was also good representation in each of the 41-50, 51-60,
and Over 60 categories. The largest group of responses came from the 21-30
age group (29%). Table 4.3 shows a fairly balanced representation of group
members both early and established in their membership. Over one-third of
the respondents have been in their group for over 5 years (36%) and one-fourth
have been in their group for less than 1 year (25%).
Age Responses %
21-30 16 28.6%
31-40 15 26.8%
41-50 9 16.1%
51-60 9 16.1%
Over 60 7 12.5%
Total 56 100.0%
Table 4.2: Age of Survey Respondents
Time in Group Responses %
Less than 6 months 7 12.5%
6-12 months 7 12.5%
1-3 years 13 23.2%
3-5 years 9 16.1%
More than 5 years 20 35.7%
Total 56 100.0%
Table 4.3: Time in Group of Survey Respon-
dents
4.2 Tagging Dataset
The primary dataset collected through this study consisted of 10 groups, 64
participants, and over 4000 tagging events.
The study software refined the raw incoming data from the HTML text
boxes presented to the participants by lowercasing the tags, substituting single
and multiple spaces with a single underscore, and removing other punctuation
marks and symbols in order to normalize the data as much as possible without
losing semantic meaning. No automatic attempt was made to remove typos or
do stemming (removing plurals, etc.).
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On average, each participant labeled their own areas of expertise (Self)
with 7.41 unique tags. On average, each participant’s areas of expertise was
labeled by their group members (Group) with 23.16 unique tags. This means
that the average list of words coming back from a participant’s group was three
times as long as the average list of words self-assigned by that participant. I
would assume this ratio would continue to rise for some time as a group’s size
increases.
Additionally, each participant labeled each of their group members’ areas
of expertise (Other) with an average of 4.43 unique tags. This is 60% of the
number of Self tags per participant; participants tagged themselves more than
they tagged others.
For some of the following analysis, the data was revisited and addition-
ally cleaned by hand. Cleaning the data was attempted due to the WordNet
database (used in some of the analysis) only including dictionary words. Lists
of items, full sentences, and phrases are not found in the database, and there-
fore must be dropped, or ignored, for any automatic analysis. An average of
60% of unique last-round tags were originally dropped when running the data
through WordNet (Table 4.4). Cleaning, and therefore, minimizing the loss of
these data points, helped ensure the algorithm was getting as much contextual
information as possible when evaluating these sets of words.
During hand-cleaning, typos were corrected, plurals were canonicalized
within an individual’s tags either on the singular or the plural if they did not
convey distinctly different meanings. Additionally, long phrases and delimited
lists were separated into their constituent ideas and words. For instance, a
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Original Dropped Remaining
Self 576 359 (62.33%) 217 (37.67%)
Group (all) 1688 989 (58.59%) 699 (41.41%)
Group (common) 515 255 (49.51%) 260 (50.49%)
Table 4.4: Percentage of unique last-round tags not found in the dictionary,
and therefore dropped by the WordNet database. Common tags are defined
to be tags occurring at least twice.
full sentence entered into the text box was cleaned to be single or double word
phrases capturing the direct objects in the sentence (e.g., “Jim is an attorney
with an expertise in family law. He also deals with divorce and other family
matters.” was reduced to the constituent tags “family law,” “divorce,” and
“family matters” and “I like to think that I am pretty knowledgeable about
our office environment and program.” was reduced to “office environment”
and “program”). If there was opportunity for obvious compression in the list
(where a word was already in use by another tagger for that participant) then
the same word was used.
After the data was hand-cleaned, on average, each participant labeled their
own areas of expertise (Self) with 8.16 unique tags (a 10% increase). On aver-
age, each participant’s areas of expertise was labeled by their group members
(Group) with 25.16 unique tags (a 9% increase). There were 492 tagging events
that were found to need cleaning (just over 17%) and this resulted in a total
increase of 281 new tagging events in the database from 2834 to 3115 (a 10%
overall increase).
The tagging activity was greatest at the beginning of the study (Table
4.5 and Figure 4.2). As the rounds progressed, the number of tagging events
logged by the system dropped off.
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Figure 4.2: Tagging Activity Per Participant, Per Round
1 2 3 4 5
Other 21.69 9.44 4.09 3.33 2.55
Self 5.72 2.67 0.88 0.50 0.43
Table 4.5: Tagging Activity Per Participant, Per Round
4.3 Similarity Comparisons
There were five variables taken into consideration when attempting to analyze
the dataset from the participants. These represent different features that may
be salient with this type of tagging data. The matrix in Table 4.6 illustrates
the 25 possible comparison options given the five manipulated variables:
1. Cleaned : whether the listed words come directly from the entered data
or have been hand-cleaned
2. Random : whether the paired lists of words (self vs. group) are from
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the same participant or two random participants
3. Group/Study : whether the analysis is carried out at the group level
or the entire study level
4. WordNet : whether the lists of words have been filtered through the
WordNet database
5. Weighted : whether the lists of words are weighted or unweighted
The grey boxes highlight which combinations were analyzed for this study.
Combinations without highlighting were skipped due to those combinations not
making sense or being of duplicate interest. In addition, each of the highlighted
combinations creates two (sets of) charts, one for all the words matching the
criteria, and one for the common words (seen two or more times in the list).
The values listed in the three right-most columns of the Table refer to the
subsequent sections that illustrate that particular comparison.
Three techniques were developed and applied to evaluate the similarity of
participant responses. They are HumanSim (Section 4.4), TurkSim (Section
4.5), and AlgSim (Section 4.6).
4.4 HumanSim
The tagging dataset was cleaned by hand for this comparison as per the guide-
lines in Section 4.2. The six trained raters for this set of comparisons were
recruited from the researcher’s peers, trained for twenty minutes each, and
serve as the “gold standard” against which the later algorithms are judged.
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Cleaned Random Group/Study WordNet Weighted HumanSim TurkSim AlgSim
1 - random group matching unweighted - - -
2 - random group matching weighted - - -
3 - random group all unweighted - - -
4 - random group all weighted - - -
5 - Random study matching unweighted - 4.5.1 4.6.1.1
6 - random study matching weighted - - -
7 - Random study All unweighted - 4.5.2 -
8 - Random study All Weighted - 4.5.3 -
9 - - Group matching unweighted - 4.5.4 4.6.1.2
10 - - group matching weighted - - -
11 - - Group All unweighted - 4.5.5 -
12 - - Group All Weighted - 4.5.6 -
13 - - Study matching unweighted - 4.5.7 4.6.1.3
14 - - study matching weighted - - -
15 - - Study All unweighted - 4.5.8 -
16 - - Study All Weighted - 4.5.9 -
17 cleaned random group matching unweighted - - -
18 cleaned random group matching weighted - - -
19 cleaned random group all unweighted - - -
20 cleaned random group all weighted - - -
21 Cleaned Random study matching unweighted - - 4.6.2.1
22 cleaned random study matching weighted - - -
23 Cleaned Random study All unweighted 4.4 - -
24 Cleaned Random study All Weighted 4.4 - -
25 Cleaned - Group matching unweighted - - 4.6.2.2
26 cleaned - group matching weighted - - -
27 cleaned - group all unweighted - - -
28 cleaned - group all weighted - - -
29 Cleaned - Study matching unweighted - - 4.6.2.3
30 cleaned - study matching weighted - - -
31 Cleaned - Study All unweighted 4.4 - -
32 Cleaned - Study All Weighted 4.4 - -
Table 4.6: Comparison Matrix - All possible similarity comparisons. High-
lighted rows are included in this analysis and can be found in the section num-
ber listed at right. Rows with no corresponding analysis were not included
either because they are implausible, redundant, or did not add any obvious
experimental value.
144
This allows for a level-setting of expectations and all-around stronger under-
standing for the complexity of the task at hand.
The HumanSim dataset is a sampling of all possible combinations of Self
and Group lists generated by the participants. A sample was used since evalu-
ating all combinations of Self/Group would be a monumental task (and part of
the reason for using Mechanical Turk later to do so). The HumanSim dataset
was created in two ways. First, the Random subset was selected by randomly
selecting pairs of study participants (regardless of their group affiliation) and
evaluating one participant’s Self list against the other participant’s Group list.
This analysis determined a baseline from which to improve with the more so-
phisticated analyses. Second, the Study subset was selected by pairing a single
participant’s Self and Group lists together to be evaluated.
Each subset consisted of both weighted and unweighted samples. Each of
the four cells in the 2x2 design consisted of 30 sampled pairs for each of the five
rounds both when all the tags were used and when only the common tags were
used (used more than once). Each pairing was evaluated by two independent
raters. Each of the four cells in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.3 therefore consisted
of nearly 600 evaluations (30 ∗ 5 ∗ 2 ∗ 2), with some pairs being dropped due
to duplication within the sample.
Random Study Total
Unweighted 588 584 1172
Weighted 586 590 1176
Total 1174 1174 2348
Table 4.7: HumanSim: 2x2 Design. A total of 2348 comparisons were made
by the six human raters.
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The HumanSim evaluations were executed and managed through a separate
custom web application and was very similar in form and function to the
interface presented to the Mechanical Turk workers (Figure 3.15). The same
7-point Likert scale was used and each pair was evaluated in an average of
15 seconds. Due to little apparent analytic value at the edges of the scale,
ratings of 1, 2, and 3 were collapsed in this reporting to “Low” similarity and
ratings of 5, 6, and 7 were collapsed to“High”similarity. Ratings of 4 remained
“Neutral”.
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Figure 4.3: HumanSim
A two-way analysis of variance shows that both independent variables were
significant and had no significant interaction effects. The main effect between
the random design and study design was significant with a p-value of 0.000.
The main effect for weightedness was significant at the 0.01 level with a p-value
of 0.0013.
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
random.study 1 5995.53 5995.53 3656.91 0.0000
weighted.unweighted 1 16.95 16.95 10.34 0.0013
random.study:weighted.unweighted 1 0.91 0.91 0.55 0.4566
Residuals 2344 3843.01 1.64
Table 4.8: HumanSim: Two-way ANOVA
The Random subset of list pairings were rated to have a definitive dissim-
ilarity with a “Low” average rating of 1.83 (Figure 4.3). There was no statis-
tically significant difference (p=0.054) between the weighted and unweighted
lists in this subset (Table 4.9). This subset served as the null hypothesis and
the baseline from which all other rating comparisons were judged. Trained
humans can determine that randomly paired sets of words are not similar.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
weighted.unweighted 1 5.01 5.01 3.73 0.0537
Residuals 1172 1573.58 1.34
Table 4.9: HumanSim - Random: ANOVA, comparing weighted vs. un-
weighted
The Study subset of list pairings were rated to have a definitive similarity
with a “High” average rating of 5.02 (Figure 4.3). There was a marked dif-
ference between the weighted and unweighted lists in this subset (statistically
significant with p=0.01, Table 4.10). Lists that had weights associated with
the listed terms were evaluated as more similar to one another, mostly by re-
moving the ambiguity on the low end of the scale. Trained humans determined
that labels attributed to one’s areas of expertise by one’s peers are similar to
the labels given by someone about their own areas of expertise.
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
weighted.unweighted 1 12.86 12.86 6.64 0.0101
Residuals 1172 2269.43 1.94
Table 4.10: HumanSim - Study: ANOVA, comparing weighted vs. unweighted
In addition to the categorical and means analysis, the percentage of agree-
ment between the raters is important. Figure 4.4 and Table 4.11 illustrate the
distribution of agreement between the trained human raters.
Figure 4.4: HumanSim Agreement – Only 60% agreement between humans
when looking at Self/Group lists about the same person.
There were a few interesting results that follow from this analysis. First,
interrater agreement for the Random subset was very strong with both raters
agreeing that the lists were dissimilar 84% of the time. This rises to nearly
92% of the time when including the scenario where one rater thought the lists
were neither similar or dissimilar. When looking at the Study subset, the
agreement was not as strong. Surprisingly, the raters only agreed that the
lists were similar to one another 60% of the time. When including the times
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when one rater was not as sure, this rises to almost 75%. While this number
is not as high as expected, it shows that agreeing on semantic similarity is a
hard problem and not consistent in the minds of different individuals.
Specifically, the raters’ feedback included that it was especially hard to
decide whether the lists were similar or not when one list was a complete
subset of the other or when the two lists of words were dramatically different
in length. Sometimes, the raters felt there was some “missing information”
from one list or the other, some part of a puzzle they were not being given.
Other times, they reported feeling confident in their assessments “except for
one word” which would throw them off, a kind of “noise.”
Similarly, the disagreement rate (when one rater evaluated High and the
other evaluated Low) exhibited a complementary pattern. The Random subset
of similarity ratings showed High/Low disagreement under 4% of the time while
the Study subset presented a more cloudy 11%.
These figures illustrate that, with minimal training, the human raters were
able to largely evaluate the same inputs with the same outputs and distinguish
random comparisons from real data.
Random Study
Both High 15 2.6% 354 60.3%
Neutral/High 8 1.4% 85 14.5%
Both Neutral 4 0.7% 17 2.9%
Neutral/Low 43 7.4% 39 6.6%
Both Low 490 84.3% 27 4.6%
High/Low (disagreement) 21 3.6% 65 11.1%
Total 581 100.0% 587 100.0%
Table 4.11: HumanSim Agreement – Total unique HumanSim evaluations:
1168
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The human raters, themselves, were fairly consistent in their volume of
disagreement. Table 4.12 shows that each of the six raters in the Study subset
had an “error” rate of only 3-8%.
Rater High/Low Ratings Percentage
1 26 of 392 6.6%
2 19 of 392 4.8%
3 29 of 390 7.4%
4 20 of 392 5.1%
5 22 of 390 5.6%
6 14 of 392 3.6%
Table 4.12: HumanSim Rater High/Low Disagreement in the Study subset
The takeaway from this HumanSim dataset seems to be that if humans are
agreeing that this type of input presented in this way is similar only 60% of
the time, then any algorithm we build to duplicate human analysis will have
a hard time deciding what is similar as well.
4.5 TurkSim
The second of three techniques used to evaluate the similarity of the study
data was via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. This section describes the results of
this set of evaluations with both Random pairings as well as analysis at both
the Group and the entire Study level.
In its entirety, this study cost $219.33 and was conducted via a series of
8773 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) within the Mechanical Turk system.
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4.5.1 Random
The random pairing analysis in this section is from Table 4.6, Line 5
- not cleaned
- random
- entire study
- in WordNet
- unweighted
similar to what was done in the previous section
(4.4) with trained human raters. Each pair of lists
shown to the Turkers is a combination of a Self list
from one participant with the Group list from a dif-
ferent random participant. The similarity of these two lists was expected to
be low and, therefore, this set of scenarios serves as the null hypothesis for the
Mechanical Turk (TurkSim) evaluation technique. Results that do better than
Random are exhibiting some effect of the study.
The subset of pairings here represent random participants, but only using
the words that matched with words known to the WordNet database. Words
that were not in the WordNet database were dropped in this analysis and not
listed when evaluated by the Turkers so that this analysis is directly compa-
rable to the equivalent AlgSim evaluation later (which cannot, by definition,
evaluate words not in WordNet as they have no WordNet definitions or weight).
Additionally, these pairs were not weighted (duplicate words were not desig-
nated as such), so every word included in the lists was only included once per
list. The words were listed in alphabetical order.
Figure 4.5 shows that the ratings for the “TurkSim - Random” subset were
situated clearly on the Low similarity end of the scale. The mean similarity
score when “all” the words were listed was 3.0 and 2.8 when only the words
occurring twice or more were listed (“common”). The median score for both
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Figure 4.5: TurkSim - Random
was 3. The minimum for both was 1 and the maximum for both was 7.
4.5.2 Random - All Words
The subset of pairings here represent random from Table 4.6, Line 7
- not cleaned
- random
- entire study
- all words
- unweighted
participants, using all the words used by the par-
ticipants, not just those found in (matching) the
WordNet database. These pairs were not weighted,
so every word included in the lists was only included
once per list. The words were listed in alphabetical order.
Figure 4.6 shows that the ratings for the “TurkSim - Random - All Words”
subset were also clearly on the Low similarity end of the scale. The mean
similarity score when “all” the words were listed was 3.5 and 3.3 when only the
words occurring twice or more were listed (“common”). The median score for
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Figure 4.6: TurkSim - Random - All Words
both was 3. The minimum for both was 1 and the maximum for both was 7.
4.5.3 Random - All Words - Weighted
The subset of pairings here represent random from Table 4.6, Line 8
- not cleaned
- random
- entire study
- all words
- weighted
participants, using all the words used by the par-
ticipants, not just those found in (matching) the
WordNet database. These pairs were weighted, so
the words included in the lists were annotated with
a “score” designating how many times that word was used in the list. The
words were listed by weight, with the heaviest words first. Words with identi-
cal weights were listed in alphabetical order.
Figure 4.7 shows that the ratings for the “TurkSim - Random - All Words -
Weighted” subset were also clearly on the Low similarity end of the scale. The
mean similarity score when “all” the words were listed was 3.3 and 3.1 when
only the words occurring twice or more were listed (“common”). The median
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score for both was 3. The minimum for both was 1 and the maximum for both
was 7.
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Figure 4.7: TurkSim - Random - All Words - Weighted
All said, the set of Random pairings suggest that untrained Mechanical
Turk workers can determine that randomly paired sets of words are not similar.
4.5.4 Group
These results are presented by round and can be from Table 4.6, Line 9
- not cleaned
- not random
- by group
- in WordNet
- unweighted
interpreted from left to right with respect to time.
Time elapsed between rounds is not uniform but the
axis still serves as a proxy for the passage of time
and increasing participant familiarity and usage of
the study tool.
There are missing boxplots in Figure 4.8 for the last two rounds of Groups
3 and 4, and for the last round for Group 6, as these groups only completed 3
and 4 rounds, respectively. These will be missing for all Group analysis (this
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and the next two subsections). The data from these rounds were not sent to
the Turkers, as the additional paid results would simply duplicate the previous
round that added new data.
Additionally, there are missing boxplots for Groups 1 and 6, Round 1, and
Group 10, all rounds, since there were no terms that were known to WordNet
that also were mentioned by multiple members of the group. As such, there
was nothing to send to the Turkers to compare.
In general, there was a slight upward trend in similarity ratings over time.
The Turkers generally agreed that the lists of words provided by the partici-
pants were more similar than dissimilar (ratings of 5 and above). The two to
three groups with lower similarity (ratings of 3 and below) were using more
specific and technical language to define their areas of expertise. This lan-
guage may not have been as accessible to or known by the Turkers and rated
accordingly.
all
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
70 100 100 60 145
g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
90 135 160 120 100
common
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
45 80 95 30 130
g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
40 135 160 120 0
Table 4.13: TurkSim - Group (Totals): These are the number of Mechanical
Turk HITs evaluated for each group and shown in Figure 4.8. The totals vary
due to the size of the group memberships and the specifics of the language used
by the participants. Only words found in WordNet were used in this analysis.
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Figure 4.8: TurkSim - Group
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4.5.5 Group - All Words
The ratings in this section are from the Turk- from Table 4.6, Line 11
- not cleaned
- not random
- by group
- all words
- unweighted
ers when presented with the Self and Group lists
of participants. These lists were presented un-
weighted and included all the words given by the
participants (no words were dropped due to lack of
inclusion in the WordNet database).
Again, Groups 3, 4, and 6 in Figure 4.9 are missing their final round(s) due
to those groups not completing the entire study. Group 10 is missing data due
to no common terms (used by more than one group member) being present by
Round 1.
These ratings are similar to the WordNet results in the last section, but
noticeably higher for the 2-3 groups that had earlier exhibited ratings in the
lower end of the similarity range. Due to more words being present for the
Turkers to evaluate, they rated the lists higher, in general.
4.5.6 Group - All Words - Weighted
The ratings in this section are from the Turk- from Table 4.6, Line 12
- not cleaned
- not random
- by group
- all words
- weighted
ers when presented with the Self and Group lists
of participants. These lists were presented in a
weighted fashion (words were shown with a corre-
sponding number representing how many times it
was present in the list) and included all the words given by the participants
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Figure 4.9: TurkSim - Group - All Words
all
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
125 150 105 75 150
g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
150 195 175 150 145
common
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
115 150 105 75 150
g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
120 190 175 150 20
Table 4.14: TurkSim - Group - All Words (Totals): These are the number of
Mechanical Turk HITs evaluated for each group and shown in Figure 4.9. The
totals vary due to the size of the group memberships and the specifics of the
language used by the participants.
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(no words were dropped due to lack of inclusion in the WordNet database).
Again, Groups 3, 4, and 6 in Figure 4.10 are missing their final round(s)
due to those groups not completing the entire study. Group 10 is missing data
due to no common terms (used by more than one group member) being present
by Round 1.
By visual inspection, these ratings are extremely similar to the ratings
from the last (unweighted) section. There is little change when introducing
weighted listings to the Turkers. The ratings were generally scores of 5.
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Figure 4.10: TurkSim - Group - All Words - Weighted
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all
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
125 150 105 75 150
g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
150 195 175 150 145
common
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
115 150 105 75 150
g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
120 190 175 150 20
Table 4.15: TurkSim - Group - All Words - Weighted (Totals): These are
the number of Mechanical Turk HITs evaluated for each group and shown in
Figure 4.10. The totals vary due to the size of the group memberships and
the specifics of the language used by the participants. This table has identical
values as Table 4.14 because the same number of evaluations were made. These
evaluations were made when the tags were weighted.
4.5.7 Study
The ratings in this section represent the com- from Table 4.6, Line 13
- not cleaned
- not random
- entire study
- in WordNet
- unweighted
posite of all the group-specific ratings displayed in
Section 4.5.4. As seen in Figure 4.11, when the
data was filtered through WordNet, there was no
confidence by the Turkers that the words were sim-
ilar in Round 1 (average rating of 4, or Neutral). The similarity ratings in-
creased slightly by Round 2 and onward as the rounds continued. Having only
the common words shown to the Turkers decreased their ability, at the mar-
gins, to discern between the lists, as the range of ratings were wider when they
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Figure 4.11: TurkSim - Study
had less information to evaluate.
4.5.8 Study - All Words
The ratings in this section represent the com- from Table 4.6, Line 15
- not cleaned
- not random
- entire study
- all words
- unweighted
posite of all the group-specific ratings displayed
in Section 4.5.5. Since this data was not filtered
through WordNet, there was more information for
the Turkers to use in deciding their similarity scores.
The ratings in Figure 4.12 were “Similar (5)” in Round 1 and remained
there for the rest of the rounds, but the range tightened noticeably as the
rounds continued. The ranges collapsed more quickly (Round 2 vs. Round 5)
when all the words were shown, rather than only the words that appeared in
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Figure 4.12: TurkSim - Study - All Words
the lists multiple times.
4.5.9 Study - All Words - Weighted
The ratings in this section (see Figure 4.13) rep- from Table 4.6, Line 16
- not cleaned
- not random
- entire study
- all words
- weighted
resent the composite of all the group-specific rat-
ings displayed in Section 4.5.6. Having the data
be presented in a weighted fashion to the Turkers
seemed to have little to no effect on their similarity
ratings of the lists of words. This is surprising as weighted lists should help
focus attention on the most agreed-upon words from the group.
However, this phenomenon is more salient with larger amounts of data,
and the relatively small weights (the maximum would be equal to the size of
the group - 1) may have contributed to this null result. The similarity scores
were 5s, and the range of scores collapsed in the same manner and at the same
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Figure 4.13: TurkSim - Study - All Words - Weighted
speed as the unweighted presentation.
4.6 AlgSim
The ratings in this section were generated using an automatic technique that
characterized, filtered, and then compared lists of words to one another. Using
the method described in Section 3.5.4.2, the ratings here are devoid of human
interpretation, save the prior human scoring and interpretations embedded
in the WordNet database. They are on a 0-1 scale and cannot be directly
compared to the human-generated Likert scale scores of 1-7 from the last two
sections.
4.6.1 Raw
The next three graphs are generated by running the study data through Al-
gSim without any post-study cleaning. This data is raw from the database
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and represents what the study participants were seeing displayed in the in-
terface both for themselves and for others. The study software cleaned the
incoming data from the HTML text boxes by lowercasing, changing spaces
to underscores, and removing other punctuation. No attempt was made to
remove typos or plurals or anything else at this time.
4.6.1.1 Random
The ratings in this section are representative of from Table 4.6, Line 5
- not cleaned
- random
- entire study
- in WordNet
- unweighted
running random data through the AlgSim function.
This serves as a baseline for the automatic ratings
that follow. The ratings are effectively zero (Figure
4.14).
This is expected as the randomness involves selecting random participants
and comparing their lists against one another. Any correlation could be at-
tributed to similarity among members of the same work group using the same
words to describe their areas of expertise (as compared to participants from
other groups, in other industries).
As shown in Table 4.16, the random data for both the “all” words and
the “common” words scenarios begin to look statistically significantly different
from the study data after Round 1 with an alpha of 0.001. Also listed in Table
4.16 are the same two scenarios, but performed with the hand-cleaned AlgSim
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Figure 4.14: AlgSim - Random
raw/cleaned all/common Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
raw all 0.095 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
raw common 0.135 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
cleaned all 0.122 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
cleaned common 0.046* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Table 4.16: AlgSim vs. Random: ANOVA p-values by Round
dataset (see Section 4.6.2.1).
4.6.1.2 Group
The ratings in this section (seen in Figure 4.15) from Table 4.6, Line 9
- not cleaned
- not random
- by group
- in WordNet
- unweighted
show the group and round level scoring of similarity
of the words used in the study. When looking at the
common words only, Groups 3, 7, 8, and 9 appear
to rise over time. The other groups struggle to rise
from zero. When all the words are used, Group 2, 5, and 10 seem to climb a
bit as well.
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Figure 4.15: AlgSim - Group
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Remember, Groups 3, 4, and 6 did not complete all five rounds and there-
fore have some missing data.
4.6.1.3 Study
The ratings in this section (seen in Figure 4.16) from Table 4.6, Line 13
- not cleaned
- not random
- entire study
- in WordNet
- unweighted
are a composite of the last section and represent
the entire study data. The scores rise slightly from
Round 1 to Round 5 in both the scenarios where
all the words are evaluated and when only the com-
mon words are evaluated.
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Figure 4.16: AlgSim - Study
A repeated measures analysis of variance (Tables 4.17 and 4.18) shows that
the change over time is statistically significant for both scenarios with an alpha
of 0.01 (p-values of 0.0036 and 0.0034, respectively).
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Round 1 0.30 0.30 8.62 0.0036
Residuals 286 9.92 0.03
Table 4.17: ANOVA: AlgSim by Round, all words
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Round 1 0.40 0.40 8.74 0.0034
Residuals 286 13.23 0.05
Table 4.18: ANOVA: AlgSim by Round, common words
4.6.2 Cleaned
The following set of three graphs has been run on the same data as before,
but after it was hand-cleaned to remove typos and plurals that did not create
confusion and to break multiple ideas into individual words. The hand-cleaning
affected roughly 10% of the entered data.
4.6.2.1 Random
The similarity of comparisons of random pair- from Table 4.6, Line 21
- cleaned
- random
- entire study
- in WordNet
- unweighted
ings remained very low after the data cleaning (Fig-
ure 4.17). The technique used here is the same as
before and serves as a baseline against which to
measure the next two sections.
As previously seen in the second half of Table 4.16, the random cleaned
data comparisons were significantly different (with an alpha of .001) from the
study cleaned data comparisons after Round 1. This shows that the study
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data was exhibiting some relevant signal.
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Figure 4.17: AlgSim - Cleaned - Random
4.6.2.2 Group
This section shows the algorithmic similarity from Table 4.6, Line 25
- cleaned
- not random
- by group
- in WordNet
- unweighted
ratings by group applied to the study data after
it had been hand-cleaned (Figure 4.18). The data
has been run through WordNet and words that did
not appear were dropped.
Like the earlier analysis, a few rounds appear to rise over time when the
words appear more than once (common). Then when all the words are used,
nearly every group shows an increase in their corresponding similarity rating
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Figure 4.18: AlgSim - Cleaned - Group
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scores from Round 1 to Round 5.
4.6.2.3 Study
When the data from all the groups are combined (Figure 4.19), there is a
clear rise in similarity score from Round 1 to Round 5. This is the case for
both evaluation techniques, when all the words were evaluated and when only
words appearing more than once were evaluated.
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Figure 4.19: AlgSim - Cleaned - Study
The repeated measures analysis of variance (Ta- from Table 4.6, Line 29
- cleaned
- not random
- entire study
- in WordNet
- unweighted
ble 4.19) of the algorithmic similarity scores across
time (represented by Round) for the case where all
words were evaluated showed a statistically signif-
icant main effect with an alpha of 0.01 (p-value of
0.0015).
However, looking at a round by round post-hoc ANOVA analysis when
all the words are used (Table 4.20), the only significant differences appear to
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Round 1 0.32 0.32 10.22 0.0015
Residuals 286 8.85 0.03
Table 4.19: ANOVA: Cleaned AlgSim by Round, all words
occur after the original feedback loop between Rounds 1 and 2 (p-values less
than 0.05) when the participants are initially faced with their group members’
feedback. No other single round or span of rounds show an effect.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Round 2 0.0249* - - -
Round 3 0.0058* 0.6428 - -
Round 4 0.0016** 0.3906 0.6783 -
Round 5 0.0014** 0.3480 0.6062 0.9072
Table 4.20: AlgSim - All: Post-hoc ANOVA p-values by Round
When comparing the algorithmic similarity scores across time when only
the words appearing more than once were evaluated (Table 4.21), we again see
a statistically significant main effect with an alpha of 0.05 (p-value of 0.038).
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Round 1 0.22 0.22 4.36 0.0377
Residuals 286 14.50 0.05
Table 4.21: ANOVA: Cleaned AlgSim by Round, common words
But this time, the post-hoc round-by-round ANOVA shows no significant
changes when only the common words are considered (Table 4.22).
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Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Round 2 0.3746 - - -
Round 3 0.1152 0.4553 - -
Round 4 0.1446 0.5035 0.9635 -
Round 5 0.0642 0.2549 0.6522 0.6334
Table 4.22: AlgSim - Common: Post-hoc ANOVA p-values by Round
4.7 Survey
The survey for this study was designed to help evaluate correctness, newness,
and potential applicability of the proposed technique for identifying areas of
expertise of group members.
The questions in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 were issued to all 64 participants
at the completion of their group’s participation. Eight participants did not
complete the survey. Two of these participants began, but did not complete,
the survey. The following data represent the 56 completed surveys.
The following ratings (Table 4.23) come from a 7-point Likert scale rep-
resenting agreement: 1=Extremely Disagree, 4=Neutral, 7=Extremely Agree.
The original items are scored directly. The scales are aggregate ratings, rep-
resenting the average rating for each scale’s constituent questions (from Table
3.3).
All but one of the original items scored with mild to strong agreement. The
highest ratings of agreement were received by the statements regarding comfort
and familiarity of the group members with one another’s areas of expertise.
Additionally, nearly all participants rated this to be an interesting exercise.
Slightly lower ratings were received by the items regarding the results of
the exercise. The participants believed the system gave them somewhat good
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and new information that they found useful. They also thought the system
did not necessarily gather all the important areas of their expertise and that
they would not necessarily use the information to help them make decisions
moving forward.
At the bottom of the ratings was the item concerning anonymity. These
were fairly small groups, so anonymity is probably too strong a word to use.
However, the participants said they would not be as comfortable if the tags
had been attributed to one another when being shown. The ability to describe
each other’s areas of expertise from behind a curtain of deniability increased
their level of comfort during the exercise.
Original Items Average Rating
I am comfortable with my group’s tags about my areas of expertise. 5.439
I am happy with my group’s tags about my areas of expertise. 5.351
I am familiar with my group members’ areas of expertise. 5.333
This was an interesting exercise. 5.196
My group members are familiar with my areas of expertise. 5.175
My group did not list important areas of my expertise. 4.764
I am confident that this system gives me new information. 4.696
This was a useful exercise. 4.679
I am confident that this system gives me good information. 4.643
I am willing to incorporate output from this system into my decision making. 4.607
I would be more comfortable with my group’s tags if the tags were not anonymous. 3.298
Scale Average Rating
Data Quality 4.709
Effort Expectancy 4.670
Result Demonstrability 4.299
Facilitating Conditions 4.250
Performance Expectancy 3.836
Relative Advantage 3.742
Anxiety (reverse coded) 3.036
Table 4.23: Survey Scales and Ratings
Being averages, the aggregate scales are relatively mild and all fit between
3 and 5, straddling the Neutral rating. However, they showed similar results to
the original items. At the top of the list, the participants believed this exercise
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provided good data quality and was easy to use and clear to understand.
The participants rated the items regarding the results of the exercise and its
fit within their organization slightly higher than neutral. There was slight
disagreement with the items concerning the usefulness and effectiveness of the
exercise, as well as whether it would help them do their job better than they
can without it. The lowest rated scale item is reverse coded and shows that
anxiety about using this tool was not very high. When reversed, the anxiety
scale is the most strongly rated set of items (it would score 4.964).
Favorite Part Response Count
thinking about specific strengths of others 12
what people thought of me 11
more awareness 8
seeing others’ self claims 8
how others see others 7
good to reconnect 2
self assessment 2
making connections / learning about others 2
thinking about friends / uplifting / feel better 2
non-job related interests 2
not time consuming 1
similarity and consensus 1
got to know people faster 1
tag clouds of expertise 1
the challenge of listing explicitly 1
help learn about colleagues, otherwise limited contact 1
Table 4.24: Reported Favorite Part of the Exercise
The participants were asked to name their favorite part of the exercise
(Table 4.24). The two most favorite things about the exercise were the effortful
thinking of others and finding out what others said about oneself. In the next
grouping, participants liked having a better understanding and awareness of
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their group members as well as seeing how everyone else rated themselves and
each other. Mentioned once or twice were more emotional items such as the
feeling of reconnection and making others feel good about their skills.
Least Favorite Part Response Count
redundancy of multiple rounds (3 was enough) 29
nothing disliked 4
yet another email / feeling of tardiness 2
phrasing of tags is hard 2
non-uniformity of terms 2
talking about myself / “not very modest” 2
everyone has a different view 1
trying to determine whether someone was an expert 1
could not go back and modify 1
being asked if i was sure 1
no semantic equivalence 1
stressful 1
vulnerability 1
when others did not reciprocate 1
nervous 1
defining “expertise” 1
fear of future reduced group dynamics because of exclusion 1
realizing i know very little about 3 group members 1
concern over “doing it wrong” 1
entering passcodes manually 1
Table 4.25: Reported Least Favorite Part of the Exercise
When listing their least favorite part of the exercise, the participants spoke
with a louder collective voice (Table 4.25). With a resounding 29 responses, the
participants really did not like how many times they were asked to complete the
same task. They found they were getting little from the group, and had little
to add, after the third round. This was expected, fits with earlier research,
and probably diluted some of the value of the remaining responses as the
participants were only asked to name their single least favorite part. Two
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participants responded that they did not like the sense of guilt and tardiness
of being reminded they had not participated yet. Two each mentioned that
the phrasing of tags is hard and that they were frustrated in how their group
did not converge on shared language fast enough for their liking.
Other responses included feeling vulnerable, nervous, having stress at think-
ing about others, as well as not seeing their self-claimed areas of expertise
reciprocated in the tags coming back from the list. Some responses were very
specific to the implementation and study-design such as no semantic equiva-
lence being applied to the tags, not being able to go back and modify their
tagging within a round, being asked if they were sure before submitting their
input, and having to enter passcodes manually.
4.8 Interviews
The semi-structured interviews consisted of the 11 interview questions in Table
3.4. These were issued to 15 volunteer participants from 8 of the 10 groups
over the phone and recorded. The average duration of an interview was 24
minutes.
In large part, the interviews reflected similar sentiments as those seen in the
survey data. Participants thought the exercise was interesting, easy, fun, pro-
vided excellent opportunity for reflection, “reinforced what we already knew”
and provided validation, but provided marginal new information and “had too
many rounds.” They felt nervous and “a bit intimidated” at the beginning but
also noted that those feelings dissipated after the second and third rounds.
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One thing made more clear in the interviews was the reasoning behind the
widespread professionalism of the tags shared within the groups. The exercise
was conducted in the context of being a group member, and so they filled
the requirement and completed the task as a member of that group, with its
constituent assumptions, hierarchies, and efficiencies (or lack thereof).
The interviews made it clear that the open-endedness of the task was mod-
erately confusing and should perhaps have been made more focused. Partici-
pants in the role of manager wanted to know how the exercise could be directly
applied to task assignment, while those participants who were not managers
wanted to know how all the data would be used. A common theme was that
they “wanted something more at the end.”
There was a clear consensus around anonymity being important within
this size group and within organizations where people naturally behave (since
they work together). It was thought that removing the anonymity, attributing
the tags to specific others, would increase the amount of “sucking up” and
lower the signal to noise ratio of insightful and interesting tags. It would also
increase the stress and anxiety within the group. Some suggested the total
volume of tags would increase, as obligation would become the dominating
social motivator. Others suggested it would lower the total volume of tags, as
participants would not want to go on the record speaking about one another’s
areas of expertise. This effect would probably be determined mostly by the
individual personalities of the group’s members and its existing office culture.
There was the observation that the Self tags tended to be more reflective,
conceptual, and considered. The Group tags were more specific, focused on
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the current tasks that each participant performed at work. A few participants
mentioned that talking about oneself was “weird,”“awkward,” or “advertisey,”
but also said that “I want people to know more about what I’m doing.” One
said that he “learned a bit about how I like to be viewed by others” and that
he now has “a better understanding of what I want to project.” Another said
“I need to be better about promoting.”
By and large, interviewed participants would recommend this exercise to
other groups, but would suggest the focus be made more explicit up front,
discussion within the group should be encouraged both during and after, and
the results should definitely be shared with new group members when they
join to increase their familiarity and rate of acceptance.
The definition of“expert”and“expertise” seemed to be a heavy subject and
one that directly influenced participation. Groups that discussed their shared
understanding of the concept felt they got more out of the exercise. Those
that did not talk as much about the process thought “it was beneficial,” but
that “it would be more beneficial if we talked about it as an office.”
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Chapter 5
Discussion
The results presented in Chapter 4 allow the research questions posed in Sec-
tion 1.7 to be answered directly. In this chapter, the research questions are
addressed and analyzed.
5.1 Research Questions and Analysis
5.1.1 RQ1
The first research question addressed by this research was concerned with
the performance of Contextual Authority Tagging and whether it successfully
identifies a group member’s areas of expertise.
R1. Does CAT work?
(a) Similarity - How similar are a group member’s opinion of his/her
own areas of expertise and the group’s opinion of his/her areas of
expertise?
(b) Convergence - How does the similarity behave over time? Do the
two opinions converge? If so, how long does it take? If not, is there
a persistent gap?
Since expertise was operationalized as a set of attributed words, or tags,
similarity of expertise was operationalized as a rating comparing two sets of
those words. A high similarity rating suggests the two sets of words were
covering the same ground and had little impedance mismatch.
Both of the human-based similarity techniques suggest that the proposed
process succeeds in providing group tags that are similar to an individual’s self
tags. The automatic technique gave scores that were relatively low on its ab-
solute scale, but statistically significantly different from random comparisons.
The results from the automatic WordNet-based approach suggest that the
algorithm could be made to better agree with the human assessments of sim-
ilarity. The algorithm itself was relatively simple and did not employ any so-
phisticated data-mining, word stemming, or semantic equivalence judgments
in its calculations. With a bit of training and semantic capability, the auto-
matic approach should improve dramatically and bring the effort and cost of
this type of analysis down significantly from the two human-based approaches.
In order to discuss convergence of a subjective evaluation, I chose to employ
an increase in similarity as a proxy for convergence. Both the TurkSim and
AlgSim techniques did display a rise in similarity over time and can therefore
be said to approach convergence. It would be too bold to suggest they ever
converged, as the richness of language can never be fully characterized by
compressing it into some subset of constituent words. Additionally, the groups
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in the study were particularly scoped and did not venture much beyond the
job tasks the group members are assigned and carry out at their workplace.
WordNet was definitely an enabling technology as well as a limiting agent
during this process. Without the extensive prior work done to categorize and
quantify the English language, the automatic technique I proposed and exe-
cuted would not have been possible. However, due to the free-text phrases
that my participants regularly used to describe their areas of expertise, many
rich contexts were lost due to the necessary dropping of the words and phrases
not found in the WordNet dictionary. As a general purpose tool, Contextual
Authority Tagging will probably need to have some human curation and/or
some discipline-specific dictionaries available to better contextualize and un-
derstand the knowledge being shared when group members are describing one
anothers’ areas of expertise. Expertise is related to depth of experience and
understanding and the deeper one goes into a subject, the more specific and
context-laden the vocabulary becomes.
The survey data shows that the participants themselves also suggest the
exercise provided them with good representations of their own areas of ex-
pertise and that of their colleagues. Besides the reverse-coded Anxiety scale,
Data Quality was the highest-rated scale. Participants also felt that their
group members did a good job labeling their areas of expertise. Slightly less,
they agreed with the notion that their group members left out, or did not list,
some important areas of their expertise. This suggests that with more data
and perhaps more participants, the data quality could improve as coverage
(familiarity) fills out and spreads across additional domains.
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The first hypothesis from Chapter 1 was:
H1. As the social fact of what a person knows is molded by the group, a
consensus will appear and converge.
The data supports the view that Contextual Authority Tagging provides
a baseline for concluding that a group’s opinion about a person’s areas of
expertise can give good information. A consensus appeared, was agreed to
by the individual being tagged, and somewhat converged over time as the
language and norms of the group were negotiated in a shared space. This
finding comes with the caveat that the participants knew one another well
enough or had enough experience with one another to feel the data being
provided was of good enough quality. When conducted outside of well-known
groups, this finding may not hold as both participant identity and the promise
of future interactions are not as strong.
5.1.2 RQ2
The second research question addressed by this research was about the more
practical issue of the acceptability of Contextual Authority Tagging as a new
technology.
R2. How acceptable is CAT?
(a) Comfort - How comfortable are group members in participating?
What are the main factors influencing their comfort level?
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(b) Confidence - How confident are group members in a system like
this? What is the quality of the output of this system? Does this
system provide a valid credential? Does this system increase users’
trust in one another?
(c) Usefulness - What is useful about a system like this? What did
participants learn? How would using this system affect participants’
decision making?
This turns out to be a hard question to quantify, but generally speaking,
the demonstration tested here is not ready for a production environment and
should be improved in a number of ways before being used to provide actionable
results to any organization.
That said, participants reported that, while they had some early apprehen-
sion about having co-workers talk about them, they quickly realized that their
co-workers were well-behaved and that a system like this could work because
everyone is equally visible and “vulnerable.” Sufficient external incentives were
already in place, apart from the study software, to make sure participants were
cordial and respectful. The participants said they were comfortable with the
tags their group members listed about them and that their cautiousness went
away after the first couple rounds, as they began to understand the dynamics
of this type of a system and its affordances both for themselves and equally so
for their colleagues. The visibility and comprehensive simplicity of the bimodal
self/group construct played a role in the participants feeling comfortable. They
quickly made peace with what others could see. The complexity of the system
is in its social application and feedback loops, not in its structure.
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The participants in this study also voiced through their survey responses
and via the follow-up interviews that their confidence in this system to provide
good information was fairly high. They felt confident that what they were see-
ing was correct, but not comprehensive, and they would assume that because
these characteristics were true for their own tags, they would be true for the
other group members as well. Multiple participants shared that there was
well-known information that was not being shared within the tags, keeping it
invisible to the system. They speculated this to be because the well-known in-
formation was off-topic for a work-related exercise, and that the person whose
areas of expertise were being omitted would not have liked off-topic informa-
tion being discussed in a work-related tool. This sentiment was most com-
monly expressed about those in positions of authority, i.e., the boss. While
this may fairly represent the existing culture of any particular group, it may
actually be representative of a failure to capture some topic or area that could
prove important later. Willingness to describe and be described outside of the
professional job description would be an interesting independent variable for
future research into productivity, teamwork, or morale to consider.
Regarding the question of being a valid credential, the participants agree
that CAT could serve as a low-to-mid value credential that would be trusted.
It would point them in the right direction, but they would want to verify any
information that was suggested by the group that they had not personally
experienced before relying on it. This new unverified, but community-sourced,
information could be seen in the same way that Ronald Reagan described the
United States’ working with the Soviet Union when emerging carefully from
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the Cold War, “Trust, but Verify.” A few participants referred to “learning”
something about someone, striking up a conversation later and being pleas-
antly surprised that the item was true. One female near-retiree was surpris-
ingly tagged with “swordfighting.” This was met with incredulity by her other
colleagues until more details were provided face-to-face to her group members.
It simply had not come up at the office prior and the explicit nature of this
tool provided an opportunity for discovery and discussion.
While nearly all the participants thought the exercise was interesting and
sometimes thought-provoking, their sense of its usefulness was moderated by
the fact that they were not sure of its goal or what they should be getting out of
it. A few mentioned small things they learned about a colleague, but were not
sure how it may help them in the future. All of the“new”information discussed
in the interviews were not job related and were considered “trivia” about the
colleague, not directly influential on their duties or capabilities. However,
where the roles in an organization or group are not as formalized and more
fluid, or when the organization itself is less role-based (e.g., a non-profit or
volunteer organization, or a consultancy), participants thought that this type
of information could be useful to help uncover unknown talents or histories.
Additionally, multiple interviewees stated that this type of information about
their colleagues would have been very useful to see when they first started
their job; they would have liked to have had a quick tagcloud-like overview of
each person in the group when first orienting themselves to a new workplace.
They expressed that having an asynchronous tool to learn about others would
be very helpful. Knowing that anyone within the community could edit it, and
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that others were paying attention, would warrant it additional trust.
However, none of the participants mentioned that this type of a tool would
influence their decision-making within their role as a group member in the con-
text of their workplace. I suspect this is because this keyword representation is
a “watered down” version of what they know more richly in person. I suspect
also that CAT’s ability to influence decision-making would increase somewhat
if the relationships being evaluated were not as rich; without existing personal
interaction and history from which to sample, the output from CAT would
become a better relative source of information. An interesting corollary suspi-
cion is that with a more personal knowledge and history shared among group
members may come a relatively less compelling set of tags. Groups that know
each other well may not learn as much from a tool like this simply because
everything is well-known already. But then again, the value may be greatest
for those outside the circle, those who are not already well-known to the group.
The second hypothesis from Chapter 1 was:
H2. Comfort levels will increase as the system becomes known and under-
stood. Initial trepidation will be assuaged as the system allows partici-
pants to see more of how they are perceived by others.
This hypothesis was supported both by the survey data reporting low anx-
iety as well as direct statements from interviewed participants. They realized
how the system was sharing their inputs and they experienced seeing the in-
puts of their colleagues concerning their own areas of expertise. Participants
stated very clearly that they became more comfortable over time.
The third and final hypothesis from Chapter 1 was:
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H3. Group members will have confidence in this system and exhibit increased
trust in one another.
This last hypothesis was found to be partially supported. Participants did
have confidence in the system to collect and then report the type of information
they were expecting it to report. They thought the data would be quality data
and they trusted it for what it was.
However, they did not report that the trust in the data carried over to
increased trust in the other participants. The study design forced the group
members to already be acquainted with one another and have existing work-
ing relationships. This means that the participants began the study with a
fairly high degree of trust. This study provided no support for the idea that
participants’ trust levels increased because of the exercise.
It would be interesting to ask a specific set of questions about colleague
trust of a set of group members who were just beginning to work together or of
group members who knew each other in a less formal environment than their
salaried jobs.
5.2 Conclusion
After considering the group results, the survey and interview responses, and
the analysis above, I think there are three major points to take from this
research.
The first conclusion is that Contextual Authority Tagging succeeds in iden-
tifying the areas of expertise of group members, within a workplace of trusted
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peers, but should not be considered a standalone technique or process. This
type of software framework should be integrated with existing email, person-
nel, or people-centric technology and provide a meta-layer above and beyond
what is already being provided. A separate product is too cumbersome and
disjoint from an employee’s already-full business workday and is less useful
than having a simple context-aware overlay available to them in a familiar
tool or environment. As long as the input interface remains just a text box
and the output is just a ranked list or tagcloud, the mental model of self/group
is simple enough to include within other interfaces without fear of introducing
any overwhelming complexity or clutter. Having a larger company’s human
resources department administer this type of a system would probably make
the most sense as their primary unit of focus is already the individual worker.
The second conclusion is that if Contextual Authority Tagging hopes to
provide a service or improve communication within a business environment, it
needs to do a much better job of providing some guidelines for interpretation
in addition to simply providing data. I had assumed that providing a new set
of information about an interesting topic (data about one’s self and colleagues)
would be enough to encourage discussion and reflection. Unfortunately, hardly
any participants reported talking about the collected and reported data within
their groups despite nearly all reporting that it was very interesting to see what
their colleagues thought about them and each other.
A tool like CAT should be deployed in a workplace environment with clear
explanations for each of the questions: who, what, when, where, and why.
Without these types of background agreements in place, new technology has a
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much harder time getting buy-in from its target audience and since the target
audience is being paid to do their jobs, it needs to be framed with respect to
those jobs. Groups will get the most out of a system like CAT if they take time
to collectively and consciously reflect on their definition(s) of “expertise”, what
they hope to get out of the exercise, and the terms being used to describe the
different members’ areas of expertise. Additionally, if this exercise is part of
a consulting service offered to a group, some interpretation should accompany
the results data. Some of the most powerful reactions I heard in the interviews
were from individuals who had gone through these framing and interpretation
steps of their own volition. Groups that did not discuss the exercise amongst
themselves were distinctly less engaged with their results.
The third conclusion is that CAT does not generally provide “new” infor-
mation to small, well-knit groups of co-workers. That said, group members
who were newer or less connected to the “core” of a group responded that they
did learn a bit about their colleagues. They speculated that they would have
learned about their peers much faster had this type of a system been in place
when they arrived. Well-known information may not be as exciting to es-
tablished members of a group, but that same known information is extremely
useful and interesting to people who are not established members of the group.
And since this type of information is “vetted” by the group, it holds a high
degree of validity to outsiders and new entrants.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this final chapter, I share a summary of findings and confirmations of earlier
work, explain the contributions and implications of this work, discuss a few
lessons learned and the limitations of the particulars of this study, and share
some thoughts on practical future research directions based on Contextual
Authority Tagging.
6.1 Summary of Findings
Overall, this research has provided insight into how familiar groups of individ-
uals in the workplace can understand what their colleagues think of their areas
of expertise. This work has shown that, with simple keywords, group members
can convey the salient areas of expertise of their colleagues to a degree that is
deemed “similar” and of “high quality” by both third parties and those being
evaluated.
Identity formation and negotiation is alive and well, and this research fits
within the frames drawn by Goffman (1959) and Tajfel and Turner (1986) and
furthered by boyd (2002, 2008). We perform and we understand ourselves
in part by understanding the reflections that come back to us from others
(Marchionini, 2009).
In a fast-moving networked workplace, this ability to gain insight into the
knowledge of others with a simple trustable lookup may prove valuable. Tap-
ping into the collective understanding and distilled opinion of those around us
could be a useful tool or sanity check against both direct and indirect individ-
ual claims of expertise. Equally, it could serve as a weapon against misplaced
modesty, allowing us to collectively reward those who deserve to be given credit
when credit is due.
What remains an open question is whether this type of collective opinion
mapping works in an environment beyond the walls of the relatively small,
trusted workplace, where people know one another (stable identity) and have
many incentives to behave and only say positive, professional things about one
another (“the shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984)).
6.2 Contributions and Implications
One of the surprising results and potentially important contributions is that
weighting did not seem to affect the similarity ratings of two lists by third
parties. Both the HumanSim and the TurkSim ratings were largely unaffected
by the addition of weights (occurrences) to the words in the compared lists.
This was unexpected and probably deserves some further investigation. The
public’s continuing affinity for relatively-sized tagclouds suggests there may
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be something missing in the current study design that suppressed this affinity.
The size of the lists were not terribly long (it was possible to keep the entirety
of a long list within working memory) and this may have contributed to the
weightings’ apparent lack of an effect. With longer lists and more data, the
weightings may have proved a more useful proxy or shortcut and therefore
added more value.
Another interesting observation is that, within this study, expertise some-
times appeared to be understood as existing on a spectrum ranging between
sets of skills and individual interests. Participants appeared to use this spec-
trum of understanding by discussing the group results in terms of the two ex-
tremes, one facing “forward” and one facing “back.” One manager spoke about
the two lists with an added layer of (self-imposed) meaning; listing things for
one’s self was showing interest or desire to work on certain tasks (“forward”),
while the group lists uncovered what others thought that person was good at
and what their current job descriptions were about (“back”). This dichotomy
allowed the manager to infer where new projects may better fit with the exist-
ing personnel’s interests in addition to fitting with existing forged expectations
and demonstrated prior experiences.
I was surprised by this layering of intention and meaning on an otherwise
straightforward request to list areas of expertise. I remain unconvinced that
this meaning is well-founded and that it may speak more to a lack of equivalent
communication (concerning intent/desire) happening elsewhere within these
groups. It feels backwards to divine intent or desire when intent is one of the
easiest things to ask directly of an employee. Again, the self assessment part of
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this tool was largely provided as a check on the group feedback. The fact that
this layering of meaning appeared in multiple conversations was interesting
and warrants further study from a managerial perspective.
I think one of the most fascinating findings from this study is that one of the
reported “most favorite” parts of participating in this study was the effortful
thinking about the specific strengths of others. Apparently, people really liked
the process of thinking about the positive aspects of those around them, those
with whom they work. They reported that this process was invigorating and
made them feel good. I would assume that this effect would dissipate if they
did not perceive their feedback was being viewed or read by the subject. I
expect there is significant opportunity in this area for morale and performance
research to contribute further insight.
On a more theoretical level, some confirmation of the effects modeled by the
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh
et al., 2003) was also demonstrated. The model, which incorporates eight
earlier models including Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) (Bandura, 1986), the
Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1986), and an instrument for measur-
ing Adoption of Information Technology Innovation (Moore & Benbasat, 1991)
predicted that anxiety would not be a significant influencer over time. The
results of this study bore that out and suggest, with experience and familiarity,
anxiety does not have a significant effect on intention of technology use. Ad-
ditionally, there was no suggestion from the participants that social influence
had a large role to play on their participation or their sense of obligation to
the study. Venkatesh et al. (2003) explicitly stated that when a technology is
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voluntary in an organization that social influence would not be a significant
factor. This validates my excluding this factor from the survey as this study
was completely voluntary in nature and would presumably be deployed as such
in any workplace environment.
Additionally, Venkatesh et al. (2003) showed that the UTAUT model ex-
plained 70% of the variance of usage intention. The strongest predictor within
the model is Performance Expectancy and this study had the Performance
Expectancy of CAT scoring the lowest. It also was the only scale item to score
below Neutral, suggesting that CAT does not meet a standing demonstrated
need or provide an apparent benefit to the participants at this time.
Coupled with the strong findings regarding Data Quality and Comfort (lack
of anxiety) and strong feedback in the interviews, I feel there is a temporal
aspect to the UTAUT model that might currently be missing. The interviews
suggest a more direct relationship between having confidence in a system and
low anxiety before being able to effectively evaluate things like Performance
Expectancy, Effort Expectancy, and any Facilitating Conditions. I would sug-
gest a more temporal model where comfort and confidence are both necessary
before usefulness can effectively be considered. An alternate interpretation
may suggest that UTAUT already considers comfort and confidence a part of
Performance Expectancy, in that without them, a participant would not expect
a system to have an effect on their relative performance in an organization.
Apart from the specifics of this study, the reputation framework generated
during my comprehensive examination, based on Sabater and Sierra (2005),
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has also proven useful when thinking about CAT and its potential future in-
carnations.
6.2.1 Reputation Framework
The following seven components cover the most interesting and salient features
of most reputation systems.
1. Unit : First, any system must be measuring the reputation of a partic-
ular unit. What this unit is determines much about how the system will
be realized. Some systems are based on people, others on documents,
and others on organizations or the reputation claims themselves.
2. Global/Local : That said, most important, from a design perspective, is
whether the system is calculating a global or localized reputation“score.”
Whatever is being calculated, if it is to be a representation of an object
from the perspective of “the system,” then it must be globally shared and
accessible by the entire system. This is most easily done in a centralized
system where a single codebase or algorithm is both determining a score
and storing it for further access and distribution. A distributed system
is much more complicated to engineer and police, but also, more robust
in the case of failure or infiltration.
3. Algorithmic/Cognitive : A third criterion would be the nature of the
information being stored – whether it is of a deterministic, algorithmic
nature or cognitively generated. This component is important as to
the level of interaction humans must have with the system to run the
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system. As a completely automated, generative algorithm can be run
many times, very quickly, it may be missing the ability to change over
time in the ways that a human-based system may find natural or easy.
4. Recursivity/Transitivity : A fourth component of reputation systems
is their level of recursivity and transitivity. Systems that are global may
integrate some amount of dampening or multiplication within an algo-
rithm when determining reputation scores, but have little with regards
to recursive programming. Distributed systems usually require partici-
pating actors to communicate amongst themselves both their scores and
some additional information regarding “hops” or “TTL” (time to live).
5. Direct/Summary : Some systems take measurements on one type of
item and use those to calculate a score for some other item, as an aggre-
gation or summarization score. Other systems are actually evaluating
the item of record directly. Direct systems are much easier to concep-
tualize and follow algorithmically, but may provide very simple outputs
and less insight into the nature of the thing being evaluated. More com-
plex models are harder to get right, but may convey more meaning when
they produce useful output.
6. Transparency : Transparency is a component that is key to under-
standing a reputation system. The double-edged sword, of course, is
that, with transparency, insights into the ways that calculations are made
comes clarity into how to game the system and provide unfair advantages
to some over others. Transparency is usually evaluated on a spectrum,
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as having full or no transparency is rarely the best option.
7. Reliability/Confidence : Lastly, some amount of internal scoring and
ranking may happen between nodes of a system to help calculate confi-
dence or reliability. If a system can be infiltrated, the individual partic-
ipants must have a way to ignore or punish misbehaving actors or the
system will become completely useless very quickly.
As an illustrative exercise, the mapping in Table 6.1 shows the above frame-
work applied to Slashdot’s Karma system for managing online comments,
Google’s PageRank algorithm for evaluating the relevancy of web pages to
search terms, and BitTorrent’s protocol for handling the behavior of nodes
that comprise the peer-to-peer filesharing network.
Component Slashdot’s Karma Google’s PageR-
ank
BitTorrent
Unit account (person) document peer node
Global/Local a single score for each
account
a single pagerank
score for each docu-
ment
scores are calculated
at the node level and
shared openly
Rational/Cognitive cognitive (human) strictly algorithmic strictly algorithmic
but with knobs
available to node
operator (human)
Recursivity/Transitivity scores are not prop-
agated between ac-
counts
high value docu-
ments propagate
value to their linked
documents
scores are reported
during discovery
Direct/Summary based on comments based on links direct observation
Transparency metamoderators can
see moderation data
and the underlying
code is open
specific code is closed
but the basic algo-
rithm is well known
code is open and
flowing data is com-
pletely visible
Reliability/Confidence confidence based on a
few trusted humans
based largely on re-
sult quality
high confidence
based on visibility
into the data
Table 6.1: Reputation Framework: A mapping of components and systems
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6.3 Lessons Learned and Limitations
The first thing I would like to share here is more of a lesson remembered. I
have always felt that I am a toolbuilder and I am always pleased to share tips
and tools that I use with others (see Appendix 6.5). Very early in the process
of writing this dissertation, I realized I would need a system for writing this
document that did not require me to go back later and reformat or recalculate
anything manually. I probably spent too much time automating and scripting
the tools that I used to generate the tasks, assign the tasks, retrieve the results,
organize and manage the results, and then analyze and display the results. But
with the time spent, I gained confidence in the process and feel that I came to
learn about the data in a more intimate way.
The second lesson learned is related to the difficulty I had in recruiting
participants for this study. My committee warned me that finding organiza-
tions to work for me would be more difficult than I had suggested, and they
were correct. I vastly underestimated the time and effort it took to recruit
and manage ten different groups. Groups declined to participate due to time,
due to a “lack of fit” with their organizational goals, and due to current office
politics and/or morale. In any future work related to this type of group-based
evaluation, I would definitely suggest having a short demonstration available;
a hand-holding exercise for the first round. An example from a previous group
would also suffice (with granted permission, of course). A full case study of
how this type of evaluation helped another similar business would probably be
most helpful for future recruitment efforts.
One of the first limitations of this study is also related to the difficulty
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in recruiting groups of participants. Groups that did respond generate some
level of a self-selection bias which I would guess leans towards friendly, positive,
and well-behaved. There is no good way to ascertain the reasons behind non-
response from potential participants as, naturally, they were not responding
to the initial snowball request for participants. It would be interesting to do
a more in-depth follow-up with a few of the initial individuals that did not
respond at all.
A definite limitation of this current work is the small size of the groups
involved. I was pleased with the overall group sizes (averaging 6.4 participants
per group) but was originally envisioning groups of 8-10 (which would have
provided roughly twice as much data about each participant, i.e., 92 = 81 as-
sessments rather than 62 = 36 assessments). Looking back, it makes sense that
most corporate group sizes are not quite that big. Most feedback suggested
that once a group was 8 or larger, it was broken into two groups of 4 or 5 as
that makes for less overhead and quicker, more agile, decisions and meetings.
As such, this small group size probably had an effect on the sentiments ex-
pressed about the lack of “new” information coming from the tags. It suggests
that, if a group was going to see any significant rates of “learning new informa-
tion,” the group would need to be at least large enough that the participants
did not feel so familiar with their group members. Group members would not
necessarily know enough about everyone to tag everyone, and this would be
by design. Using relatively small groups also limited the study’s ability to pre-
dict how this type of exercise would function in a larger context (at a unit or
company level). I suspect that more “new information” would begin to appear
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one organizational level “up,” where a group of groups participate together to
better learn about those they work “near” but not “with.” I hope to explore
this aspect of CAT in the future.
Another possible limitation is related to the backgrounds of the individual
similarity raters. In both the HumanSim and the TurkSim similarity com-
parisons, the raters were not subject-level experts themselves. This may have
affected their ability to evaluate any possible in-group language usage from
tightly coupled groups with specific or technical areas of expertise. Certainly
the WordNet database did not have good insight into engineering phrases or
particular areas of legal practice. This would suggest that, when non-subject-
area-experts are evaluating this type of data, their evaluations could be biased
towards “more similar” than if subject-area-experts were looking at the lists
and seeing more nuance. I suspect that, with research of this type with larger
groups and more diverse participants, the evaluation problem could shift from
one of “too narrow” to one of “too many different levels of detail” collapsing
into one namespace.
The last limitation, or potential side-effect, concerns the psychology of
participants as they continue working together after participating in this study.
If a set of words becomes associated with a particular person, this could have
some potential for limiting the views of others who come into contact with the
tags out of context. This person may be unfairly pigeonholed in the future, or
left out of certain conversations, since their tags did not reflect their interest
or expertise in a particular area. This is part of a larger pattern of dealing
with a more algorithmically determined environment more generally (Pariser,
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2011). As we continue to depend on the products of algorithms as our inputs
for daily decision-making, we must keep in mind the bigger picture and our
original intentions. If we lose sight of what the data we have represents and
the limitations of how it was gathered and processed, we may begin to measure
and value the wrong things.
6.4 Future Work
In addition to some of the work mentioned above in the limitations section,
this study begs for more detail to be provided across different contexts and
different algorithms.
First, the limits of running this study on only 64 participants are paramount.
Second, these participants were in a limited physical region of the United States
and expanding the scope of this work would provide significantly stronger ev-
idence for a group’s ability to assess and provide credentials for its members.
In addition, it could provide further opportunities to assess group dynamics
in other parts of the country, in specific fields or industries, or with groups
of differing sizes. Other variables ripe for study include whether the tags are
attributed (anonymity, pseudonymity, etc.), whether the participants are al-
lowed to pre-approve the publication of their group-awarded tags (potential
whitewashing/grooming), and different types of groups. Additional types of
groups, besides corporate, could be family groups, hobby groups, neighbor-
hoods, social groups, professional affiliations, and just friends. Each of these
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would provide rich fodder for further sociological, organizational communica-
tion, identity formation, reputation, and interpersonal research.
I would also like to see this type of timestamped tagging analysis done over
a longer period of time. The strongest negative response was to the repeti-
tive nature of the study design and the feeling that the participants had to
do the same thing over and over again with little return for their efforts after
the second and third rounds. This fits with the Delphi Study literature and
was not a surprise. However, I think this represents a simple first “discovery”
phase which would be followed by other, longer, slower to develop phases if the
analysis was continued. This would require a more continuous system without
the forced iterations that made some participants feel tardy and guilty for not
responding as fast as their group members. If a continuously updated and cur-
rent system was available through a company’s personnel database or directory
service, regular additions to the tags could automatically percolate to other
systems or reports. If this type of assessment were part of regular performance
or job evaluations it could prove cheaper and more efficient than capturing the
same information in other ways. A longer-term analysis of expertise data may
also afford reporting where company-wide aggregate arcs of knowledge could
be mapped and trends could be discovered. As mentioned before, once some-
thing can be counted, it can also be graphed over time, modeled, and perhaps
even predicted.
Additionally, my human similarity raters brought to my attention their
troubles considering differing lengths of lists. I had not considered how two
lists, when one is a complete superset of the other, might be interpreted. It
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turns out this is a very subjective question to answer (”How similar are these?”)
and may depend on a variety of interesting factors.
More specifically, what does it mean when the group shares information
that is continually not reflected back by the individual? Are they ignoring the
signals from the group? Are they trying to downplay a certain skill set? Is it
old? Is it passe´? Are they embarrassed?
And what of an individual that is continually suggesting they know more
than is being reflected back? Is that persistent gap a demonstration of un-
tapped expertise? Or is it a call for attention? Perhaps it is boastful arrogance
that is correctly being ignored by the rest of the group? Learning more about
what is happening when there is a Self/Group imbalance seems a rich area for
continued research.
There is also a large potential for reducing the cold-start issue when cre-
ating tagging databases. There is probably a good way to import data (tags)
from other data sources to jump-start good discussion and participation. A
good data source (or word bank) would be scoped in the desired direction (pro-
fessional, off-work, medical, etc.) and could have huge effects on how quickly
and effectively an organization took to using a tool like CAT. A few exemplars
of “model” behavior can go a long way in establishing the culture around any
new practice or tool.
As the corollary to better data coming out, a better way to get tags into the
system may significantly affect uptake or enthusiasm about a tool like CAT.
If tags could be entered via voice capture, copy and paste, or even as a result
of some game dynamics, this could lead in interesting directions.
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One of the most significant areas of improvement could be found in the
automatic algorithm used to determine similarity scores themselves. The
Mihalcea et al. (2006) algorithm used here was limited to a bag-of-words anal-
ysis and did not have any outside knowledge or context for the words being
thrown at it to process. A topical dictionary could be used to retain more
words (and even decipher acronyms) for participation in the algorithm. Stem-
ming could be used to compress plurals and other words with similar roots.
A clustering algorithm could be used to generate an additional parameter for
the similarity calculation.
A much more grand vision for this work is to deploy at web-scale a backchan-
nel for expertise tags to be attributable to web-wide identifiers. This datastore
would create a marketplace for different inputs (from web pages, re´sume´s, jour-
nal articles, source code, credentials, etc.). It would also create a marketplace
for filters and provide some ammunition in the fight against what Clay Shirky
has called “Filter Failure” (Shirky, 2008b). Additionally, if authority tagging
is successful at a large scale, filtering the quality tags (and quality taggers)
from the noise quickly presents itself as a new problem to be addressed. This
would in turn create a marketplace for knowledge about the filterers.
As we each need to make explicit value judgments about what information
sources we believe have credibility, we would begin to choose certain providers
over others. We would make these decisions based on theory, convenience,
experience, and recommendation. It quickly becomes a recursive reputation
problem – one we have seen before. How does one know whom to trust to help
one determine whom to trust? The selection of a filter would mean as much
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to this type of an ecosystem as the selection of a particular expert. Having a
transparent infrastructure that was able to support this level of determination
and record-keeping for those who wish to share and benefit from the collective
activity could provide a robust capability to filter the noise from a vast sea of
opinions.
If this vision is to come to pass, much work will need to be done in bridg-
ing the small corporate groups studied here to a global network of loosely-
connected individuals trying to perform the same task of tagging each others’
areas of expertise. However, my hunch is that by combining what we have
learned about Networks (Baraba´si, 2002), Small World Theory (Milgram, 1967;
Watts & Strogatz, 1998), and The Strength of Weak Ties (Granovetter, 1973),
it can be shown that the same effects are possible at web-scale.
6.5 Conclusion
This research into Contextual Authority Tagging needed to be centered in
theory and found its home in the corporate knowledge management literature
as well as network science, reputation and identity, and classification theory.
The intersection of these areas suggest a tightly coupled meritocracy where
transparency and trust are possible and expertise can be rewarded.
We now live in an ever-shrinking world of always-on connectivity and pow-
erful communication devices. Since these devices are two-way, they provide
a voice (and a distribution platform) to millions who, prior, have never had
a voice. This is a remarkable achievement and serves as a testament to the
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incredible advance of technology and our collective striving for equality with re-
gards to opinions and freedom of speech. However, with monumental increases
in the number of voices and opinions being shared, we demand a requisite in-
crease in the power of tools to help us filter all this newfound information. We
need good knobs to help us determine where to direct our always-limited and
increasingly precious amount of attention.
The freedom to listen to anyone has to be balanced with the practicality of
not being able to listen to everyone. We need tools that help us serve both of
these needs, albeit not at the same time. The tools need to be flexible enough
to let us listen to whomever, whenever and wherever we want, and to reserve
the right to change our minds at a later time.
Finding good sources of information is hard. Knowing whom to listen to
when the subject matter is beyond one’s personal experience is a daunting and
important problem, but one that can be reduced to an engineering problem
with the right approach.
By showing that a group’s opinion can be quantified, validated, and trusted,
I feel Contextual Authority Tagging has taken the first small, but foundational
step towards a future with a functional ecosystem of marketplaces for exper-
tise inputs, filters, and brokers. This, in turn, may help us make sense of a
democratic world where everyone has a voice.
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Appendix A: Colophon
Over the years I spent on this work, I developed some strong opinions about
the software and platforms I was using along the way. The unix philosophy of
having a set of singular tools that each do one thing well guided my hand and
I found the following tools most effective.
The Contextual Authority Tagging software was written in PHP and MySQL.
The similarity tools used to process the data were written in PHP, Perl, and
bash. Images and statistics were produced with R and OpenOffice. Survey
data was captured using Qualtrics, licensed through UNC-Chapel Hill’s Odum
Institute.
This LATEX document was written and managed in TextMate on Mac OS
X. The references were saved in BibTEX format and managed with BibDesk.
The statistics are included with Sweave and generated from the accompanying
raw data files. The resulting PDFs were viewed in Skim.
The entire process (text, statistics, scripts, data, notes) was saved along
the way in Subversion.
Clearly, I owe a debt of gratitude to the vast array of open source software
that made this project possible.
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